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Dedication 
 
Throughout my twenty-some-odd years of schooling (including eleven arduous and 
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I am truly one of the luckiest people in the world. I have the most amazing support 
network of family, friends, and mentors. I don’t know where to begin and even 
though I can finally write without fear of reprisal, I find myself at a loss of words 
(shocking, isn’t it?). I am truly blessed. Each of you must know that the words on this 
page cannot possibly do you justice. What you mean to me transcends words. I’ll do 
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This dissertation is dedicated to seven amazing people whom I cherish more than you 
will ever know. In loving memory of my grandfather (Poppa) and to my wonderful 
grandmother (Nana), for providing financial and emotional support throughout my 
cherished life. I know that my grandfather is looking down from heaven above and he 
is proud of me and all I have accomplished. When I was born, my grandparents 
established an educational trust fund so that my brothers and I would be able to 
pursue our educational endeavors unencumbered my financial woes. As educators, 
they recognized the priceless value of education. I doubt I would have pursued my 
doctorate had they not unselfishly provided the means for me to obtain my degree. I 
have the deepest gratitude for their boundless kindness, generosity, and love.  
 
To my father, my dad. I will always be your little girl. You have no idea how much I 
admire you and respect you. Whenever I didn’t know the answer to something (which 
was quite often) I would always say to myself or whomever was involved in the 
conversation, “I’ll call my dad, he’ll know the answer”. Whether it was a mundane 
question such as “how do I fix my toilet” or “what’s the distance between Tampa and 
Phoenix” or more important life questions such as “should I abandon my academic 
pursuits to play women’s professional football” or “why are you a Republican”, my 
amazingly intelligent Dad always has the answer and a brilliant one at that. My dad 
has also provided me with the financial means to live comfortably throughout my 
college years. I am truly grateful. Several of my friends have received monetary 
support from their parents as well but they often complained that the support came 
with strings attached. I have never felt burdened or pressured by my father. His 
support has been given freely and he never made me feel as if I owed him anything. 
Dad, I love you more than words can say. 
 
To my mother, my friend, my genetic twin. I am proud to be your daughter and I 
cherish our similarities and even our differences (the few). Even when it seemed as if 
our close relationship was disintegrating at times, we both had the faith and patience 
to listen to one another and to learn from one another. I believe that the mother-
daughter bond is one of the most precious and one of the most precarious 
relationships in life. You have always been an inspiration to me. I champion the 
downtrodden because you taught me to help those less fortunate than us. You have 
unselfishly given your time and energy to the dying, the homeless, the depressed, and 
the uneducated (dare I say, ignorant). You have always listened to me and supported 
me, even if you didn’t always agree with me. You have loved me unconditionally and 
have enriched my life in more ways than I can express. I love you, Mom. 
 
To Danielle, my long-distance partner in crime. Our friendship means the world to 
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achievements. We may go about things differently but ultimately we see injustice in 
the world and have decided that we will be the ones to make a difference. I do not 
believe you give yourself enough credit for being a wonderfully beautiful woman and 
friend. Danielle, I love you dearly and cannot wait to share our successes together.  
 
To Mike, my mentor and major professor. I have always had amazing female role 
models in my life but very few men have truly inspired me. In fact, I can only think of 
two and the other one is my father. I don’t think you realize the impact you have had 
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conversation, with each paper comment, I realized that I was in the presence of a 
brilliant man. I am in awe of your knowledge and expertise. Your achievements are 
remarkable. Your guidance throughout my MA and Ph.D. has been invaluable. I 
consider myself lucky to have known you and to have learned from you. You have 
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All the News That’s Fit to Print?  
Media Reporting of Environmental Protection Agency Penalties  
Assessed Against the Petroleum Refining Industry, 1997-2003 
 
 
Melissa L. Jarrell 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Although examination of the relationship between the media and crime has 
received considerable attention in the academic literature, only a few studies have 
examined news media coverage of environmental crimes. The present study examines 
print news media coverage of federal penalties assessed against the petroleum refining 
industry from 1997 to 2003. The Environmental Protection Agency initiated and/or 
settled 162 cases involving seventy-eight petroleum refining companies from 1997 to 
2003. While a news search of the nation’s twenty-five largest newspapers produced 
seventy-four articles related to petroleum refining industry violations, only seventeen 
articles matched the EPA cases analyzed in the present study. The present study found 
that while there is a considerable amount of federal petroleum refining industry 
violations, only a few cases receive media attention. The greatest factor leading to 
news media coverage of petroleum refining industry violations is the penalty and 
compliance amount assessed by the EPA. Companies assessed the highest penalties 
appeared in news media articles, however, only the top seven penalty assessments 
received news coverage. Overall, the lack of news media coverage of petroleum 
 ix
industry violations suggests that this type of crime is considered less important despite 
the vast amount of harm to the environment and human health produced by petroleum 
refining industry violations. Lack of attention by the news media to these important 
issues may lead to public misunderstanding and ignorance to the causes and 
consequences of environmental crime.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 Since the 1970s, the word “environmentalism” has become a household 
term.  The emphasis on conservation and preservation of our environment and natural 
resources, the passage of major environmental legislation, and the annual celebration of 
Earth Day have all had a positive impact on the environment and subsequently, human 
health.  However, most publicly touted environmental efforts have been aimed at 
changing the behaviors of individual consumers.  For example, Americans have been told 
to use less water, plant a tree, ride their bicycles, and recycle endlessly.  While these 
individual efforts are helpful, in reality, the largest sources of environmental harm and 
pollution are multi-national corporations.  Environmental crime is rarely depicted as 
“crime” despite the fact that many researchers suggest that environmental crime causes 
more illness, injury, and death than street crime (Burns and Lynch, 2004; Albanese and 
Pursley, 1993).  According to Burns and Lynch (2004: ix), “we estimate that each year in 
the United States, up to ten times as many people die from environmental crimes, such as 
exposure to toxins in the workplace, home, and school, as die by homicide.” 
 Despite overwhelming evidence that environmental crime is responsible for a 
great deal of harm to the environment and human health, the vast majority of the public is 
unaware or ignorant to this type of crime.  One reason for this ignorance or lack of 
understanding has to do with media coverage of environmental crime.  While only a few 
studies have examined media coverage of environmental crime, results indicate that the 
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media either underreports environmental crime or frames such crimes as “accidents”. 
Given the importance of the media in creating public awareness and garnering attention 
for certain social problems, it is essential for researchers to examine media coverage of 
environmental crimes.  
 There is no single type of “environmental crime”; consequently, research focusing 
on environmental crime must selectively examine a more narrow range or particular type 
of environmental offense and offender.  The present study examines one of the most 
polluting industries in the United States: the petroleum refining industry.  Studies 
examining media coverage of petroleum refining industry violations are virtually 
nonexistent. Randall and DeFillippi (1987) offer one of the first and only studies of 
media coverage of oil company misconduct.  For the most part though, their study is 
descriptive and offers little insight into what factors, other than perceived seriousness of 
the offense, result in greater media coverage.  Furthermore, their data is drawn from oil 
industry and news source information from the late 1970s, over 25 years ago.  In the past 
twenty-five years, there has been almost no academic inquiry into media coverage of the 
petroleum industry or on coverage of industry violations. 
 The purpose of the present study is three-fold: (1) to determine the nature 
and distribution of petroleum refining industry violations; (2) to examine media coverage 
of petroleum refining industry violations and enforcement actions and determine whether 
media reporting is influenced by any specific case characteristics; and (3) to determine 
the impact of legal and extra-legal factors on fine amounts meted out to petroleum 
refineries found guilty of violating environmental protection statutes.  In order to 
accomplish these goals, data on media coverage of petroleum refinery violations, 
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petroleum refinery violations, and community characteristics of areas where violative 
petroleum refineries were located were collected.   News articles from twenty-five 
leading American newspapers were employed as the source for media reporting data. 
Data on petroleum refinery violations and area characteristics were collected from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Descriptive statistics, content analysis and 
multiple regression were utilized to analyze the data.  
The present study contributes to the criminological literature on environmental 
crime and justice and the literature pertaining to media representations of crime.  Chapter 
One provides an overview of environmentalism in the United States; describes the nature 
and impact of environmental crime; explores the causes and consequences of 
environmental crime and injustice in terms of environmental and human impacts; 
presents federal environmental legislation and enforcement efforts with a discussion of 
the various problems associated with legislation and enforcement, and highlights 
corporate and political responses to environmental crime and legislation.  This chapter 
also presents an overview of studies of environmental crime within the criminological 
literature. 
Chapter Two presents a historical overview of mass communication in the United 
States; explores the major differences between the mainstream mass media and 
alternative media sources, discusses the factors influencing media information; and 
highlights the political and social impact of mainstream mass media exposure.  
Chapter Three presents a thorough overview of the literature concerning the mass 
media and street crime; discusses the limited media attention given to corporate crime; 
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describes media reporting on the environment and environmental crime; and highlights 
the problems associated with media reporting of environmental risk, harm, and crime.  
Chapter Four describes the current status of the petroleum refining industry; 
emphasizes the environmental and human health hazards associated with the industry; 
discusses the industry’s environmental compliance history; and presents the literature 
related to petroleum refining industry violations.  
Chapter Five describes the data and methods of the present analysis, followed by 
a presentation of the results in Chapter Six.  A discussion of the results is presented in 
Chapter Seven and the conclusions and recommendations for future research are 
discussed in Chapter Eight.  
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Chapter One 
 
Environmental Crime 
 
 
Introduction 
Environmental crime is considered to be one type of white-collar or corporate 
crime (Burns and Lynch, 2004).  The government, the media, and the public rarely 
conceptualize environmental harm and injustice as “crime” despite overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary.  Chapter One provides an overview of environmentalism in the 
United States; describes the nature and impact of environmental crime; explores the 
causes and consequences of environmental crime and injustice in terms of environmental 
and human impacts; presents federal environmental legislation and enforcement efforts 
with a discussion of the various problems associated with legislation and enforcement, 
and highlights corporate and political responses to environmental crime and legislation. 
This chapter also presents an overview of studies of environmental crime within the 
criminological literature. 
Environmentalism in the United States 
A majority of the American public, if asked about the roots of environmentalism, 
would likely recall the 1970s and the back-to-basics mentality of the “hippies”.  They 
may even remember the first celebration of Earth Day.  While the large-scale 
environmental movement may indeed be rooted in the 1960s and 1970s, environmental 
awareness and resource conservation have been hot topics throughout American history. 
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In order to understand current environmental legislation, debates, and controversies, it is 
critical to understand what has led us to where we our today.  
 Although heightened concerns for environmental crime and justice are relatively 
recent, public and political concern for the environment is not a new phenomenon.  At 
times throughout our nation’s history, environmental issues have received a great deal of 
attention publicly and politically, while at other points in history, our nation has focused 
its attention on arguably more pressing issues including national security, economic 
development, and the like.  
 Waves of Concern 
According to Taylor (2000), environmentalism in the nineteenth century was 
characterized by the “exploitative capitalist paradigm”.  Environmental destruction was 
considered to be “the inevitable by-product of growth, consumption, and industrial 
advancement” (Taylor, 2000: 529).  However, toward the turn of the twentieth century, 
environmentalists cautioned that with rapid urbanization and industrialization, our nation 
must focus on preserving nature and protecting species for the enjoyment of later 
generations.  For the most part, environmental concern focused on conservation and 
protection of natural spaces.  Leaders of the “romantic environmental paradigm”, 
including Rosseau, Muir, Marsh, and others, challenged people to protect the wilderness 
and live harmoniously with nature (Taylor, 2000).   
During the 1960s, however, environmental problems affecting human health were 
becoming increasingly apparent.  Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring (1962) highlighted 
industrial and government practices with respect to the use of pesticides and other 
chemicals.  Citizen groups grew in number and fought for more governmental 
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involvement in the regulation of environmental hazards.  The “new environmental 
movement” evolved from the social fervor of the 1960s (Taylor, 2000) and involved 
legal-scientific groups and the creation of the Natural Resources Defense Fund (NRDC), 
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (SCLDF), and the Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF) (Cole, 1992).  In early 1970, Congress authorized the creation of a federal agency 
to oversee federal anti-pollution efforts and administer regulatory and environmental 
protection legislation; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  
Although the “new environmental movement” (Taylor, 2000) can be credited with 
aiding in the creation and implementation of federal environmental legislation aimed at 
preserving nature and regulating pollution, their efforts were not intended to achieve 
equitable justice.  The “new environmental movement”, comprised mainly of college-
educated, white, middle class activists and legal scholars with a growing enthusiasm for 
outdoor recreation, was more concerned with resource conservation than with human 
environmental hazards and more inclined to strive for small systematic changes rather 
than radical political and social changes.  The “environmental justice paradigm” (Taylor, 
2000) involves activists who are most directly affected and more severely affected by 
environmental problems (Cole, 1992).  Mainstream or “new” environmentalists are 
primarily concerned with aesthetic and recreational considerations; are overwhelmingly 
white and middle class, use litigation for problem solving; and typically pinpoint a single 
bad actor as the cause of an environmental problem.  In contrast, grassroots activists are 
often fighting for health and home; are primarily poor and working class people of color; 
often have a greater distrust of the law and more experience with non-legal strategies; 
they adopt a social justice orientation that calls for structural level changes so as to 
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address the deeper problems of poverty, crime, unemployment, and environmental 
destruction.  
“People living in or near industrial communities know that law-
abiding and law-breaking corporations differ in degree only; both put 
pollutants out the smokestack, and both thus poison nearby communities. 
In contrast to the bad actor model, which seeks to identify and punish 
individual bad actors, the institutional model identifies individual polluters 
not as explanations themselves’ but merely as part of an overall system of 
maximizing profit” (Cole, 1992: 25).  
 
 While mainstream environmentalists view pollution as the failure of government 
and industry to clean up the mess of a few violators, grassroots activists see pollution as 
the success of industry in maximizing profits by externalizing environmental costs (Cole, 
1992).  Similar to deeming unemployment as the failure of the individual rather than our 
economic system, many regard environmental crime as the result of a few corrupt 
individuals rather than the result of our capitalist economy (Mayo and Hollander, 1991). 
What is Environmental Crime and Injustice? 
Most definitions of environmental crime consider such crime to cover acts or 
omissions that violate federal, state, or local environmental standards and laws (National 
White Collar Crime Center, 2004; Situ and Emmons, 2000).  Some acts, especially those 
committed by corporations, may not violate the criminal law.  Many are violations of 
regulatory laws (Burns and Lynch, 2004).  Many of these acts cause a great deal of harm 
to the environment and human health and safety and therefore should be treated as 
criminal (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Frank and Lynch, 1992; Lynch, 1990; Reiman, 
1998).  
Environmental crime typically affects many victims and the victimization may be 
gradual and/or silent (Frank and Lynch, 1992).  The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
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(2003) focuses its attention on the most serious threats to public health and natural 
resources such as cases involving handling of hazardous waste and pollutants that may 
endanger workers, environmental catastrophes that place entire communities at risk, 
federal government facility violations, businesses identified by regulatory agencies as 
having a long history of violations or flagrant disregard for environmental laws and 
organized crime activities generally in the solid waste industry.  
A number of studies in disciplines outside of criminology have examined 
victimization distributions by examining exposure to toxic hazards in relation to 
community characteristics.  For example, it has been shown that minority or low-income 
communities are disproportionately affected by environmental hazards (Bullard, 1983; 
Lavelle and Coyle, 1992; Mohai and Bryant, 1992; United Church of Christ, 1987; U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 1983).  The majority of these studies fall within an area of 
research identified as “environmental justice.”  Environmental justice advocates argue 
that no person, regardless of race, class, or gender, should suffer the consequences of 
environmental degradation and therefore substantial political, social, and economic 
efforts should be made to protect the environment and human health. 
 Conceptualization of Environmental Crime and Injustice 
 Environmental crime often goes unnoticed and people are somewhat apathetic to 
the problems caused by environmental crime.  For the most part, the apathetic response to 
environmental crime is a direct result of public unawareness of the real dangers to health 
and safety posed by this type of criminal behavior.  Most environmental hazards 
commanding political, public, and media attention have been those hazards that can be 
easily “pinpointed” at particular places and locations and where cause and effect could be 
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closely linked (Mayo and Hollander, 1991).  “Some hazards remain hidden or unattended 
because they lie embedded in a societal web of values and assumptions that either 
denigrates the consequences or deems them acceptable, elevates associated benefits, and 
idealizes certain notions, or beliefs” (Mayo and Hollander, 1991: 12).  
 Causes of Environmental Crime and Injustice 
Environmental crimes are usually committed for economic reasons and more 
often than not, corporations place the value of money over public health.  
Criminal pollution is an economic crime committed to escape costs of dealing with things 
properly.  “If compliance expenses are costly, and the chances of being caught are 
minimal, a strong incentive to pollute exists. Especially, if they can be reasonably sure 
that the penalty that will be imposed will be a monetary one in the way of the fine” 
(Albanese and Pursley 1993: 317).  In order to be a deterrent, the penalties must outweigh 
the crime.  Fines are related to the offense, not the offender so often small companies pay 
too much and super-rich corporations a drop in the bucket (Wilson, 1986). 
Environmental crime and environmental injustice then are a result of industry and 
corporate decisions to maximize profits and externalize costs.  In addition, environmental 
injustice and environmental racism are a result of the political and economic processes 
that exist at all levels of government.  State governments must balance economic 
development and community interests in health and safety.  These decisions are often 
influenced by corporate donations.  On the federal level, members of Congress as well as 
Presidential candidates are courted by industry and given massive campaign contributions 
in order to affect legislative issues (Pope, 2004).  Often, economic and political decisions 
at the state and federal level benefit industry or a segment of the community at the 
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expense of others in the community.  “Grassroots activists, whose homes are being 
contaminated or who want to prevent a chemical plant from locating next to them, . . 
.they ask for help from federal agencies, like the EPA. The EPA, which is under intensive 
pressure from legislators who are in support of wealthy national and transnational 
corporations, is caught in the middle of a contentious political fight” (Roberts and 
Toffolon-Weiss, 2001:76).  Environmental crime and injustice then, is the result of 
corporate and political decision-making that appears to benefit a few at a substantial cost 
to many. 
Impact of Environmental Crime and Injustice 
The devastating effects of environmental crime are not easy to determine or 
estimate.  Although we gather and report a wide range of statistics of street and violent 
crime at the national, state, and local level, there are virtually no uniform or national 
statistics describing the status and impact of environmental crimes. There is a continuing 
debate over the consequences and extent of environmental pollution and serious 
questions over the impact of enforcement on the nation’s competitiveness in 
global/domestic markets.  The cost of environmental toxic abatement and clean up is 
often more than the government is willing to spend.  Researchers suggest that 
environmental crime causes more illness, injury, and death than street crime (Burns and 
Lynch, 2004; Albanese and Pursley, 1993).  According to Burns and Lynch (2004: ix), 
“we estimate that each year in the United States, up to ten times as many people die from 
environmental crimes, such as exposure to toxins in the workplace, home, and school, as 
die by homicide.” 
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Particular problems are presented by the research produced by “corporate” 
scientists (Lynch and Stretesky, 2001).  Despite the abundance of toxic chemicals 
everywhere, it is difficult to establish a direct causal link between adverse health effects 
and chemical contamination (Adeola, 2000).  “Establishing the time, space, and non-
spurious causality of ailments of individuals due to their exposure to toxic chemicals has 
been the pivotal issue in numerous cases” (Adeola, 2000: 6).  Affected communities 
strongly believe that their symptoms are not taken seriously and are blamed on unhealthy 
lifestyles.  Evidence to support residents’ claims is even more difficult to obtain because 
there is a lack of sufficient baseline data on their health prior to the arrival of industry. 
Health assessments are extremely expensive and time-consuming and not without 
methodological flaws.  Yet, as Bryant (1995: 9) notes “Although we may not be able to 
prove causality due to confounding variables such as smoking, diet, indoor pollution, and 
synergistic and repeated effects of multiple exposures, this does not mean that cause and 
effect does not exist; it may mean only that we failed to prove it”.  Bryant summarized 
the problem as follows: “When the burden of proof is on the community to demonstrate 
certainty, policy makers often want to hold them to the rigors of traditional research. Yet, 
when policy makers initiate siting and remediation decisions, they often fail to apply that 
same level of rigor for certainty as they do for community groups” (Bryant, 1995: 14).    
 Environmental Impact  
 Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, 200 billion tons of carbon 
dioxide have been added to the atmosphere (Owen, 1975).  Nearly 70,000 chemical 
products have been introduced since World War II and 1,500 are added each year.  The 
total U.S. production of chemicals amounts to over 300 million tons annually (Goldman, 
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1991).  The Environmental Protection Agency has identified over 700 substances as 
hazardous to the environment.  Over 2 billion pounds of toxic chemicals are released into 
the environment legally each year (Gray, 1998).  According to the EPA, of the 100 billion 
tons of hazardous waste produced each year in the U.S., 90% is disposed of in an 
environmentally unsafe manner (Humphries, 1990).  The U.S. Department of the Interior 
and Commerce have identified more than 1,500 species of wildlife as threatened or 
endangered. In 1995, 46 contaminants, from dioxin to chlordane, were found in fish.  The 
number of lakes, rivers, and other U.S. waterways where consumers have been advised to 
avoid or limit consumption of trout, salmon, or other species because of chemical 
contamination rose from 1,278 in 1993 to 1,740 in 1995 (Council on Environmental 
Quality, 1995).  
 Human Impact  
Each year in the United States, environmental pollutants and hazards are 
responsible for thousands of illnesses, injuries, and deaths.  An estimated 40 million 
people, one-sixth of the U.S. population, live in close proximity to one or more hazardous 
waste sites (Cope 2002).  Day (1989) argues that polluted water is the single greatest 
cause of human illness and death through disease.  In 1995, over 40 million Americans 
were served by drinking water systems with lead levels exceeding the regulatory action 
level (Nadakavukaren, 1995).  The EPA states that as many as 30,000 waste sites may 
pose significant health problems related to water contamination (Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, 1980).  More than half the U.S. population lives in counties that 
violate the Clean Air Act (DeLuca, 1999).  Approximately 53,000 people each year die 
prematurely from lung ailments as the result of air pollution (Situ and Emmons, 2000). 
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Furthermore, Nelkin and Brown (1984) suggest that air pollution kills about 100,000 
workers each year and results in 400,000 cases of disease.  Cancer death rates are highest 
in areas close to petrochemical plants, steel mills, and metal refineries (Berry, 1988; 
Whelan, 1985).  According to a 1999 Committee on Heath Risks of Exposure to Radon, 
radon in homes in the United States accounts for 15,400 to 21,800 lung cancer deaths 
each year; 10% of the total deaths attributed to lung cancer each year (Goldstein and 
Goldstein, 2002).  In 1993, over 40% of the Hispanic population and over 35% of the 
Asian/Pacific population were exposed to poor air quality (Council on Environmental 
Quality, 1995).  Three out of every five African-Americans live in communities with 
uncontrolled waste sites (United Church of Christ, 1987).  
Residents who believe their health is directly affected by environmental 
degradation are faced with numerous personal challenges.  Not only must residents deal 
with the health consequences of pollution, they also are subjected to numerous emotional 
and economic maladies.  Their homes lose value, they worry about cancer, and they are 
concerned about losing jobs in the very industry that pollutes them.  Fighting for justice 
creates even more hardships.  When community residents complain about pollution, 
experts are called in to determine if a problem exists and whether or not is it directly 
caused by the polluting company.  From the perspective of the common citizen, scientific 
findings are often extremely technical and difficult to comprehend.  “Taking the struggle 
for environmental justice out of the community and into the domain of scientists plays 
into the domain of risk producers because they have resources and access to scientists” 
(Kuehn, 1996).  For example, in Mossville, Louisiana, residents living near a large 
chemical plant were found to have abnormally high levels of dioxin in their blood. 
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Experts were called in to ascertain the cause of the abnormalities, while community 
leaders expressed frustration at being unable to understand the technical reports.  One 
activist sent the following e-mail: 
 “I, as an average citizen, do not know what half the words. . .from your e-
mail means. I do know that many people in Mossville are ill. I personally 
invite you to come to Mossville, meet the people, and discuss it with those 
who are affected. Then, perhaps you could go back and find a way to help 
us instead of playing with words. We are sick. We need help.” (Roberts 
and Toffolon-Weiss, 2001: 19). 
Overall, environmental crime and injustice are responsible for a great deal of 
harm to the environment and human health.  Although concern for the environment isn’t 
a new phenomenon, the growth of urbanization and industrialization has increasingly put 
environmental issues at the forefront of public concern.  
Environmental Legislation 
The federal government did not enter the field of environmental law until 1890 
mainly because political leaders were concerned over their constitutional authority to 
develop and regulate natural resources (Campbell-Mohn, Breen, and Futrell, 1993).  In 
1890, Congress established the Rivers and Harbors Act but true federalization of 
environmental law really took effect about 25 years ago in conjunction with the nation’s 
first Earth Day on April 22, 1970.  In July 1970, President Nixon created the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  A great deal of environmental legislation was passed 
during the 1970s (see Table 1) including: the National Environmental Policy Act (1969), 
the Clean Air Act (1970), Clean Water Act (1972), Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (1972), Endangered Species Act (1973), Safe Drinking Water Act 
(1974), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976), the Toxic Substance Control 
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Act (1976) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (1980).  Today, environmental law encompasses a broad range of federal, 
state, and local statutes, regulations, and case law relating to the prevention and clean-up 
of contamination of the environment by chemicals, hazardous waste, and other pollutants. 
Table 1: Major Federal Environmental Legislation Enacted During the 1970s 
National Environmental Policy Act (1969) Enacted to establish a national policy for the environment 
and provide for the establishment of a Council on 
Environmental Quality. 
Clean Air Act (1970) Enacted to prevent the deterioration of air quality through 
controlling emissions of pollutants from sources that cause or 
contribute to air pollution or endanger human health. 
Clean Water Act (1972) Enacted to restore and maintain the integrity of the Nation’s 
waters and to regulate the sources of water pollution. 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (1972) 
Enacted for federal control of pesticide distribution, sale, and 
use in the U.S., for the study of the consequences of use, and 
to require users to register when purchasing pesticides. 
Endangered Species Act (1973) Enacted to encourage the development and maintenance of 
conservation programs to safeguard endangered and 
threatened species. 
Safe Drinking Water Act (1974) Enacted to protect drinking water in the U.S., establish safe 
standards of purity, and require all owners and operators of 
public water systems to comply with primary standards. 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(1976) 
Enacted to protect human health and the environment from 
the dangers associated with waste management and disposal; 
to encourage the conservation and recovery of natural 
resources through reuse, recycling, and waste minimization. 
Toxic Substances Control Act (1976) Enacted to regulate chemical substances to which the public 
or environment may become exposed. 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (1980) 
Enacted to address problems associated with abandoned 
hazardous waste sites and clean-up of these sites. 
 
  
 Problems with Environmental Law 
 Attorneys engaged in environmental law and academics in environmental studies 
often agree that our environmental legislation is extremely complex and often vague 
(Lavelle, 1993).  For example, the EPA has received so many queries about the meaning 
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, it set up a special hotline for RCRA 
questions.  In a National Law Journal survey of 200 corporate environmental attorneys, 
over fifty percent stated that most of their time and energy was spent trying to determine 
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whether or not their companies were complying with the law (Lavelle, 1993).  The lack 
of legislative clarity and complexity has led to a great deal of inconsistent enforcement of 
such laws.  
 Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
 Except for a few highly sensational cases, the criminal prosecution of 
environmental violations at the federal and state level is a relatively recent development 
(Edwards et al, 1996).  In 1981, the EPA created the Office of Environmental 
Enforcement and the Department of Justice established an Environmental Crimes Unit. 
Prior to 1982, only 25 environmental crimes were prosecuted by the federal government 
(Campbell et al, 1993).  Since 1982, the federal government has secured over 1,400 
criminal indictments and over 1,000 convictions for violations of environmental law. 
Since 1974, the courts have assessed over $3 billion in civil and judicial penalties and 
over $290 million in criminal penalties (Reske, 1992).  According to the FBI (2003), at 
any given time the organization is involved in the prosecution of about 450 
environmental crimes cases in conjunction with other federal agencies, in particular the 
EPA.  Over fifty percent of the 450 FBI environmental crimes cases involve violations of 
the Clean Water Act (FBI, 2003).  The FBI generally focuses attention to environmental 
crimes only when the cases are very serious and involve immediate threats to public 
health and natural resources (FBI, 2003).  
 In 1997, U.S. attorneys initiated criminal investigations against 952 individuals or 
organizations involved in violations of environmental law (BJS, 1999).  Approximately 
one quarter of the suspects were identified as organizations.  In 1997, 446 defendants 
were charged with criminal environmental violation (47% for the unlawful emission of a 
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hazardous substance or other pollutant and 53% for a wildlife violation).  Approximately 
one quarter of those convicted for environmental law violations were sentenced to prison 
with an average sentence length of 21.5 months (BJS, 1999).  Sixty-four percent of those 
convicted were order to pay a fine and the average fine imposed was $67,416.  In that 
same year, the Federal government filed 207 civil cases involving the violation of 
environmental laws. Seventy-three percent of these cases ended with a settlement (27%) 
or a consent agreement (46%) (BJS, 1999).  Although federal and state enforcement 
efforts targeting environmental crime have increased in recent years, only a small 
percentage of criminal enforcement efforts are aimed at environmental crime. 
 Problems with Environmental Enforcement 
According to Albanese and Pursley (1993), one of the main problems with 
environmental regulation and enforcement is the fragmented nature of authority.  No 
singular agency is responsible for regulation and enforcement of our federal 
environmental laws.  The Environmental Protection Agency, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Association, Department of Energy and the 
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry are just some of the many agencies 
that deal with regulation and enforcement of laws concerning the environment.  On the 
state level, there are several different approaches to dealing with environmental law 
violations which are all a great deal more complex than dealing with conventional crime. 
Although state and local prosecutors are given the authority to enforce these laws, they 
have rarely focused on such violations, due in large part to the overwhelming and 
complex nature of environmental crime and the public and media focus on conventional 
crime.  
 19
Despite the creation and implementation of new and amended laws to address 
environmental hazards, it is proving very difficult to enforce such laws (Albanese and 
Pursley, 1993).  Penalties for law violations are generally handled by administrative 
agencies who impose fines; most actions do not result in criminal penalties.  “And unlike 
most conventional crimes, it is generally impossible to determine the seriousness of the 
offense by the nature of the action taken” (Albanese and Pursley, 1993: 306).  A study of 
violations of regulatory laws by Fortune 500 companies revealed that even serious 
violations generally received only administrative sanctions (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).   
Corporate and Political Responses to Environmental Crime and Justice Legislation 
Industry has learned to deal effectively with environmental crime and justice 
legislation, mandates, and communities.  During the 1970s and 1980s, as more and more 
laws established industrial rules and regulations, industry was faced with a vast 
bureaucracy and expensive clean-up costs.  Industry has not given in to these laws or 
grassroots campaigns.  Rather than create non-polluting alternatives, corporations 
prepared for war, which made future struggles even more difficult.  To challenge 
environmental justice legislation and mandates, corporations have utilized a wide range 
of techniques including: the “greenwash” and “spin” of environmental justice claims 
(Stauber and Rampton, 1995) and “environmental blackmail” (meeting suggested 
standards will force the industry to move, costing the communities jobs).  Industry has 
spent millions of dollars on PR campaigns to protect their image and promote their new 
“green” attitudes.  Each year, Earth Day is sponsored by the worst polluters in the 
business.  Grassroots activists have been called “insane”, “half-cocked nut cases”, 
“extremists” and “opportunists” (Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss, 2001).  
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Corporations are also fighting for “voluntary standards” and spending billions of 
dollars on no-holds-barred lobbying and on PR campaigns that present their new, greener 
image (Lynch and Stretesky, 2001).  The EPA has been directly attacked by industry 
lawyers who argue that the EPA lacks authority under the law to force states to undertake 
new environmental policies.  
The current Bush Administration has effectively reduced many of the victories 
accomplished during the Clinton Administration.  Industry has been successful at the 
federal level at combating environmental justice.  Congressional Republicans placed into 
the VA-HUD Appropriations Bill in 1998, a one-year moratorium on the EPA’s using of 
any funds “to implement or administer the interim guidelines” for Title IV complaints 
filed after October 21, 1998 and this moratorium was extended through 1999 (EPA, 
2000).  According to William Kovacs, vice president for environmental policy for the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “these appropriations provisions are central to our efforts to 
stop the worst excesses of the environmental movement. . .this will block the worst kind 
of environmental lunacy masquerading as civil rights” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
1998).  Environmental justice advocates emphasize that the mandates don’t address 
nearly enough; broader problems need to be addressed such as land values, lowered 
quality of life, and the like (Cushman, 1998). 
To address this issue, the EPA put together a 25-member committee to revise the 
Interim Guidelines with representatives from industry, state/local governments, and the 
scientific community.  The revised guidelines were supposed to be published in 1999 but 
no consensus was reached.  The committee decided to issue a report expressing the 
various diverging opinions in conjunction with ideas for future decision-making (Sissell, 
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1999).  On June 16, 2000, the EPA issued a Revised Guidance for Investigating Title VI 
Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits.  The revised report made state 
environmental agencies responsible for determining what constituted a significant 
disparate impact.  Accordingly, only the very worst cases would be subject to 
compliance.  
Environmental Crime and Criminology 
In recent years, academic attention to problems of environmental crime and 
injustice and racism has increased.  Scholars in environmental studies, law, public health, 
and other disciplines have focused their efforts on understanding the problem and 
offering solutions.  Despite this unprecedented growth in other fields of inquiry, 
criminologists, aside from a few individuals, have been relatively silent.  
A handful of criminologists have, in recent years, turned their attention to crime 
as it relates to the environment.  However, “environmental crime anthologies (Clifford, 
1998; Edwards et al., 1996) have largely overlooked the social power context in which 
environmental deviance occurs” (Simon, 2000).  “The absence of environmental justice 
studies in the criminological literature speaks to the unwillingness to take issues of racial 
and class discrimination and corporate harm seriously” (Lynch, Stretesky, and McGurrin, 
2001).  Although there has been an unprecedented increase in the number of criminal 
statutes for environmental crimes, there has been little academic research concerning this 
form of sanctioning (Edwards et al., 1996).  “Criminologists not only neglect the harms 
caused by corporate crime, but have also neglected the laws which criminalize these 
behaviors” (Lynch, Stretesky, and McGurrin, 2001). 
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The few criminologists who have endeavored to study environmental crime have 
made important contributions to the literature.  Stretesky and Lynch (1999) addressed the 
connections between institutionalized racism and corporate violence.  “The problem is 
learning to accept that when companies dump chemicals into rivers, streams, and 
landfills, or alongside roadways, they do so purposefully and with knowledge that the 
likely results of their actions will include injury and death for those exposed to their 
waste products. These are not accidents- they are planned actions no less serious than 
assaults of killings” (Stretesky and Lynch, 1999: 169).  The authors conclude that 
corporate environmental violence cannot be alleviated via traditional criminal justice 
responses.  In order to understand and effectively deal with corporate environmental 
violence, we must acknowledge social structural factors, economic variables, and 
institutionalized racism as primary causes of this type of violence.  Lynch and Stretesky 
(2001) demonstrate ways criminologists can employ medical evidence to identify toxic 
harms.  In their study, the authors find a great deal of literature supporting the premise 
that toxic chemicals are directly related to illness and death in the United States. 
Furthermore, they note the lack of attention given to the production and use of safe 
alternatives. Research also shows that corporations deny or ignore their role in causing 
death and illness (Lynch and Stretesky, 2001).  The authors conclude that although the 
link between illness and disease and toxic exposure is well documented in the medical 
literature, industry continues to manipulate data, spend millions of dollars on elaborate 
public relations campaigns, and hide important findings.  
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Conclusion 
 Environmental crime, in its various forms, is responsible for a great deal of 
environmental and human harm.  Complexities and problems associated with 
environmental legislation make it difficult to enforce environmental laws.  Rather than 
consider safe alternatives to environmental pollution, industry has spent money on PR 
campaigns to present to the public an image of “environmental friendliness”.  For the 
most part, the public is unaware of the dangers to the environment and human health 
associated with environmental crime.  This public ignorance combined with corporate 
strategies touting corporate environmental responsibility creates a false and misleading 
image of environmental crime.  The importance of understanding environmental crime 
across many categories cannot be over-emphasized.  Awareness and understanding are 
the first steps leading to meaningful change.  Although a small number of criminologists 
have begun to examine issues related to environmental crime, in order for this 
information to reach the public, information must be available outside of the academic 
literature.  One of the primary vehicles for presenting mass information about important 
social issues is the mass media.  Chapter Two presents information pertaining to mass 
communication and the mass media.  
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Chapter Two 
 
The Mainstream Mass Media 
 
Introduction 
 Each day, we are bombarded by a wide range of media messages.  It is nearly 
impossible to avoid the media.  Whether or not we choose to watch TV, surf the web, 
listen to the radio, or read a newspaper, chances are high that we are exposed to the 
mainstream mass media in some form on a daily basis.  Chapter Two presents a historical 
overview of mass communication in the United States; explores the major differences 
between the mainstream mass media and alternative media sources, discusses the factors 
influencing media information; and highlights the political and social impact of 
mainstream mass media exposure.  
What is Mass Communication? 
Mass communication is a method by which mediated information is disseminated 
to a large audience of people.  Mass communication differs from interpersonal 
communication in a number of ways, most notably for its potential for far greater impact 
than interpersonal communication (Rodman, 2001).  Mass communication is 
synonymous with the mass media.  The mass media disseminate information in various 
forms through a vast number of sources including television, newspapers, magazines, 
books, radio, movies, and the Internet.  The mass media, in its numerous forms, has 
become a fundamental part of contemporary life.  
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 Historical Overview of Mass Communication in America 
 Throughout most of human history, speech and body language were the only 
forms of interpersonal communication.  Communication changed with the development 
of writing in about 3,000 B.C.  Information spread throughout North American colonies 
through letter carriers, postings in taverns, and via word-of-mouth.  Rumors and gossip 
were considered primary methods for spreading the news.  Mass communication dates 
from the invention of the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg in 1456, who created the 
means by which printed documents, most notably the Bible, could reach large numbers of 
people (Rodman, 2001).  First utilized to propagate religious text, the printing press was 
soon used to distribute news, entertainment, and government missives.  Newspapers 
made periodic appearances as early as the 1600s, in the very beginning of the colonial 
days (Compaine and Gomery, 2000).  The first American magazines appeared in the 
1740s.  In 1791, Congress ratified the First Amendment, emphasizing the government’s 
commitment to free speech and media freedom.  Over the next 430 years, newspapers, 
books, and magazines were the primary methods by which information was presented for 
mass consumption (Rodman, 2001), until the advent of broadcast radio in the 1920s.  In 
the past sixty years, media evolution has made rapid changes with the invention of the 
television, and more recently, the growth of cable television and creation of the Internet 
(Rodman, 2001).  Today, the mass media, comprised of print media (books, newspapers, 
magazines), electronic media (television, radio, audio/video recording), and new media 
(computers and computer networking) is a dominant presence locally, nationally, and 
globally.  
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Mainstream Mass Media Versus Alternative Media 
 While the present study is concerned primarily with the “mainstream” mass 
media, it is important to recognize that there are “alternative” media sources which often 
highlight information ignored by mainstream sources. The mainstream mass media refers 
to media that are “easily, inexpensively, and simultaneously available to large segments 
of a population” (Surette, 1992: 10).  Alternative media sources do not have the financial 
or political resources to reach the majority of the American public as compared to 
mainstream mass media sources.  The mainstream mass media, which reaches the 
majority of the American population in terms of distribution numbers, have the greatest 
resources politically and financially.  Alternative media sources were established in order 
to critique the mainstream mass media or to fill in the gaps created by narrow mainstream 
mass media agendas.  Often, individuals seek out alternative sources through their own 
personal motivations, while mass media sources generally do not need to seek out 
consumers.  The mainstream mass media sets the framework in which other media 
sources operate (Chomsky, 1997).  Throughout the present study, the term “media” refers 
to the mainstream mass media. 
Pervasiveness of Media Exposure in the United States 
 The mass media in the United States is comprised of 1,700 daily newspapers; 
11,000 magazines; 9,000 radio stations; 1,000 television stations; 2,500 book publishers; 
and 7 movie studios (Bagdikian, 2000; Compaine and Gomery, 2000).  According to 
Stempel and Hargrove (1996), in a 1995 survey of Americans, 70.3% were regular 
viewers of local TV news; 67.3% were regular viewers of network TV news; and 59.3% 
read a daily newspaper.  In addition, 48.6% of the survey population listened regularly to 
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radio news and 31.4% regularly read a newsmagazine.  According to a Gallup poll in 
1996, 78% of Americans claimed they get their news from nightly national television 
newscasts (DeLuca, 1999).  
Television has become the dominant form of news communication.  In 1950, only 
9% of U.S. homes had a television set.  Today, the average American household has two 
television sets, which are on for more than seven hours per day (Rodman, 2001). 
According to Graber (1980), the average American high school graduate spent more time 
in front of the TV than in the classroom.  According to the National Association of 
Broadcasters (1995), the average person listens to the radio for over 22 hours per week.  
The growth and development of the Internet and the World Wide Web has had a 
major impact on mass information dissemination especially in the past ten years.  A 
survey conducted in 2001 by the UCLA Center for Communication Policy found that 
72.3 percent of Americans had online access, a growth of over 5 percent from 2000 
(Surette, 1998).  According to the Census Bureau (2000), over 54 million American 
households or 51 percent had one or more computers, an increase of 9% in a little over a 
year. Internet and World Wide Web use has increased dramatically in the past few years, 
making it the most significant communication tool ever devised (Greek, 1997).  
Factors Influencing Media Information 
 Media Ownership 
There is a growing concentration in media ownership (Bagdikian, 2000; Herman 
and Chomsky, 1988; Manoff and Schudson, 1986; Miller, 1996, 1998; Parenti, 1993).  At 
the end of WWII, eighty percent of daily newspapers were independently owned.  By 
1989, eighty percent of daily newspapers were owned by corporate chains.  In 1983, fifty 
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corporations dominated the mass media and the largest media merger in history involved 
a $340 million transaction.  By 1990, twenty-three corporations controlled most of the 
mass media.  In 1997, just ten corporations dominated the mass media, and the Disney-
ABC deal became the biggest merger in history at $19 billion.  Today’s mass media is 
virtually controlled by six firms, which are among the world’s largest and most powerful 
corporations; General Electric, Viacom, Disney, Bertelsmann, Time Warner, and 
Murdoch’s.  In 2000, the AOL-Time Warner merger involved a $350 billion deal which 
was over 1,000 times greater than in 1983 (Bagdikian, 2000).  
The ownership of the mass media by just six conglomerates means that a very 
powerful and prosperous few have control over influencing the American public.  Media 
owners are driven by profits, most of which are derived from advertising dollars of other 
multi-national corporations.  The voices of those opposed to the vested interests of media 
corporations are not likely to be heard (DeLuca, 1999).  Former CBS president Frank 
Stanton stated, “Since we are advertiser supported we must take into account the general 
objective and desires of advertisers as a whole” (Parenti, 1993: 35).  For example, 
Chrysler’s advertising agency circulated a letter to magazines requiring them to submit 
articles for screening for possible offensive content to Chrysler (Glaser, 1997).  The 
government appears indifferent to the immense and still growing power of major media 
corporations (Bagdikian, 2000).  Citizen action groups and alternative media outlets lack 
the financial and political resources to match corporate funds.  For the most part, the 
public isn’t even aware of the political, social, and economic dangers of concentrated 
corporate control of the media.  
  
 29
 Use of Authorities as Sources 
There is a heavy demand for dramatic and sensational stories and the media must 
pick and choose which stories to present to the public.  “If it bleeds, it leads”, has become 
a leading media mantra.  Journalists rely heavily on easily accessible and reliable sources 
for information which generally means using government officials.  Media personnel are 
not likely to criticize governmental organizations out of fear they may deny access to 
information.  Reliance on high-ranking officials is problematic for several reasons. 
Reliance on political officials leads to the acceptance and reaffirmation of traditional 
approaches to dealing with certain social problems.  In addition, rather than provide 
accurate information, bureaucrats can use news exposure opportunities to promote 
themselves and the institution they represent, which leads the public to believe they are 
reliable and credible sources of information (Chermak, 1997).  
Political and Social Impact of Mainstream Mass Media 
The mass media is the platform by which a plethora of political matters are 
discussed and how most people learn about political issues and determine which are 
important (Perse, 2001).  Because the public’s exposure to the political process is limited 
(Kessel, 1975), information from the mass media may be the only contact with politics 
for an overwhelming majority of Americans (McCombs and Shaw, 1972).  Political 
campaigns are often built around electronic media because they are a cost-effective way 
to gather support for policy positions (Graber, 1980; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; 
Tunnell, 1992).   One of the major uses of media in political campaigns is agenda setting. 
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 Agenda-Setting 
 Agenda-setting refers to the power of the news media to direct our concerns 
toward certain issues (Perse, 2001).  A large body of research supports the agenda-setting 
influence of the media (Berk, Brookman, and Lesser, 1977; Dearing and Rogers, 1996; 
Fisher, 1989; Gordon and Heath, 1981; Haskins and Miller, 1984; McCombs and Shaw, 
1972; Pritchard, 1986).  According to Cohen (1963), the media may not tell us exactly 
what to think, but they tell us what to think about.  The similarity of programming across 
channels and in news reports due to the concentration of ownership and economy of scale 
have led to the proliferation of different venues of news drawing from the same sources 
(Perse, 2001).  Repetition of certain issues, people, and events in conjunction with media 
consistency reinforces the public’s understanding of what is important (Perse, 2001). 
McCombs and Shaw (1972), the original pioneers of the term “agenda-setting” found 
almost identical rank-order correlation between amount of news coverage of issues and 
the rank ordering of those same issues by a sample of individuals.  Dearing and Rogers 
(1996) in a meta-analysis of 100 studies, found overwhelming support for the agenda-
setting hypothesis.  Funkhouser (1973a, 1973b) and MacKuen and Coombs (1981) found 
that the public’s belief in the importance of events closely followed media coverage of 
events, and not real-world indicators.  The media are a powerful force in establishing 
public opinion and in reducing the number of divergent opinions in society (Noelle-
Neumann, 1991, 1993). 
Conclusion 
The mainstream mass media are a dominant presence in American society.  On a 
daily basis, the American public is inundated with a vast array of media information from 
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a variety of sources.  The mass media not only provide the public with information but 
also interpret the information.  In addition, the mass media have a great impact on 
socialization by providing a sense of collective norms and values.  In the past several 
decades, the media has shifted from an investigative role to a more profit-driven role.  
The growing concentration of media ownership and the use of government officials as 
sources both have a huge impact on media content.  Information presented to the public 
often reflects the interests of the powerful in our society.  Although alternative media 
sources exist, they lack the financial and political resources to compete for exposure with 
mainstream mass media sources.  Chapter Three unites the topics addressed in Chapter 
One and Chapter Two with a thorough examination of crime, environmental crime, and 
the mass media.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The Mainstream Mass Media and Crime 
 
Introduction 
Many of our ideas about the world around us are gleaned, not through direct 
experience, but through exposure to the mass media.  The news media play an important 
and primary role in the construction of social problems (Sacco, 1995).  In many cases, the 
media distorts the facts and provides us with a simplistic and often erroneous view of 
reality.  By creating a distorted, provincial, and/or false view of reality, the media are 
responsible for perpetuating myths that have dramatic, misdirected, and often dangerous 
consequences.  In particular, the media has misconstrued the reality of crime in American 
society.  According to Fishman (1978: 542) in an analysis of the social and media 
construction of crime waves, “the interplay between national elites and national media 
organizations may well have given rise to a number of social issues now widely accepted 
as fixtures in the recent American political scene”.  The media doesn’t just report about 
crime; they are responsible for constructing a social reality of crime that has an enormous 
impact on public perceptions of crime and criminality (Surette, 1992; Barlow, 1991; 
Garofalo, 1981).  Chapter Three presents a thorough overview of the literature 
concerning the mass media and street crime; discusses the limited media attention given 
to corporate crime; describes media reporting on the environment and environmental 
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crime; and highlights the problems associated with media reporting of environmental 
risk, harm, and crime.  
The Mass Media and Street Crime 
 Research into the relationship between the media and crime, although not a recent 
phenomenon, has gained a great deal of criminological attention in the past two decades 
(Barlow et al, 1995a; Lofquist, 1997).  Researchers generally agree that crime as it is 
portrayed in the mass media is distorted and over sensationalized (Barlow et al, 1995a; 
Benedict 1992; Chermak, 1994; Kappeler et al, 1996), presents a misleading view of 
crime (Chermak, 1998; Fishman, 1978; Graber, 1980; Lotz, 1991; Marsh, 1989), and 
blurs the line between news and entertainment (Newman, 1990).  Politicians, the public, 
and the media are preoccupied with violent crime and neglect other types of crime, in 
particular corporate crime (Kappeler et al, 1996).  Furthermore, the media focuses a great 
deal of attention on crimes committed by young, male minorities while overplaying the 
prevalence of white, affluent victims.  The media perpetuates the myth that most crime is 
interracial.  The media makes us afraid of random violent crime by strangers and even 
though youth crime is on the decline, surveys indicate that an overwhelming number of 
Americans believe juveniles are committing more crimes than ever before.  The picture 
of crime in America, as presented by the vast majority of media outlets, is of the violent 
stranger and as such, the most viable solutions are more police, more laws, and harsher 
sentencing practices.  By limiting or excluding incidences of corporate crime from news 
coverage, the media plays a large role in shaping public opinion as to what constitutes 
crime (Garofalo, 1981; Hills, 1987; Marsh, 1989; Reiman, 1998).  This distorted view of 
crime has an enormous impact on society.  Fear of crime, in particular violent, individual 
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crime, is on the rise even though the violent crime rate has been on the decline over the 
past two decades.  
 Most people have little direct experience with the types of crime presented in the 
media (Ericson et al, 1987; Graber, 1980; Hall et al, 1978; Stroman and Seltzer, 1985; 
Surette, 1992).  Therefore, the public relies heavily on the media to supply them with 
crime news.  Researchers emphasize that it is important for criminologists to challenge 
the media and analyze reporting biases (Wright et al, 1995).  Criminologists have a great 
deal to offer the news media with respect to making news more representative and less 
distorted (Barak, 1994). 
 Sources of Information 
Police and court officials provide relatively easy access to crime information. 
However, they also affect how crime is presented in the news.  Reporters generally rely 
on authoritative sources for crime news (Berkowitz, 1987; Berkowitz and Beach, 1993; 
Brown et al, 1987; Chermak, 1995; Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973).  The media utilize the 
police and criminal justice officials as their primary source of information for a number 
of reasons.  In order to provide the public with as much credible information as possible, 
the media need to gather information from reliable sources.  In addition, due to time 
constraints, the media need easy and quick access to crime information.  The police 
provide the media with seemingly credible and easy-to-access data (Lynch et al, 2000). 
The problem with relying on police information is that once again, certain crimes, 
moreover street crimes, are given more coverage than other types of crime and the police 
are able to promote their own interests and their own version of crime (Sherizen, 1978; 
Fishman, 1980; Hall et al, 1978; Ericson et al, 1987; Grabosky and Wilson, 1989).  In 
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addition, “the police role as the dominant gatekeeper means that crime news is often 
police news and that the advancement of a police perspective on crime and its solutions is 
facilitated” (Sacco, 1995: 146).  Chermak (1997) found that in the majority of 1,900 
crime, drug, and policy stories, police and court officials were utilized as sources. 
Criminologists and sociologists only accounted for 2% of sources in all crime stories and 
even less in drug stories (Chermak, 1997). 
 Focus on Individual Violent Crime and Neglect of Official Crime Data 
Serious personal crime, most notably murder, is given high priority by the mass 
media (Cohen, 1975; Chermak, 1994, 1995; Ericson et al, 1991; Graber, 1980; 
Humphries, 1981; Sheley and Ashkins, 1981; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981) while white-
collar crime and property crime are given very little attention (Chermak, 1994, 1995; 
Evans and Lundman, 1983; Graber, 1980; Jerin and Fields, 1995).  A large amount of 
criminological literature supports the premise that there is an overrepresentation of 
violent individual crimes in the news media, especially when compared to proportions of 
such crimes indicated in the official crime data (Barlow et al, 1995a; Graber, 1980; 
Garofalo, 1981; Reiman, 1998; Sherizen, 1978; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981).  Barlow et 
al (1995a) found that 73% of the articles included in their sample of news magazines 
focused on violent crime whereas only 10% of crimes known to police involved such 
violence in that same year.  According to Chiricos et al (1997) television and news stories 
about violent crime and juvenile violent crime increased more than 400% between June 
and November of 1993.  However, while media and public attention to violent crime 
continued to escalate, the rates of such crime continued to decline (Chiricos et al, 1997). 
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Media accounts of crime not only exaggerate incidences of violent crime, they 
egregiously overstate the occurrence of individual crime (Garofalo, 1981; Graber, 1980; 
Schlesinger et al, 1991) and stranger crime (Chermak, 1994; Kappeler et al, 1996; 
Tunnell, 1992.)  The reason for the overrepresentation of violent individual crime has a 
lot to do with the sensational and dramatic quality of such crimes (Sacco, 1995). 
Although these crimes are atypical, they provide the media with the opportunity to create 
dramatic stories with victims and villains.  
 Distortion of Victim and Offender Characteristics 
A number of studies examining the nature of homicide reporting have found that 
the strongest predictor of reporting and attention was directly related to the number of 
victims killed during the incident (Chermak, 1998; Johnstone et al, 1994; Wilbanks, 
1984).  In other words, the more victims, the more coverage.  Several studies show that 
minorities are overrepresented as offenders in news coverage of crime (Barlow et al, 
1995a; Sheley and Ashkins 1981; Smith, 1984) and there is a growing emphasis on 
socially favored victims of crime (Benedict, 1992; Fishman, 1978; Graber, 1980).  
Barlow et al (1995a) found a significant bias against racial minorities in the news 
accounts of crime utilized in their study of Time magazine articles over a five-year 
period.  While official data reported that white offenders were responsible for the 
majority of crimes committed in the years in question, over 74% of news reports on crime 
during the same time frame concerned minority offenders.  Similarly, Entman (1990, 
1992, 1994) found that defendants were most likely to be presented as African-American. 
Humphries (1981) found a disproportionate emphasis on the arresting of young minority 
males from lower class backgrounds in his study of news stories in the New York Post in 
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the 1950s and 1960s.  Johnstone, Hawkins, and Michener (1994) found that murders of 
minority victims were less likely to be reported while murders of women and children 
were more likely to be reported. 
 Lack of Attention Given to Solutions or to the Wrong Solutions 
Most crime news articles focus on criminals and criminal events with little 
attention given to solutions to the problem (Barlow et al 1995a; Sherizen, 1978; 
Dussuyer, 1979; Graber, 1980).  For example, in their study of 175 Time magazine 
articles, Barlow et al (1995a) found that 82% of the articles focused on crime and 
criminals and only a small percentage (17%) addressed larger criminal justice issues.  
While lack of media attention to appropriate solutions is cause for concern, even 
more troubling is the attention given to solutions that have little or no positive support in 
the academic literature.  Cavendar (1984) studied the media coverage of “Scared 
Straight”, a program designed to bring troubled juveniles into contact with inmates in a 
New Jersey prison.  The program was one of the most widely publicized media 
presentations of crime in the 1970s.  Although evaluations of the program and similar 
“shock” programs failed to produce significant results in the criminological literature, the 
media nonetheless promoted the ideals of deterrence and retribution as primary 
punishment mechanisms for reducing criminal and delinquent behavior (Cavendar 1984).  
Federal anti-crime agendas have prioritized criminalization and enforcement over 
social intervention since the early 1920s (Potter, 1998).  Anti-crime legislation which 
focuses on getting tough and pointing the finger at individual responsibility continues to 
dominant the political and social agenda while there continues to be almost no mention of 
economic and political structures as root causes of crime (Barlow et al, 1995b).  By 
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presenting crime as largely the result of individual pathology, the media neglect to link 
crime with broader social forces (Humphries, 1981).  When the public believes violent 
crime is so prevalent and that police are very successful in apprehending offenders, they 
will continue to support legislation and funding that calls for more police, more prisons, 
and more money for the criminal justice system (Surette, 1992).  
 Creating Fear 
By promoting violent and individual crime, the media has the potential to elevate 
fear of crime or fear of certain types of crime.  Williams and Dickinson (1993) articulate 
that regular exposure to crime news has a direct impact on fear of victimization.  While 
Sacco (1995) emphasizes that many consumers are skeptical of the news media, there 
remains a substantial number of people who believe what they watch and read.  Heath 
and Gilbert (1996) suggest that some television viewing is correlated with fear of crime 
for some viewers.  However, directly relating fear of crime to media exposure is difficult 
to uncover due to the complexities of the relationship between fear and media exposure. 
The type of programming, operationalization of fear, viewer demographics and beliefs, 
sense of justice, and level of fear prior to exposure all have an impact on study results. 
Therefore analyses of exposure to crime news and fear of crime is difficult to accurately 
determine.  Heath (1984) found in a sample of phone interviews that reports of local 
crimes that were sensationalized or random were associated with higher levels of fear of 
crime.  Similarly, Williams and Dickinson (1993) found that British news articles 
depicting more sensational aspects of crime appeared to promote fear of crime.  Gordon 
and Heath (1981) found that fear of crime is related to the proportion of the newspaper 
devoted to crime.  Liska and Baccaglini (1990) found that fear of crime was greater in 
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middle aged white women.  The researchers suggested that the elevated fear among this 
group was due to their overrepresentation as victims on television news shows.  In reality, 
middle-aged white women are less likely to be victimized than young, minority males. 
Elevated levels of fear in women have devastating effects on women’s feelings of 
independence and thwarts efforts to be powerful in a male dominated society.  
 In Support of the Powerful 
The overrepresentation of violent individual crime and underrepresentation of 
corporate and other forms of crime in the news media has serious consequences.  Several 
researchers emphasize that crime news supports the interests of the powerful in our 
society (Hall et al, 1978; Barlow et al 1995a) and diverts public attention away from the 
enormous impact and costs associated with crimes committed by the elite and powerful 
members of society (Wright et al 1995, Hills, 1987; Reiman, 1998).  “Equating crime 
with violence, rather than recognizing it for what is most often is-the acquisition of 
property-distorts the property relations in capitalist society, which makes most crimes so 
conspicuously rational” (Barlow et al, 1995a: 10).  In addition to failing to take into 
consideration the links between crime and unemployment, the news media rarely if ever 
suggests that macro-social conditions are the source of the crime problem (Barlow et al 
1995b).  Marxist media critics emphasize that the media has become the means by which 
the “haves” of society gain the willing support of the “have-nots” in order to maintain the 
status quo (Rodman, 2001).  In other words, the mass media distract people from the 
“real” problems existing in society such as poverty, racism, sexism, and the like in order 
to emphasize the threats of individual and violent predators.  Crime has never been 
abolished but the federal government has succeeded in expanding its capacity to police 
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the nation through the identification of public enemies and the creation of new crimes 
(Potter, 1998). 
 In recent years, the media has focused its attention on a handful of corporate 
scandals, namely Enron and Martha Stewart.  While the media can be credited with 
providing the public with information regarding such incidents, there has been a limited 
amount of critical dialogue concerning these types of corporate crimes.  The focus in both 
cases has been on individual accountability and not on the corporate, economic, and 
social climate which often encourages such behavior.  
The Mass Media and Corporate Crime 
Several researchers have estimated that the costs of corporate crime in terms of 
direct financial costs to consumers exceeds $2 billion annually (Clinard and Yeager, 
1980; Kappeler et al, 1996; Simon and Eitzen, 1993).  Despite the enormous costs 
associated with corporate crime, the media generally ignores or underestimates the costs 
of corporate crime (Hills, 1987; Kappeler et al, 1996; Reiman, 1998).  Additionally, a 
large number of studies have suggested that the human costs in terms of death and 
injuries due to corporate crime are greater than those associated with street crime (Bierne 
and Messerschmidt, 1991; Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Frank and Lynch, 1992; Kappeler 
et al, 1996; Michalowski, 1985; Reiman, 1998).  The costs in terms of dollar amount and 
human injury/death due to corporate crime is enormous, yet there is very little attention 
directed toward this type of crime from the media, the public, politicians, and even within 
academia.  Calavita and Pontell (1994) suggest that even if corporate crime is depicted as 
a threat in media reports, it is generally described as a threat to business and economic 
interests rather than consumer, employee, and environmental interests.  
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Criminologists who study white-collar crime in its various forms realize that it is 
much more complex and more difficult to reduce to numbers than street crime.  Just as 
there is relatively little media coverage of corporate crime, a limited number of studies 
have examined representations of corporate crime in the media (Evans and Lundman, 
1983; Lofquist, 1997; Lynch et al, 1989; Lynch et al, 2000; Morash and Hale, 1987; 
Randall, 1987; Randall and Lee-Sammons, 1988; Swigert and Farrell, 1980; Wright et al, 
1995).  The research indicates that reporters appear to have an inadequate and simplistic 
understanding of the complexity of corporate crime (Levi, 1994; Randall, 1987; Randall 
et al, 1988) and are unlikely to conceptualize corporate deviance as “crime” (Lynch et al, 
1989; Wright et al, 1995).  Evans and Lundman (1983) and Morash and Hale (1987) 
examined cases of non-violent corporate crime.  News coverage in both cases was limited 
and accounts directed attention toward individual responsibilities or secondary causes 
rather than organizational malfeasance (Hills, 1987; Morash and Hale, 1987; Wright et al, 
1995b). 
Lofquist (1997) compared newspaper coverage of two widely reported crimes that 
occurred in Rochester, New York in 1994.  The first case involved the disappearance of 
Kali Ann Poulton, a 4 year-old girl, while the second case centered on the collapse and 
flooding of a large salt mine owned by Azko Nobel Salt.  The cases were similar in that 
they occurred in the same year, in the same area, and it was unclear as to whether they 
were actually accidents or crimes.  Detailed analyses of news coverage of these events 
revealed that the media immediately depicted the missing child as a victim of stranger 
abduction, despite the fact that stranger abductions are rare cases.  Family members or 
acquaintances are most likely to be responsible for child abductions.  In the case of the 
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mine collapse and subsequent flooding, despite overwhelming evidence of corporate 
negligence, the media described the event as an “accident”.  Lofquist (1997: 256) 
concludes that the media is responsible for creating and reproducing hegemonic 
understandings of events.  In other words, the media chooses to fill in the gaps in ways 
which protects the dominant social structure and points the finger at individual actors as 
responsible for such criminal events.  In the case of Kali Ann Poulton, the media created 
a social reality that suggests that our children are in grave danger of pathological 
strangers rather than calling into question the dangers of poverty, illiteracy, poor 
education, poor health care, and the like (Lofquist, 1997).  In the case of corporate 
negligence, Lofquist highlights that “organizational wrongdoing is obscured; the 
weakness of regulation and of media scrutiny limits the likelihood of ‘naming and 
blaming’ and allows a vocabulary of ‘accident’ to prevail” (258).  
Research on media coverage of corporate violence is even more limited. 
According to Lynch et al. (1989) the American media is reluctant to socially construct 
corporate violence as crime.  Wright et al (1995: 22) stresses that “how the media 
constructs corporate violence can affect whether it will be conceptualized and treated as a 
crime”.  Swigert and Farrell (1980) examined newspaper coverage of corporate violence 
in reference to the Ford Motor Company’s Pinto scandal.  Ford’s failure to recall the 
Pinto resulted in numerous injuries and deaths to consumers.  Reporters initially 
portrayed the cases as indicative of accidents and not corporate violence.  News coverage 
gained momentum when it was discovered that Ford officials were aware of the 
mechanical defect and refused to recall the Pinto (Dowie 1977).  Swigert and Farrell 
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(1980) contend that media attention to the case contributed to Ford’s eventual indictment 
and prosecution on charges of reckless homicide.  
Even in cases in which evidence of corporate violence is clear and convincing, the 
media still has difficulty linking such behavior with crime.  Wright et al (1995) analyzed 
newspaper coverage of a fire at the Imperial Food Products plant in North Carolina.  The 
fire resulted in 25 deaths and over 55 injuries.  It was widely reported that the exit doors 
had been locked or barricaded by the owner; there was no plant-wide working sprinkler 
system; no windows; too few exits; and the plant had never been inspected by OSHA 
(Occupational Safety and Health Administration).  Wright et al (1995) reasoned that the 
case provided a unique opportunity to study the media’s reactions to corporate violence. 
The evidence of corporate malfeasance was strong, the physical harm severe, and the 
case ended in charges of manslaughter.  Often, in cases of corporate violence, a clear 
individual offender is difficult to find (Clinard and Yeager, 1980). Wright et al (1995) 
conducted a content analysis of 10 major city newspapers.  Nine of the ten papers 
covered the fire but new coverage dwindled substantially over the days following the fire. 
The news coverage focused mainly on the enormous death and physical harm caused by 
the fire and the suffering and damage to the community.  But although the incident was 
immediately perceived to be an act of corporate violence, the media did little to link such 
actions with crime (Wright et al, 1995).  The deaths were not depicted as homicides nor 
was the possibility of prosecution raised until after the government indicated its intent to 
prosecute.  Even when the case officially became a crime, news coverage still did not 
depict the actions as criminal.  “Instead of a potential criminal offense, the news reports 
socially constructed the worker deaths as a breakdown in government safety regulation” 
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(Wright et al, 1995: 32).  Consequently, the coverage did not transform the public reality 
of corporate violence as crime.  Furthermore, the limited coverage of the manslaughter 
convictions did little to educate the public or produce deterrent effects (Wright et al, 
1995: 32).  Lynch, Stretesky and Hammond (2000) argue that crime news is constructed 
not only by what is said about corporate crime, but by what is left out.  That is, the public 
image of crime is shaped by the nonreporting of corporate crime.  Underreporting the 
extent of corporate crime and, at the same time overreporting on crimes the public fears 
the most, both shape the fear of crime.  
The Mass Media and the Environment 
For the most part, the media’s interest in the environment and related issues is 
cyclical (Gaber, 2000).  There is a great deal of media coverage during environmental 
disasters and industrial catastrophes but the attention quickly fades until the next crisis 
occurs (Anderson and Gaber, 1993).  Consequently, there is almost no media dialogue 
concerning the true causes of such environmental devastation.  Furthermore, mass 
media’s focus on spectacular events prevents sustained coverage of the more serious 
environmental problems facing our society (DeLuca, 1999). 
The role of the mass media in the history of environmentalism has not received a 
great deal of attention (Neuzil and Kovarik, 1996).  Ponder (1986) examined the role of 
the media in environmental dialogue during the Progressive Era and suggested that the 
media were active in calling for environmental reform on the federal level.  According to 
Neuzil and Kovarik (1996), “from the muckrakers’ work in the public health reform 
movements to scientific and political fights to conserve western lands and resources, 
journalists participated in many environmental controversies of their era” (1996: xxi).   
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 The influence and popularity of television in the 1960s had a great impact on 
environmental awareness (Neuzil and Kovarik, 1996).  Although the mainstream media 
had little or nothing to do with environmental legislation in the 1970s, research suggests 
that alternative media outlets and activists had a great deal of impact on the creation and 
implementation of federal environmental policy during that time (Neuzil and Kovarik, 
1996).  Prior to the creation and enactment of federal environmental legislation in the 
1970s, specialized environmental publications and professional interest groups were 
calling for political involvement in environmental issues at the national level.  The 
mainstream media gave attention to environmentalism and environmental policy after the 
legislation was already in place (Strodhoff, Hawkins, and Schoenfeld, 1985).  
Critical media attention toward corporations in the early 1970s, spurred by the 
consumer movement and actions of Ralph Nader, angered and outraged corporate 
leaders.  In addition to pouring millions into elaborate PR campaigns and lobbying 
efforts, corporations launched a savage campaign against the media.  Corporate leaders 
attacked the media, suggesting that the media had a significant bias against business.  In 
1980, corporate leaders were successful in electing a national administration dedicated to 
wiping out a half century of social legislation and regulation of business (Bagdikian, 
2000).  Today, with ownership of the mass media in the hands of just six corporations, 
media reporting is heavily weighed in favor of corporate values.   
In the past few decades, the public has been inundated with specialty 
environmental magazines, books, and cable television shows and channels.  According to 
American Opinion Research, Inc. (1993) by 1993, more than two-thirds of the nation’s 
medium and large newspapers had reporters specializing in covering issues involving the 
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environment.  Despite the growth in environmental awareness across the media, political, 
and public realms, most media information focuses on what individuals can do to save 
the environment.  The mass media has aided corporations and the politicians in creating a 
consumer culture that advocates individual responsibility for protecting the environment. 
According to a Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting survey which analyzed source 
attributions in news articles relating to environmental issues, fifty percent of all quotes 
come from government officials (McDonald, 1993).  The next largest percent of 
environmental quotes came from industry and the lowest percentage, 4%, from 
environmental groups.  Consequently, environmental issues, as depicted in the media, are 
presented in government and corporate terms.  The media then rarely questions the 
structural components that have led to environmental harm. 
 Radical Environmental Groups and the Media 
 Environmental organizations have utilized a wide range of tactics to gain media 
attention and publicity for environmental issues.  Greenpeace was one of the first 
environmental groups to recognize the power of the mass media to publicize their efforts. 
Since 1971, environmental activists have performed thousands of “image events” in 
support of environmental issues including chaining themselves to whaling harpoons, 
plugging waste discharge pipes, and forming human blockades to stop trucks from 
transporting hazardous waste (DeLuca, 1999).  Members of Earth First! have sat in trees, 
blockaded roads, and chained themselves to logging equipment.  In many ways, these 
environmental activists have been successful.  There is a ban on commercial whaling and 
ocean dumping of nuclear waste and activists have successfully blocked the placing of 
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several garbage and hazardous waste incinerators.  Environmental groups have gained 
more public visibility and public support for environment issues.  
 Despite the number of successes achieved by these radical groups, they have a 
very uneasy relationship with the media and more often than not, these radical 
environmental groups are depicted as crazy, deviant, and “disturbers of order” (Parenti, 
1993).  Corporations have filed lawsuits against many environmental activists.  Many 
activists have been the victims of vandalism, death threats, and serious violence.  For 
example, on September 17th, 1998, David Chain, an Earth First! member was crushed to 
death by a redwood when an angry Pacific Lumber logger continued to fell trees despite 
the presence of protesters (Goodell, 1999).  Corporate leaders, politicians, and the FBI 
have labeled many activists as terrorists, even activists who themselves have been victims 
of threats (DeLuca, 1999).  According to Lois Gibbs, founder of the Love Canal Home 
Owners Association and later, founder of the Center for Health, Environment, and 
Justice, states that “people have been followed by private detectives, had their homes 
broken into. I’d say 40 percent of people protesting toxic waste sites and incinerators 
around the country have been intimidated (Helvarg, 1994: 651). 
 Radical environmental groups maintain that confrontational efforts and 
orchestrated image events are the only major ways to achieve massive publicity and 
support.  Elected officials, corporate leaders, and corporations all enjoy enormous 
advantages over environmental groups in terms of access to the media and control of their 
image, which “is due in no small measure to the fact that media themselves are giant 
corporations with a vested interest in the status quo” (DeLuca, 1999: 20).  Image events 
are intended not only to bring attention to a particular imminent environmental issue; 
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they are intended to contest the hegemonic discourse of industrialism that dominates our 
society (DeLuca, 1999).  Image events though are rarely recognized as working for social 
structural change.  “News media’s emphasis on the new, its quest for the novel, forces 
groups to perform even more outrageous events in order to get coverage” (DeLuca, 1999: 
92).  Radical environmental groups are in a difficult position.  In order to get public 
attention, they must rely on the media to cover environmental issues.  The media will 
only give radical environmental groups attention when the story is exciting and dramatic. 
The confrontational tactics utilized by radical activists often come across as crazy and 
desperate. 
 Mainstream environmental groups are a great source of animosity for radical 
environmental groups.  Mainstream groups appear to be working for the environment in 
socially and politically appropriate channels and therefore come across as diplomatic and 
responsible engineers of environmental protection.  Despite their public image as 
supporters of the environment, most mainstream groups are aligned with corporations, 
industry, and government.  It’s almost impossible to tell them apart.  For example, Jay 
Hair, former president of the National Wildlife Federation now does public relations for 
Plum Creek Timber (Cockburn, 1997). John Sawhill, president of the Nature 
Conservancy, appears in General Motors ads which tout the shared goal of “safeguarding 
the environment without destroying jobs or businesses” (DeLuca, 1999).  Mainstream 
groups, as allies of government and industry, often adopt anti-environmental initiatives 
(Cockburn, 1995; Dowie, 1995; Sale, 1993).   They advocate and promote market 
solutions to environmental problems and rarely, if ever, challenge the industrial 
exploitation of nature (DeLuca, 1999).  The government, corporate leaders, and the media 
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frame radical environmental groups in negative terms because they fear the disruption of 
their power and privilege (Gitlin, 1980).  The media understands environmental issues, 
groups, and disasters through the discourse of industrialism (DeLuca, 1999). 
Environmental columnist Edward Flatteau stated that “there are exceptions, but 
publishers are basically hostile to environmental protection. It’s a threat to their business. 
Their economic lifeblood comes from advertising revenues and that means conspicuous 
consumption” (Jacobson, 1998: 48).  
 Media Reporting of Environmental Crime 
There are only a handful of studies that have examined media coverage of 
corporate crime and even fewer studies have examined media coverage of environmental 
crime.  Lynch, Nalla, and Miller (1989) analyzed media coverage of the Union Carbide 
lethal gas leak in Bhopal, India, which resulted in the immediate deaths of over 2,000 
people.  The authors compared articles and pictorial representations of the event as 
depicted in American and Indian magazines.  American magazines portrayed the event as 
an “accident” or as a disaster and labeled Union Carbide as a victim.  Conversely, Indian 
magazines labeled the event as a crime and portrayed Union Carbide as the negligent 
offender.  Similarly, Lynch, Stretesky, and Hammond (2000) emphasize that most 
environmental problems and disasters (i.e. pollution, hazardous waste dumping/siting) are 
described in the news media as accidents.  In addition, the authors suggest that it is 
common to depict environmental pollution as the “price we pay for technology” (Lynch 
et al, 2000: 115).  Lynch et al (2000) found that only 8 (1.5%) of 544 cases of chemical 
crimes in Tampa were actually reported in the Tampa Tribune. Of the eight articles 
discussing chemical crimes in Tampa, two indicated that the crimes were accidents and 
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the other six articles suggested that poor individual decision-making was the cause of the 
chemical incidents.  Furthermore, while there were only 47 homicides in Tampa in 1995, 
there were 88 articles on these particular homicides and 4,089 articles concerning 
homicide in general.  Overall, the study found that there was no discussion of corporate 
negligence in news media coverage of environmental crime in Tampa.  The authors 
conclude that more research is necessary in order to determine the prevalence across 
news media outlets of neglecting and ignoring corporate crime, in particular. 
 Problems with Reporting Environmental Risk, Harm, and Crime 
The mass media rarely unites issues of the environment, crime, and public health. 
One reason the media often avoids presenting information regarding environment risk 
and harm has to do with the complexity of the information.  Environmental risk, harm, 
and crime are complex, multi-faceted, and deeply rooted in our political economy. 
Therefore, risks from dramatic or sensational causes of injury, illness, or death such as 
accidents, homicides, and natural disasters tend to be greatly overestimated while risks 
from environmental toxins and pollutants tend to be greatly underestimated (Lichtenstein 
et al, 1978).  News media coverage of dramatic and sensational examples contributes to 
the difficulties of obtaining a proper perspective on environmental risks (Combs and 
Slovic, 1978).  Psychological research demonstrates that people’s beliefs change slowly 
and are extraordinarily persistent even in the face of contrary evidence (Nisbett and Ross, 
1980).  Consequently, public opinion is difficult to change.  With constant media 
attention to random violent encounters and lack of exposure to the extent and severity of 
environmental harms, it is unlikely the public will regard environmental risks as serious. 
 51
In addition to problems encountered in reporting the complexity of environmental 
harm, other difficulties further impede media coverage of environmental issues. 
Reporters often rely on journalistic precedence when reporting information.  The lack of 
precedence and lack of understanding of environmental harms has an impact on 
reporting.  Environmental issues are not black and white and sometimes there are no clear 
victims and offenders.  And since the government focuses very little attention on 
environmental issues, the media often regards such issues as less important and not 
newsworthy (Simon, 2000).  Environmental risk, harm, crime, and justice are considered 
too difficult, too time-consuming, and too expensive to cover (DeLuca, 1999).  
According to Tom Winship, former editor of the Boston Globe, “there isn’t a ‘Stop the 
presses!’ kind of development on the environmental story everyday. This is not event 
coverage. We need to persuade the media to cover the environmental story consistently. 
Sure, it’s a slow story, but they’ve got to change their attitudes about what makes a story” 
(Hertsgaard, 1990: 16-17).  
Conclusion 
 While “street crime” is given more than its fair share of media, political, and 
enforcement attention, “white collar” crime is generally ignored unless the consequences 
of such corporate actions results in several immediate deaths, affects hundreds or even 
thousands of lives, and costs several hundred millions of dollars (i.e. Enron).  Even then, 
media attention is terminal.  Headlines and leading news reports favor the isolated violent 
encounter.  Although both “street crime” and “white collar” crime involve violence, 
victims, offenders, and injury, “street crime” is more sensational and simplistic and 
therefore, more appealing for copy than the often misunderstood and more injurious 
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“white collar” variety.  The media, our government and our justice personnel convince us 
that street crime is rampant and that we are all potential victims; worst case scenarios 
dominant our thinking and appear to be the norm.  Consequently, voters are affected by 
this slanted portrayal.  Over the past twenty years, we’ve become extremely adept at 
waging war against street criminals.  Each year we build more and more jails and prisons. 
The war on street crime has diverted our attention away from the more serious problem 
of white-collar crime and corporate crime, despite recent headlines devoted to coverage 
of Enron and Martha Stewart.  As long as we conceptualize street crime as the major 
criminal threat to society we will continue to ignore far more deadly, costly, and 
destructive crimes of corporate America.  This cultural image of our crime problems is 
fed by the media, politicians, and crime specialists who emphasize the growing epidemic 
of the war on drugs, school violence, workplace violence, terrorism, and the like.  In 
essence, murder by gun, knife, or other weapon is considered horrendous while murder 
by unsafe working conditions, pollution, and defective products is accidental and 
therefore, not as problematic or deserving of public attention.  To compound the problem, 
many of the individuals who commit white collar offenses are the very same individuals 
who have the power, resources, and influence to shape laws and determine where much 
of our federal and state money goes.  White-collar crime doesn’t fit prevalent stereotypes 
of “real” crime hence it is not given as much attention by the media, politicians, the 
public or academics. 
  Media attention to environmental crime and its impact on the environment and 
human health is lacking.  Given the importance of the media in creating public awareness 
and garnering attention for certain social problems, it is essential for researchers to 
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examine media coverage of environmental crimes.  There is no single type of 
“environmental crime”; consequently, research focusing on environmental crime must 
selectively examine a more narrow range or particular type of environmental offense and 
offender.  Chapter Four introduces and describes one of the most polluting industries in 
the United States: the Petroleum Refining Industry. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The Petroleum Refining Industry 
 
Introduction 
The petroleum refining industry is one of the leading manufacturing industries in 
the United States.  Oil and natural gas are our biggest source of energy in the United 
States (65%) (American Petroleum Institute, 2004).  Our nation uses two times more 
petroleum than natural gas or coal and four times more than nuclear power or renewable 
energy (Department of Energy, 2004).  Oil is a valuable commodity and few individuals 
realize just how many products come from oil including gasoline, heating oil, plastics, 
diesel fuel, jet fuel, rubber, nylon, kerosene, tires, asphalt and even crayons.  Chapter 
Four describes the current status of the petroleum refining industry; emphasizes the 
environmental and human health hazards associated with the industry; discusses the 
industry’s environmental compliance history; and presents the literature related to 
petroleum refining industry violations.  Only one study to date has examined media 
coverage of petroleum refining industry violations.  
Current Status of the Petroleum Refining Industry  
The United States is currently one of the largest producers and consumers of 
crude oil in the entire world.  According to the Department of Energy (1998), in 1995, the 
United States was responsible for 23% of world refinery production.  Almost fifty percent 
of the oil we consume is produced in the United States (American Petroleum Institute, 
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2004).  Americans continue to consume about two-thirds of the world’s oil production. 
Domestic production has declined but demand continues to soar.  In the early 1980s, our 
country had a record high of 324 refineries and produced approximately 18.6 million 
barrels of oil per day.  Today, the number of American oil refineries has decreased due to 
changes in oil prices, a shift to alternate fuel uses, and a focus on conservation 
(Envirotools, 2004).  
Oil is a finite resource and accordingly production will eventually rise to a peak, 
which can never be surpassed.  Once the peak has been passed, production will decline 
until oil resources are depleted.  This peak effect is known as the Hubbert Peak 
(EcoSystems, 2004).  According to a study conducted by Dr. C.J. Campbell on behalf of 
Petroconsultants (the most comprehensive database on oil resources outside of 
continental North America), world oil reached the midpoint of oil depletion in 1999.  The 
study cautions that we are not running out of oil but we are running out of low cost, easy 
access oil that has fueled the economic development of the twentieth century 
(EcoSystems, 2004).  The only companies a significant way from their midpoints or 
Hubbert Peaks, are the major Middle Eastern oil producers.  Consequently, the likelihood 
of a global crisis similar to the oil crisis of 1973 is eminent.  
The United States has found it increasingly difficult to balance diplomatic 
relations with Arab oil-producing nations while continuing to aid Israel (Foner and 
Garrarty, 1991).  The petroleum refining industry faces some economic pressures with 
respect to increased costs of labor, compliance with new safety and environmental 
regulations, and the closing of small refineries.  However, despite these pressures, total 
refinery output has remained steady and demand is increasing (EPA, 1995a). 
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The petroleum refining industry is comprised of a very small number of 
companies and facilities.  According to the Census Bureau (1997) there are 
approximately 242 petroleum refineries in the United States.  The EPA, which only 
includes larger facilities, estimates that there are 150 petroleum-refining facilities in the 
United States (EPA, 2004c).  Table 2 presents the top U.S. companies with petroleum 
refining operations.  While smaller refineries comprise half of the total number of 
refineries, they only produce approximately 14% of the total crude distillation capacity 
(EPA, 1995a).  Most petroleum is refined and produced by large, integrated companies. 
The majority of facilities are located near crude oil sources which are concentrated along 
the Gulf Coast and in heavily industrialized areas on the east and west coasts.  According 
to the Department of Energy (1998), 78% of the crude oil distillation capacity is located 
in just ten states.  According to the 2001 Annual Survey of Manufacturers (Census 
Bureau, 2001), 101, 452 people are employed by the petroleum refining industry.  In 
2001, the value of shipment products sold by the refining industry totaled over $219 
billion, which was approximately 5.5% of the entire U.S. manufacturing sector.  
Table 2: Top U.S. Petroleum Companies 2002 
Exxon-Mobil 
BP 
Royal Dutch/Shell 
Chevron Texaco 
TotalFinaElf 
Conoco Phillips 
 
Environmental Hazards Associated with the Petroleum Refining Industry 
There are numerous air, water, and soil hazards associated with the petroleum 
refining industry and their processing methods.  According to the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (2001), the petroleum refining industry is one of the major sources of 
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pollution in the United States.  The petroleum refining industry is the largest industrial 
source of volatile organic compounds; the second largest industrial source of sulfur 
dioxide; and the third largest industrial source of nitrogen oxides.  Air pollutants include 
BTEX compounds (benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene); carbon monoxide; 
hydrogen sulfide; sulfur dioxide; and methane (Envirotools, 2004).  Air emissions are the 
result of equipment malfunctions, combustion processes, and transportation errors.  
Water pollutants contaminate the ground and surface water. Several refineries use deep-
injection wells for disposal of wastewater.  In many cases, this wastewater ends up 
polluting aquifers and groundwater.  Soil pollution is generally the result of oil spills and 
landfill usage.  
Air, water, and soil pollutants generated by the petroleum refining industry are 
directly related to a wide range of human health and environmental problems.  Many of 
these toxic and hazardous air, water, and soil pollutants are known cancer-causing agents 
and are also responsible for liver damage and cardiovascular impairment.  Human health 
consequences of exposure to petroleum refinery air pollutants also include 
gastrointestinal toxicity, kidney damage, blood disorders, reproductive and 
developmental toxicity, pulmonary disorders, polyneuropathy, cataracts, and anemia 
(EPA, 1995b).  Benzene exposure is associated with aplastic anemia, multiple myeloma, 
lymphomas, pancytopenia, chromosomal breakage, and weakening of bone marrow 
(EPA, 1995b).  In addition to causing a plethora of human health problems, exposure to 
pollutants generated by petroleum refineries causes a great deal of worry and fear among 
residents living near petroleum refining operations.  
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 The decline in domestic crude oil output over the past decade has led to the 
demand for opening up additional areas for exploration and production.  There is a great 
deal of controversy surrounding oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in 
Alaska.  According to a National Academy of Sciences report (2003), since oil was 
discovered, the environment has been substantially damaged due to refining operations. 
The future of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge is in jeopardy.  Oil industries spend 
millions lobbying legislators for reducing environmental standards and opening up 
additional areas for oil exploration.  From 1992 to 1996, auto and oil industries gave 
more than $56 million in campaign contributions (U.S. PIRG, 1999).  In 1998, auto and 
oil industries spent more than $90.9 million on lobby expenditures with Mobil, Exxon, 
and ARCO leading the way (U.S. PIRG, 1999).  In addition, member of Congress who 
supported bills to overturn EPA air emissions standards received 76% more campaign 
contributions than members of Congress who did not support such legislation (U.S. 
PIRG, 1999). 
Environmental Compliance  
 According to the EPA (1995a), the petroleum refining industry has a larger 
proportion of facilities in violation and with enforcement actions than any other industrial 
sector.  The EPA’s Petroleum Refining Compliance History analysis, which reviewed 
industry enforcement and compliance from August 1990 to August 1995, also found the 
following: 
• Almost all facilities were inspected from 1990-1995 and on average, every three 
months. 
• Facilities with one or more enforcement actions over the five-year period had, on 
average, eight enforcement actions brought against them. 
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• Of all the industrial sectors, the petroleum refining industry was the most frequently 
inspected. 
• The rate of enforcement actions per inspection for the petroleum refining industry is 
high and has changed little over the past year. 
• Clean Air Act violations were the most common. 
 
According to the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory, which contains information on 
toxic chemical releases and other waste management activities, the petroleum refining 
industry released and transferred over 480 million pounds of pollutants in 1993 (EPA, 
1995a).  The petroleum refining industry is far above average in its pollutant releases and 
transfers per facility when compared to other industry facilities (EPA, 1995a). Table 3 
presents TRI information from 1993 for the petroleum refining industry.  
Table 3: Petroleum Refining Industry TRI information, 1993 
Year 1993 
Percent of total pounds of TRI releases/transfers by all 
manufacturers 
11% 
Mean amount of pollutants released per facility 404,000 pounds  
(3.4 times more facility releases 
than other industries) 
Mean amount of pollutants transferred per facility 2,626,000 pounds 
(13 times more facility transfers 
than other industries) 
Percent of total poundage released to air by the petroleum 
refining industry 
75% 
Percent of total poundage released to the water by the 
petroleum refining industry 
24% 
Number of chemicals released or transferred by the petroleum 
refining industry 
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  Environmental regulations have had a tremendous impact on the operations of the 
petroleum refining industry.  Refineries have been forced to invest in upgrading their 
refining processes to reduce emissions.  The refining industry has spent billions on 
complying with environmental regulations (Lichtblau, 1992).  However, according to the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (2001), environmental laws and regulations do not 
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stand in the way of expanding American oil refining capacity.  American Petroleum 
Institute data indicates that oil refineries spend approximately one penny per gallon on 
clean air controls.  Although the costs of complying with environmental laws have 
escalated in the past two decades, profitability has also been increasing.  Oil companies 
are posting record profits (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2001).  Joint ventures, 
mergers, and mega-mergers have allowed oil companies to reduce their costs by sharing 
operations and assets with other companies (Department of Energy, 2003).  “Pollution 
abatement operating costs have been and continue to be a small part of overall operating 
costs” and play a small role in the deterioration of cash margins in U.S. refining and 
marketing (Department of Energy, 1997).  
 Petroleum Industry Violations 
 Only a few studies to date have examined petroleum refining industry violations 
(Randall and DeFillippi, 1987; Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns, 2004a, 2004b).  Recently, 
Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns (2004a) examined whether petroleum refineries that violated 
environmental laws in Black, Hispanic, and low-income areas were more likely to receive 
smaller fines than refineries in White and more affluent communities.  The authors found 
that “Black and low-income communities appear to receive less protection (via the 
deterrence goal of monetary penalties) from the EPA than areas with high concentration 
of White and high-income residents” (Lynch et al, 2004a: 436-437).  The mean penalty 
for noncompliance in Black census tracts ($108,563) was much lower than in White 
census tracts ($341,590) and the mean penalty for noncompliance in low income census 
tracts ($259,784) was lower than in high income census tracts ($334,267).  In a similar 
study examining petroleum refinery violations from 2001-2003, the authors found that 
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refineries in Hispanic and low income zip codes received lower penalties than refineries 
located in non-Hispanic and more affluent zip codes (Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns, 
2004b).  The authors conclude that penalty disparities are not the result of the seriousness 
of the violation, number of past violations, facility inspection history, facility production 
or EPA region but are the result of unequal protection of environmental laws for low 
income and minority communities (Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns, 2004a).  
Media Coverage of Petroleum Refining Industry Violations 
According to Randall and DeFillippi (1987), the media virtually ignored the oil 
industry prior to the early 1970s.  However, following the oil embargo in 1973, the media 
and thus the public began to scrutinize the oil industry with more fervor than ever before. 
By the end of the 1970s, the oil industry had been accused of direct involvement in 
several incidents of illegal and unethical practices.  Industry leaders angrily protested that 
the media had an anti-business slant.  Leading corporate crime researchers, Clinard and 
Yeager (1980) stated that “the history of the oil industry has been characterized by the 
oligopolistic domination of the industry by a few massive corporations able to cooperate 
in controlling worldwide supplies and their distribution and thus to influence prices in a 
noncompetitive manner and a tendency for the federal government to defer to the power 
and interests of the industry”.  
Studies examining media coverage of petroleum refining industry violations are 
virtually nonexistent.  Randall and DeFillippi (1987) examined patterns of media 
coverage of the 25 largest American oil firms from the late 1970s.  The authors 
hypothesized that corporations with greater net sales, more frequent violations of law, 
and more serious offenses would receive greater media attention than corporations with 
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lesser net sales, few law violations, and less serious offenses.  Data were drawn from the 
Clinard-Yeager dataset for 1975-76, Moody’s Industrial Manual for 1975, and news 
indexes for 1975-1976 (Wall Street Journal, Television News Index, and Reader’s Guide 
to Periodic Literature).  Randall and DeFillippi’s (1987) content analysis revealed that the 
media attention was greater based primarily on the seriousness of the offense rather than 
the net sales of the firm or the frequency of offenses.  The authors concluded that there 
was a “systematic media bias toward oversampling the most serious and undersampling 
the least serious oil firm violations” (40).  Their results are not surprising considering the 
media’s tendency to focus on the most serious violations of law across administrative, 
civil, and criminal categories.  
Conclusion 
Randall and DeFillippi (1987) offer one of the first and only studies of media 
coverage of oil company misconduct.  For the most part though, their study is descriptive 
and offers little insight into what factors, other than perceived seriousness of the offense, 
result in greater media coverage.  Furthermore, their data is drawn from oil industry and 
news source information from the late 1970s, over 25 years ago.  In the past twenty-five 
years, there has been almost no academic inquiry into media coverage of the petroleum 
industry or on coverage of industry violations.  The present study examines media 
coverage of federal petroleum refining industry violations in addition to examining the 
nature and distribution of this type of environmental crime.  Chapter Five presents the 
data collected and methods utilized in the present study. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Data and Methods 
 
 The purpose of the present study is three-fold: (1) to determine the nature and 
distribution of petroleum refining industry violations; (2)  to examine media coverage of 
petroleum refining industry violations and enforcement actions and determine whether 
media reporting is influenced by any specific case characteristics; and (3) to determine 
the impact of legal and extra-legal factors on fine amounts meted out to petroleum 
refineries found guilty of violating environmental protection statutes.   
In order to accomplish these goals, data on media coverage of petroleum refinery 
violations, petroleum refinery violations, and community characteristics of areas where 
violative petroleum refineries were located were collected.  News articles from twenty-
five leading American newspapers were employed as the source for media reporting data. 
Data on petroleum refinery violations and area characteristics were collected from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Descriptive statistics, content analysis and 
multiple regression were utilized to analyze the data.  
Research Questions 
 To facilitate investigation of the issues described above, a series of research 
questions were devised.  These questions are as follows: 
1. What is the nature and distribution of environmental crime as indicated by federal 
petroleum refining violations?  
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2. What is the nature and distribution of mainstream news media reporting of federal 
petroleum refining violations? 
3. Which factors lead to greater news media coverage of petroleum refining 
violations? 
4. Are petroleum refining industry penalty assessment decisions affected by the 
racial and socioeconomic composition of the communities surrounding the 
violating facility? Do other factors influence penalty assessment decisions? 
Data 
 Data for the present study were collected for the years 2001-2002 from the 
Environmental Protection Agency and for the years 1997-2003 from the LexisNexis 
database.  Cases in the EPA database reflect cases settled or initiated in 2001-2002, 
consequently, some cases were initiated as early as 1997.  The first step in this research 
was to identify all environmental violations by petroleum refineries using data from the 
EPA.  Once identified, each case was searched in the LexisNexis data base in order to 
locate newspaper articles that reported on known oil refinery violations.  The following 
sections describe the specific databases and the variables drawn from each case and 
article.  
 Environmental Protection Agency 
Established in 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the federal 
agency responsible for protecting human health and the environment by overseeing, 
developing and enforcing environmental policies and regulations.  The EPA has an 
operating budget of over $7.6 billion and employs over 17,600 employees, making it the 
largest federal regulatory agency in the United States.  Of particular interest in the current 
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research is the EPA office of Compliance and Enforcement Assurance (OECA) which is 
responsible for compliance assistance, monitoring, incentives, and auditing as well as 
civil and clean-up enforcement.  The goal of OECA is to maximize compliance and 
reduce threats to public health and the environment through coordinated efforts with state 
and local governmental agencies.  EPA compliance and enforcement efforts are managed 
by a number of various sub-agencies including the Federal Facilities Enforcement Office 
(FFEO); Office of Compliance (OC); Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics, and 
Training (OCEFT); Office of Environmental Justice; Office of Federal Activities; Office 
of Planning, Policy Analysis and Communication (OPPAC); Office of Regulatory 
Enforcement, and the Office of Site Remediation Enforcement.  
 Compliance and Enforcement Data: ECHO 
 The data used in the present study were collected from the EPA’s Enforcement 
and Compliance History Online (ECHO) system.  ECHO supplies compliance and 
enforcement data for over 800,000 regulated facilities nationwide and includes 
information pertaining to permits, inspections, violations, enforcement actions, and 
penalty information covering the past two years.  ECHO data includes violations of the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) for stationary sources, the Clean Water Act (CWA) for facilities 
with direct discharge permits (under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System, NPDES), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) which 
includes information on generators/handlers of hazardous waste.  Data on four key 
enforcement actions can be found in ECHO data (EPA, 2004a):  
1. The number of EPA inspections, and voluntary compliance or self-reported 
violation and pollution emission reports;  
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2. The number and types of violations (noncompliance);  
3. The occurrence of a government enforcement action to address violations; and  
4. Penalties associated with enforcement actions.  
 
The data for the present study were accessed through the EPA enforcement case 
search, which provides access to federal civil enforcement data tracked by the Integrated 
Compliance Information System (ICIS).  ICIS is a multi-statute case activity tracking and 
management system for EPA administrative and civil judicial enforcement cases.  Case 
information is supplied and updated by case attorney’s in the EPA’s Office of Regional 
Counsel and the Headquarters Office of Regulatory Enforcement (EPA, 2004b).  
Data included in the present study were selected based on Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system code 2911, which includes facilities in the petroleum refining 
industry engaged in producing gasoline, kerosene, distillate fuel oils, residual fuel oils, 
and lubricants through fractional or straight distillation of crude oil, redistillation of 
unfinished petroleum derivatives, or cracking or other processes (OSHA, 2004).  In 
addition, cases were included in the present study if they were initiated or concluded 
between January 1997 and January 2003. Bounding the time period yielded 162 cases.  
Using ECHO, a detailed case report summary of enforcement activity, and a 
detailed facility report was produced for each facility.  Information was gathered on the 
following variables. 
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Company Information:  Data were gathered on company name, address, city, 
state, zip code, and latitude and longitude.  These data were used to identify each facility, 
and to allow each facility to be associated with Census data.   
Case Type: Enforcement cases were either administrative or judicial.  It is 
important to distinguish between cases resolved by judicial or administrative means.  For 
example, it is possible that judicial cases are more likely to receive higher penalty 
assessments due to the fact they were not resolved without court intervention.  In 
contrast, administrative decisions are typically rendered when the corporation and the 
EPA reach an informal agreement concerning an appropriate solution to the alleged 
violation.  Thus, it could be hypothesized that because judicial cases are more likely to 
receive higher fines and compliance costs, that they are also more likely to receive media 
coverage, especially if the civil action is costly.  
Voluntary Disclosure: For each case, the EPA indicates whether or not the case 
was the result of a facility self-disclosure or an EPA enforcement action.  Theoretically, it 
could be hypothesized that the EPA is likely to be more lenient with facilities that self 
report law violations, and that it is more likely to require compliance without assessing a 
penalty.  In addition, self-disclosed cases that result in financial penalties are more than 
likely to receive a lower penalty assessment than cases discovered through the EPA 
inspection process.  
Multi-media:  The EPA records whether or not the facility was in violation of 
more than one environmental statute.  If the facility was in violation of more than one 
environmental statute during an inspection, the case is considered to be a multi-media 
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case.  Penalties should be higher in cases involving more than one environmental statute 
violation. 
Case Status: Cases were either coded as closed/concluded or in process/other.  No 
penalty amount can be determined for cases without enforcement outcomes, consequently 
some data will be coded as missing.  Media reports, however, may be available for 
ongoing cases. 
Case Outcome: Case outcomes fall under one of six categories; final order with 
penalty, final order with no penalty, source agrees, unilateral administrative order without 
adjudication, combined with another case, or undecided.  The outcome may impact both 
the reporting and penalty determination for each case. 
Number of Violations and Laws Violated: For each case, the EPA provides a list 
of the number of violations under each environmental statute. While most cases focused 
on violations of the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and/or the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), other environmental statutes were 
also included in the case information, including the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TSCA), the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), and the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA).  Cases that included multiple law violations were coded according 
to the number of laws violated.  It is plausible that penalty assessment and media 
coverage will vary along with the seriousness of a violation, the number of violations, 
and the type of law violated. 
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Federal Penalty Sought and Assessed, Compliance Amount, and SEP Amount: 
Data were collected on the federal penalty sought and the amount assessed in each case.  
According to the EPA, the compliance amount is “the combination of the injunctive relief 
and the physical or nonphysical costs of returning to compliance. Injunctive relief 
represents the actions a regulated entity is ordered to undertake to achieve and maintain 
compliance, such as installing a new pollution control device to reduce air pollution, or 
preventing emissions of a pollutant in the first place” (EPA, 2004d).  The compliance 
amount also includes the costs associated with civil court actions. In addition, data on the 
amount each facility paid into the Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP) was also 
collected. SEP was enacted by the EPA in order to give the defendant the opportunity to 
reduce the penalty assessed for a violation.  The defendant/respondent agrees to 
undertake a particular action as stipulated in the order or decree resolving the 
enforcement action.  A SEP is done voluntarily and is negotiated to reduce penalties.  
CAA, CWA, and RCRA Information: Data were collected concerning the Clean 
Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act for 
major permits, inspections, enforcement actions, penalty assessed, state inspections, 
current significant non-compliance, and number of quarters of non-compliance over the 
past two years.   
1. Permits: Each facility is coded as having a major CAA, CWA, and/or 
RCRA permit, a minor permit, or no permit.  
2.  Inspections: The number of EPA inspections that have occurred at the 
facility, under the corresponding statute, within the last two years. 
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3. Enforcement Actions:  The number of enforcement actions that have 
occurred at the facility, under the corresponding statute, within the last 
two years. 
4. Penalty Amount Assessed: The amount of penalty assessments that have 
occurred at the facility, under the corresponding statute, within the last 
two years. 
5. State Inspections: The number of state inspections that have occurred at 
the facility, under the corresponding statute, within the last two years. 
6. Significant Non-Compliance Violations : Indicates whether or not the 
facility is in significant non-compliance violation of the corresponding 
statute within the last two years. 
7. Quarters of Non-compliance:  The number of quarters (out of 8) the 
facility has been in non-compliance for each statute. 
8. Demographic Information for Each Facility: For each facility, information 
was collected for the following demographics; percent minority, percent 
African-American, percent Hispanic, and percent below poverty within a 
three mile and five mile radius of the violating facility, and for the county 
and state where the violation occurred.   
 LEXISNEXIS News Information 
 In order to examine news coverage of petroleum refining industry violations, 
newspaper articles published on cases listed in the EPA’s ECHO data between 1997 and 
2003 were collected from the LexisNexis database. LexisNexis contains articles from 
over 25 widely circulated newspapers (see Appendix A).  A guided news search was 
conducted utilizing a wide range of search terms in order to reliably identify news articles 
covering petroleum industry violations during the search time frame.  General search 
terms included the following: EPA, oil, petroleum, violations, and fines.  In addition to 
general searches, each of the companies included in the ECHO databases were searched 
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for by name in the LexisNexis database.  Articles not pertaining directly to the petroleum 
industry violations under examination were collected in order to provide a more detailed 
picture of media coverage of the petroleum industry.    
Each article was examined for the following information: article location (i.e. 
front page, business section, etc.); article type (news, editorial, etc.); word count, headline 
keywords, companies named, and article themes.  Articles pertaining directly to cases 
included in the present study were content analyzed in order to determine which factor 
led to greater news media coverage of petroleum refining industry violations. 
Methods of Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics were tabulated for research questions one and two in order to 
describe the nature and distribution of environmental crimes as indicated by federal 
petroleum violations and the nature and distribution of mainstream news media reporting 
of the federal petroleum violations.  
Research question three involves a content analysis of the news articles that 
reported on the federal petroleum refining violations included in the present study. The 
purpose of the content analysis is to describe the factors that led to greater coverage of 
the violations and to describe the latent content of the news reporting. Content analysis 
generally involves examining the manifest and latent content of the data. Manifest 
content refers to the obvious surface content of the data while the latent content refers to 
the meaning underlying what is stated. Both manifest and latent content analysis were 
utilized in the present study.   
 Research question four involved the use of multiple regression. Multiple 
regression is used to account for (predict) the variance in the dependent variable, based 
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on linear combinations of the independent variables.  In other words, multiple regression 
is utilized to estimate the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable, and 
determine whether selected independent variables make a significant contribution 
towards explaining that variance while holding constant competing explanations (i.e., 
represented by other independent variables). The R2 can be used to judge the validity of 
the independent variables as a set of estimators.  The variable estimates (b coefficients 
and constant) are used to construct a prediction equation, and estimate effect sizes.  
 Multiple regression is based on several underlying assumptions (Pedhazur, 1997): 
1) normal distributions, 2) linearity of relationships, and 3) homoscedasticity. Regression 
assumes that variables have normal distributions and that the relationship between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable is linear in nature. In order to check for 
normal distribution and nonlinearity, histograms and scatterplots were examined. The 
data presented a non-normal distribution and a non-linear pattern. In order to obtain a 
more normal distribution and provide a better linear fit, logistic transformations of the 
dependent variables were conducted. Logistic transformation allows for a more normal 
distribution and linearizes the fit as much as possible (Pedhazur, 1997). The main 
drawback of log transformations concerns complicating interpretation of the results. 
Homoscedasticity means that the variance in errors is the same across all levels of the 
independent variable. In the present study, homoscedasticity was checked through a 
visual examination of a plot of the standardized residuals by the regression standardized 
predicted value.   
Several regression models were estimated.  The dependent variable was the 
logged penalty difference.  Previous research has concentrated on predicting the fine 
 73
levied by the EPA against oil refineries that violate environmental statutes (Lynch, 
Stretesky and Burns, 2004a, 2004b).  These studies indicate that community race and 
class characteristics have a significant effect on total EPA penalty assessed.  The present 
study investigates this relationship further by examining the impact of community race 
and class characteristics on penalty departure.  Penalty departure is the difference 
between the EPA recommended penalty and the final assessed penalty.  The distribution 
of this variable was nonlinear and non-normal.  A log transformation approximated a 
more normal, linear variable. 
The independent variables used to predict penalty departure included both legal 
and extra-legal factors.  Legal factors included: voluntary disclosure, number of 
violations, type of violation (CAA, CWA, RCRA), major and minor violations and 
permits, number of violations, and Supplemental Environmental Project contributions.  
Extra-legal factors consisted of community race, class and ethnic concentration measures 
(percent minority, percent African-American, percent Hispanic, and percent below 
poverty) representing the characteristic of people living within three-mile and five mile 
radii surrounding facilities.  Tests for mean racial, ethnic and class variation that 
measured the difference between county and/or state racial, ethnic and class composition 
and local area (3 and 5 mile) racial, ethnic and class composition were also tested. These 
tests were used to assess whether racial, ethnic or class composition per se, or variation in 
racial, ethnic and class composition relative to larger aggregations (counties and states) 
might better account for penalty departure.  
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Study Limitations  
 Before proceeding to the analysis and results, it is useful to address the limitations 
of the present research.  One of the greatest concerns for researchers studying crime in its 
various forms is the likelihood that not all crimes are reported, meaning that any official 
measure of crime contains some measurement bias.  For example, researchers routinely 
conduct crime analyses and make predictions based on the Uniform Crime Reports. 
While the UCR may provide some of the most reliable statistics on crime in comparison 
to other surveys (a debatable suggestion), there are still a wide range and number of 
crimes excluded from the survey. The UCR only reports on crimes known to police. The 
same problem exists in the present study. The data collected only report crimes 
committed by the petroleum refining industry known to the EPA. It is widely noted that 
official reports underestimate the actual amount of crime (Sherman, 1998; MacDonald, 
2002); consequently, the nature and distribution of environmental crime as depicted by 
petroleum refining industry violations may be biased. This problem may be compounded 
by the fact that, EPA enforcement and compliance efforts are heavily influenced by the 
political climate and budgetary commitments. Consequently, in some years increased 
enforcement initiatives may be the direct result of political pressure while in other years, 
budget cuts and other concerns may misdirect environmental concerns.  
 While secondary data analysis presents a wide range of advantages for social 
science research inquiry (Bachman and Schutt, 2001), there are also a number of 
disadvantages which have an impact on the data and analyses in the present study. For a 
number of cases, the EPA did not report data for a range of variables. In some cases, the 
EPA case was still open and consequently data was missing for good cause. In other 
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cases, the data was listed as unavailable despite numerous attempts to retrieve the data. 
Missing data does have an impact on the study results and even more so due to the 
limited range of cases included in the present study. In the future, researchers engaging in 
similar research should contact the EPA in order to request missing data. Furthermore, 
the range of cases can be increased in order to analyze a greater number of cases which 
lessens the impact of missing data.  
Another serious limitation in the present study has to do with the very small 
number of news articles collected with reference to petroleum refining industry 
violations. In the future, studies should widen their search parameters in order to increase 
the potential for wider news coverage.  
 The present study did not take into consideration other factors that influence 
penalty assessment decisions. For example, the EPA or the judge (depending on whether 
the case is administrative or judicial) may base their decisions on personal biases that 
cannot be readily or easily observed and therefore there is no method by which to control 
for these other factors.  
 Finally, the relationships, if any, discovered through the use of regression models 
cannot demonstrate causality.  First, the regression may be inefficient predictors of 
penalty departure, and important independent variables may have been omitted from 
consideration.  Second, the “causal” relationships measured here cannot be directly 
observed, but are inferred from the direction and strength of the statistical relationship.  
For example, if penalty departures are influenced by community class factors, this 
implies that the EPA has somehow considered community factors in reaching a penalty 
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decision,  There is, however, no overt evidence of this influence that can be garnered 
from the present study of aggregate trends. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Results 
 
Introduction 
 The following chapter presents the results for the four research questions 
discussed in the previous chapter. Overall, the present study found that petroleum 
refining industry is responsible for a great deal of environmental crimes; media coverage 
of petroleum refining violations is virtually non-existent; certain factors contribute to the 
likelihood of news coverage; and that penalty amounts are disproportionately distributed 
by racial characteristics. 
Research Question #1 
What is the nature and distribution of environmental crime as indicated by federal 
petroleum refining violations? 
 
Company Information 
 The Environmental Protection Agency ECHO database returned one hundred and 
sixty-two cases. Seventy-eight separate companies were involved in the 162 cases. Of 
these seventy-eight companies, sixteen companies (20.5% of all companies) were 
involved in three or more EPA cases (representing a total of 81 cases or 50% of all cases) 
from 2001-2002 (see Table 4). Twelve companies (15.4% of all companies) were 
involved in two EPA cases (representing a total of 24 cases or 14.8% of all cases) from 
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2001-2002 (see Table 5). The remaining fifty companies were involved in one EPA case 
from 2001-2002.  
Table 4: Companies with Three or More EPA Cases in 2001-2002 (N=16) 
Company Name Number of Cases 
Koch Industries 10  
Chevron 9 
Shell Oil 8 
Motiva Enterprises 7 
BP Amoco 6 
Marathon Ashland 5 
Clark Refining and Marketing 5 
Conoco, Inc 4 
Cross Oil Refining and Marketing 4 
Crown Central Petroleum 4 
Sunoco, Inc 4 
E.I. DuPont 3 
Mobil Oil 3 
PRC Patterson 3 
Sun Company Inc 3 
Tosco Refining Company 3 
 
Table 5: Companies with Two EPA Cases in 2001-2002 (N=12) 
Company Name 
Berry Petroleum 
Cyril Petrochemical 
Double Eagle Refinery Company 
Fina Oil and Chemical 
Texaco 
Montana Refining Company 
Murphy Oil USA 
Navajo Refining Company 
Phillips Petroleum 
Quantum Realty Company 
Reichhold Chemicals Inc. 
Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation 
 
Violating facilities were located in thirty states across the country with the most 
cases occurring in Texas (42) followed by Oklahoma (14) and California, Louisiana, and 
Pennsylvania (each with 11 cases). Table 6 presents the location of the violating facilities 
by state and percentage that this number represents in the total number of cases. 
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Table 6: Location of Violating Facility by State and Percentage of Total Cases*(N=162) 
 
State 
Number of 
 Cases per state 
Percent 
of  
 Total 
per state  
Texas 42 25.9 
Oklahoma 14 8.6 
California, Louisiana, Pennsylvania 11 6.8 
Illinois 9 5.6 
Delaware 8 4.9 
Arkansas 7 4.3 
Puerto Rico 6 3.7 
Minnesota 4 2.5 
Michigan, North Dakota, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Utah, Virginia 
3 1.9 
* The following states had two or fewer violating facilities: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Montana, New York, Ohio, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.  
 
 Overall, federal petroleum refining violation data indicates that a large number of 
petroleum refining companies are in violation of federal violation statutes. Furthermore, 
half of the cases (81) involved companies with more than one violation committed from 
2001-2002. The data also indicate that violations occur in a majority of states which 
operate petroleum refining facilities. A more detailed discussion of these results will be 
presented in Chapter Seven.  
 Case Type 
 Cases were coded as either administrative or judicial (civil). Most cases were 
resolved by the EPA without court intervention (127 cases or 78.4%). The remaining 35 
cases (21.6%) involved judicial intervention.  
 Voluntary Disclosure 
 For each case, the EPA indicates whether or not the case was the result of a 
facility self-disclosure. Only 21 cases (13%) involved self-disclosure.  
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 Multi-media 
 The EPA records whether or not the facility was in violation of more than one 
environmental statute. Most cases involved one violation (142 cases or 87.7%) while 20 
cases (12.3%) involved violations of two or more environmental statutes.  
 Case Status 
 Although a large proportion of cases (115 or 71%) were settled or closed from 
2001-2002, a number of cases (47 or 29%) were initiated during this time period and 
remained open or undecided. 
  Case Outcome 
 Case outcomes were divided into six categories (see Table 7). Most cases (102 or 
63%) received a final order with penalty with the remaining 60 cases falling under one of 
the five additional categories.  
Table 7: Case Outcomes with Frequencies and Percentages (N=162) 
Case Outcome Number Percent 
Final Order with Penalty 102 63.0 
Final Order with No Penalty 11 6.8 
Source Agrees 9 5.6 
Unilateral Administrative Order with No Adjudication 15 9.3 
Combined with Another Case 10 6.2 
Undecided 15 9.3 
 
 Number of Violations 
 For each case, the EPA provides a list of specific violations committed by the 
facility for each environmental statute. While the majority of facilities (113 or 69.8%) 
violated just one environmental statute, the remaining forty-nine facilities were in 
violation of more than one environmental statute (see Table 8).  
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Table 8: Number of Violations per Facility with Frequencies and Percentages (N=162) 
Number of Violations Frequency Percentage of Total 
1 113 69.8 
2 25 15.4 
3 10 6.2 
4 7 4.3 
5 1 .6 
6 5 3.1 
9 1 .6 
 
 Laws Violated 
 The majority of cases involved violations of the Clean Air Act (CAA; N = 74; 
45.7%), the Clean Water Act (CWA; N = 39; 24.1%) and/or the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA; N = 22; 13.6%). Table 9 provides the frequencies and 
percentages of the six other environmental statutes included in the present study. 
Table 9: Frequency and Percent of Environmental Statute Violations (N=202) 
Environmental Statute Frequency Percentage of Facilities 
in Violation 
CAA 74 45.7 
CWA 39 24.1 
RCRA 22 13.6 
CERCLA 26 16.0 
TSCA 12 7.4 
EPCRA 26 16.0 
FIFRA 2 1.2 
SDWA 1 .6 
 
 Federal Penalty Sought and Assessed 
Data were collected on the amount of the federal penalty sought and the amount 
assessed in each case. Of the 162 cases, 57 cases (35.2%) did not list information 
pertaining to penalty sought. The EPA sought a total of $61,788,724 from 105 facilities 
with a range from $0 to $9,500,000. The average penalty sought was $588,464 when the 
highest penalty amounts sought (2 x $9,500,000) were included in the calculations. 
Excluding the two highest penalties sought, the EPA sought a total of $42,788,724 from 
103 facilities, or an average penalty sought of $415,424. The average amount sought by 
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the EPA is skewed by the high amounts assessed to a small number of facilities therefore 
it is important to examine the penalty amount sought by the EPA in terms of the 
frequency and percentage by dollar range (see Table 10). In 43.2 percent of the cases 
(70), the EPA sought less than $100,000 in fines. For a small number of cases (12 or 
7.5%) the EPA sought more than a million dollars in fines. 
Table 10: Penalty Amount Sought By the EPA by Dollar Range (N=105) 
Dollar Range Number of Cases Percentage of Cases 
$0 6 5.7 
$1-$10,000 20 19.0 
$10,001-$99,999 44 41.9 
$100,000-$500,000 18 17.1 
$500,001-$1,000,000 5 4.8 
$1,000,001-$5,000,000 9 8.6 
$5,000,001-$10,000,000 3 2.9 
 
 In terms of the federal penalty assessed, 55 cases (34%) did not list information 
pertaining to penalty assessed. The EPA assessed a total of $49,942,407 from 107 
facilities with a range of $0 to $9,500,000. The average penalty assessed was $466,532 
when the highest penalty amounts assessed ($9,500,000 and $6,000,000) were included 
in the calculations. Excluding the two highest penalties assessed, the average penalty 
assessed was $328,023. Table 11 presents the frequencies and percentages of penalty 
amount assessed by the EPA by the dollar range. In 48.1 percent of the cases (79), the 
EPA assessed less than $100,000 in fines. For a small number of cases (11 or 6.8%) the 
EPA assessed more than a million dollars in fines.    
Table 11: Penalty Amount Assessed By the EPA by Dollar Range (N=107) 
Dollar Range Number of Cases Percentage of Total Cases 
$0 11 10.3 
$1-$10,000 36 33.6 
$10,001-$99,999 31 29.0 
$100,000-$500,000 14 13.1 
$500,001-$1,000,000 4 3.7 
$1,000,001-$5,000,000 9 8.4 
$5,000,001-$10,000,000 2 2.0 
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 Compliance Amount 
 In 34 of the 162 cases, the EPA assessed compliance costs against the violating 
facility. Compliance costs include injunctive relief costs and costs associated with 
returning the violating facility to compliance with EPA statutes. Information pertaining to 
compliance costs was missing for 50 cases (30.9%) due to case status (open/undecided). 
Seventy-eight facilities (48.1%) were not assessed any compliance costs. Compliance 
costs for the remaining 34 facilities (21%) ranged from $5 to $550,000,000. Total 
compliance costs assessed by the EPA equaled $1,506,698,706. In eighteen of the thirty 
four cases (52.9%), the EPA assessed compliance costs of $1,000,000 or less (in twelve 
cases (35.3%), the EPA assessed compliance costs of $5,000 or less). In the remaining 
sixteen cases (47.1%), the EPA assessed compliance costs of greater than $1,000,000. Of 
these sixteen cases, 10 cases (29.4%) involved compliance costs between $9,500,000 and 
$22,000,000 while the highest five compliance cost cases (14.7) were assessed costs 
ranging from $80,000,000 to $550,000,000. Due to the vast difference in the range of 
compliance costs, the average compliance cost is misleading ($44,314,668) due to the 
extremely high amounts assessed to five of the violating facilities. These five facilities 
alone comprise $1,397,000,000 of the total compliance costs of $1,506,698,000 or 93.7% 
of the total.  
 SEP Amount 
 The Supplemental Environmental Project was enacted by the EPA in order to give 
the violating facility the opportunity to reduce the penalty assessed for a violation. The 
violating facility agrees to undertake a particular action as stipulated in the order or 
decree resolving the enforcement actions. Due to open or undecided cases, SEP amount 
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data was missing for 49 cases (30.2%). No SEP amount was negotiated for 87 cases 
(53.7%). Twenty-six cases (16.1%) involved negotiation and assessment of an SEP 
amount. SEP amounts ranged from $1,000 to $7,500,000. The total SEP amount assessed 
equaled $26,854,509. Of the twenty-six cases assessed SEP amounts, eleven cases 
(42.3%) were assessed less than $31,000. Eight cases (30.8%) were assessed more than 
$31,000 but less than $1,000,000. Seven cases (26.9%) were assessed more than 
$1,000,000 in SEP costs and of those seven cases, three cases (11.5%) were assessed SEP 
costs in excess of $5,500,000.  
 CAA, CWA, and RCRA Information 
  Data were collected pertaining to facility permits, EPA inspections enforcement 
actions, penalties assessed, state inspections, current significant non-compliance, and 
number of quarters of non-compliance over the past two years (2003-2004) for each 
facility, for the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act. With respect to major permits, number of EPA inspections, number of 
EPA enforcement actions, and EPA penalty amounts, data were missing for 33 cases 
(20.4%). With respect to number of state inspections, current significant non-compliance, 
and number of quarters non-compliance, data were missing for 34 cases (21%). Missing 
data were the result of undecided cases or a delay in EPA data entry.  
 Table 12 presents the number and frequencies of CAA, CWA, and RCRA major 
permit holders in 2003-2004. The majority of the companies were major RCRA permit 
holders (97.7%) while approximately three-quarters (74.4%) were major CAA permit 
holders. A little over half (55.0%) of the companies were major CWA permit holders. 
Sixty-five cases (50.4%) involved companies with all three major permits.  Twenty-nine 
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cases (22.5%) involved companies with major CAA and RCRA permits. Ten cases 
(7.8%) involved companies with major CWA and RCRA permits. There were no cases 
involving companies with just CAA and CWA major permits.  
Table 12: CAA, CWA, and RCRA Major Permits 2003-2004 (N=129) 
Major Permit Number of Cases Percentage of Cases 
CAA, CWA, RCRA 65 50.4% 
CAA and RCRA 29 22.5% 
CWA and RCRA 10 7.8% 
CAA only 2 1.6% 
RCRA only 23 17.8% 
 
 EPA Inspections 
 Table 13 presents the number and frequencies of inspections conducted by the 
EPA from 2003-2004. A large number of companies were not inspected for CAA 
violations (54.3%), CWA violations (49.6%), or RCRA violations (48.4%). When 
combining the percentage of inspections for the CAA, CWA, and RCRA, approximately 
one-third of the companies were inspected by the EPA for CAA, CWA, and RCRA 
violations from 2003-2004. Eight companies (6.3%) were inspected more than three 
times for CAA violations; twenty-five companies (19.4%) were inspected more than 
three times for CWA violations; and thirty companies (23.2%) were inspected more than 
three times by the EPA for RCRA violations. 
Table 13: CAA, CWA, and RCRA Number of EPA Inspections 2003-2004 (N=129) 
Number of Inspections CAA CWA RCRA 
0 70 (54.3%) 64 (49.6%) 63 (48.4%) 
1-2 51 (39.5%) 40 (31.0%) 36 (27.9%) 
3-4 6 (4.7%) 15 (11.6%) 15 (11.6%) 
5 or more 2 (1.6%) 10 (7.8%) 15 (11.6%) 
 
 Enforcement Actions 
 Table 14 presents the number and frequencies of enforcement actions initiated by 
the EPA for CAA, CWA, and RCRA violations from 2003-2004. For the CAA, most 
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companies had no enforcement actions (75.2%), although 18 companies (14.0%) had one 
enforcement action and 14 companies had 2 or more enforcement actions (10.5%). For 
the CWA, the vast majority of companies had no enforcement actions (96.1%) while 5 
companies (3.9%) had one or more enforcement actions. For RCRA, the majority of 
companies had no enforcement actions (88.3%) although nine companies (7.0%) had one 
enforcement action and six companies (4.7%) had two enforcement actions.  
Table 14: CAA, CWA, and RCRA Number of EPA Enforcement Actions 2003-2004 (N=129) 
Number of 
 Enforcement Actions 
CAA CWA RCRA 
0 97 (75.2%) 124 (96.1%) 114 (88.3%) 
1 18 (14.0%) 2 (1.6%) 9 (7.0%) 
2 5 (3.8%) 2 (1.6%) 6 (4.7%) 
3 or more 9 (7.0%) 1 (.7%) 0 (0.0%) 
  
 Comparisons of the inspection and enforcement data reveal that 54.2 percent of 
CAA inspections resulted in an enforcement action, 7.7 percent of CWA inspections 
resulted in an enforcement action, and 22.7 percent of RCRA inspections resulted in an 
enforcement action.  
 Penalty Amounts 
 Table 15 presents the number and frequencies of penalty amounts assessed by the 
EPA for CAA, CWA, and RCRA violations from 2003-2004. For the CAA, most 
companies (82.2%) had no penalty assessments, four companies (3.1%) were assessed 
less than $10,000 in fines, five companies (3.8%) were assessed fines ranging from 
$10,001-$100,000, four companies (3.1%) were assessed fines ranging from $100,001-
$1,000,000, and one company (.7%) received a fine in excess of $1,000,000. For the 
CWA, all but two companies (98.4%) received no penalty assessments. One company 
(.7%) was assessed a penalty of less than $10,000 while the other company received a 
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fine in excess of $1,000,000. For RCRA, most companies (93%) received no fines from 
the EPA while four companies (3.1%) were assessed less than $10,000 in fines and three 
companies (2.3%) were ordered to pay fines ranging from $10,000 to $1,000,000.  
Table 15: CAA, CWA, and RCRA EPA Penalty Amounts Assessed 2003-2004 (N=129) 
Penalty Amount CAA* CWA* RCRA* 
$0 106 (82.2%) 127 (98.4%) 120 (93.0%) 
$1-$10,000 4 (3.1%) 1 (.7%) 4 (3.1%) 
$10,001-$100,000 5 (3.8%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.6%) 
$100,001-$1,000,000 4 (3.1%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (.7%) 
$1,000,001 or more 1 (.7%) 1 (.7%) 0 (0.0%) 
* Range of penalty amounts for CAA: $0-$4,395,407; CWA: $0-$4,500,000; RCRA: $0-$205,866 
 
 Table 16 presents the number and frequency of inspections conducted at the state 
level for the CAA, CWA, and RCRA from 2003-2004. State inspections were conducted 
more frequently than federal inspections. For the CAA, forty companies (31.3%) had no 
inspections, 31 companies (24.2%) had 1-3 inspections, eighteen companies (14.1%) had 
from 4-6 inspections, and 31 companies (25%) had more than 7 inspections. For the 
CWA, over half of the companies (53.1%) were never inspected by the state from 2003-
2004. Forty-eight companies (37.5%) were inspected from 1-3 times and 12 companies 
(9.4%) were inspected over 4 times by the state. For RCRA, almost half of the companies 
(49.2%) were not inspected by the state while forty-four companies (34.4%) had 1-3 
inspections. Twenty-one cases (16.4%) were inspected by the state more than four times 
from 2003-2004.  
Table 16: CAA, CWA, and RCRA Number of State Inspections 2003-2004 (N=128) 
Number of  
State Inspections 
CAA CWA RCRA 
0 40 (31.3%) 68 (53.1%) 63 (49.2%) 
1-3 31 (24.2%) 48 (37.5%) 44 (34.4%) 
4-6 18 (14.1%) 1 (.8%) 15 (11.7%) 
7-9 9 (7.0%) 1 (.8%) 6 (4.7%) 
10 or more 23 (18.0%) 10 (7.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
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 When examining all inspections (by both the EPA and the state), the data reveals 
the following: in thirty cases (23.3%) no inspections were conducted by the EPA for 
CAA, CWA, or RCRA violations from 2003-2004; in thirty-nine cases (24.1%) no 
inspections were conducted by the EPA or the state for CAA violations from 2003-2004; 
in sixty-three cases (48.8%) no inspections were conducted by the EPA or the state for 
CWA violations from 2003-2004; and in sixty-two cases (48.1%) no inspections were 
conducted by the EPA or the state for RCRA violations from 2003-2004.  
 Significant Noncompliance 
 Table 17 presents the number and frequency of companies determined by the EPA 
to be in significant non-compliance with the CAA, CWA, and RCRA. Sixty companies 
(46.9%) were in significant non-compliance with the CAA, four companies (3.1%) were 
in significant non-compliance with the CWA, and eight companies (6.3%) were in 
significant non-compliance with RCRA.  
Table 17: CAA, CWA, and RCRA Significant Non-Compliance 2003-2004 (N=128) 
Significant  
Non-Compliance 
CAA CWA RCRA 
YES 60 (46.9%) 4 (3.1%) 8 (6.3%) 
 
 Table 18 presents the number and frequency of the quarters of non-compliance 
(out of 8) for the CAA, CWA, and RCRA from 2003-2004. Non-compliance can result 
from three conditions: (1) the company is found to be in current noncompliance with 
statutes; (2) the company has failed to remedy a past non-compliance finding; (3) the 
company has failed to file a compliance statement with the EPA. Sixty-two companies 
(48.4%) were in non-compliance for the CAA for 7 or 8 quarters while fifty-two 
companies (40.6%) had zero quarters of non-compliance. Half of the companies (50.0%) 
had zero quarters of non-compliance for the CWA while fifteen companies (11.7%) were 
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in non-compliance for 7-8 quarters. Seventy-five companies (58.6%) had zero quarters in 
non-compliance with RCRA while thirty-five companies (27.3%) were in non-
compliance for 7-8 quarters.  
Table 18: CAA, CWA, and RCRA Number of Quarters of Non-Compliance 2003-2004 (N=128) 
Quarters of Non-
Compliance 
CAA CWA RCRA 
0 52 (40.6%) 64 (50.0%) 75 (58.6%) 
1-2 2 (1.6%) 18 (14.1%) 12 (9.4%) 
3-4 7 (5.5%) 20 (15.6%) 4 (3.1%) 
5-6 5 (3.9%) 11 (8.6%) 2 (1.6%) 
7-8 62 (48.4%) 15 (11.7%) 35 (27.3%) 
 
 
 Summary of Results for Research Question #1 
 
 Results of the descriptive statistics tabulated for research question #1 on the 
nature and distribution of environmental crime as indicated by federal environmental 
violations committed by the petroleum refining industry indicate the following: 
1. Violations of environmental statutes are frequent and widespread.  
2. Thirty-six percent of companies were involved in more than one EPA case from 
2001-2002. 
3. The majority of states (thirty) hosting petroleum refining operations had a least 
one refinery in violation of environmental statutes. 
4. One out of every five cases involved judicial intervention. 
5. Only a small number of cases (13%) involved a facility self-disclosure of 
violations. 
6. The Clean Air Act was the most frequently violated statute.  
7. Over half (50.4%) of cases involved companies with major permits for the CAA, 
CWA, and RCRA. 
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8. Over twenty-three percent of cases involved companies with no inspections by the 
EPA or the state for violations of the CAA, CWA, or RCRA from 2003-2004. 
9. Forty-seven percent of cases involved companies in significant non-compliance of 
the CAA from 2003-2004. 
10. Forty-eight percent of cases involved companies in non-compliance with the CAA 
for 7 or quarters of 2003-2004.  
Research Question #2 
 
What is the nature and distribution of mainstream news media reporting of federal 
petroleum refining violations? 
 
 News articles from the LexisNexis database were collected from 1997 to 2003 
corresponding with the earliest EPA initiated case in 1997 and a year after the last case 
was initiated in 2002. A guided news search was conducted in order to obtain the expanse 
of news articles covering petroleum refining violations during the search time frame. 
Each article was examined for the following information; article location, article type, 
word count, and case match. In addition, a content analysis was conducted in order to 
determine which factors lead to greater news media coverage of petroleum refining 
industry violations.  
Seventy-four articles were collected with reference to petroleum refining industry 
violations. Of these seventy-four articles, seventeen articles (23%) corresponded directly 
with cases included in the EPA ECHO database. The remaining fifty-seven articles (77%) 
reported on the petroleum refining industry but were not directly related to any of the 
cases included in the ECHO database.  
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 All News Articles on the Petroleum Refining Industry 
 Seventy-four news articles were collected with respect to the petroleum refining 
industry. Table 19 presents the year and number of articles collected during that year. The 
majority of articles appeared in 2000 (22 or 29.7%) or 2001 (25 or 33.8%), representing 
63.5% of the total number of articles.  
Table 19: Number of News Articles on the Petroleum Refining Industry by Year (N=74) 
YEAR Number of Articles 
1997 5 
1998 2 
1999 0 
2000 22 
2001 25 
2002 9 
2003 11 
 
  Articles appeared in twenty different news sources. Table 20 presents the news 
sources and the number of articles presented by each source. The Houston Chronicle 
produced the most news articles (15 or 20.3%) followed by the Times Picayune (News 
Orleans) with 12 articles (16.2%) and the Star Tribune (Minneapolis) and the New York 
Times with 7 articles each (9.5%). Together, articles from these four news sources (41) 
represent over half (55.5%) of the total number of articles.   
Table 20: News Sources and Number of Articles by Source (N=74) 
News Source Number of 
Articles 
News Source Number of 
Articles 
Atlanta Journal Constitution 2 San Diego Union Tribune 1 
Chicago Sun-Times 5 San Francisco Chronicle 5 
Daily News (New York) 2 Seattle Times 1 
Denver Post 1 St. Louis Post 2 
Houston Chronicle 15 Star Tribune (Minneapolis) 7 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 3 Tampa Tribune 2 
New York Times 7 Columbus Dispatch 1 
Pittsburgh Post Gazette 1 Times Picayune (New Orleans) 12 
Rocky Mountain News (Denver) 2 USA Today 1 
San Antonio Express 1 Washington Post 3 
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 Each article was examined for article location. News articles appeared in one of 
four locations: 1) News (including Section A and National News), 2) Local News 
(including Section B, Metro, and Suburban), 3) Business (including Money), and 4) 
Other (including editorials or Science). Table 21 presents the frequencies and percentages 
of news articles by the article location. For each article location, information was also 
gathered according to location of the article within that specific sub-section of the paper. 
Table 22 presents the frequencies and percentages of article locations within each of the 
four major categories. Over forty-four percent of the articles (33) appeared on the front 
page of the paper sub-section while over forty percent of the articles appeared on page 
four or higher (30).  
Table 21: Frequencies and Percentages of News Articles by Article Location (N=74) 
Article Location Number and Percent of Total 
News (Section A/National) 29 (39.2%) 
Local (Section B/Metro) 21 (28.4%) 
Business (Money) 21 (28.4%) 
Other (Editorial/Science) 3 (4.5%) 
 
Table 22: Frequencies of News Articles by Sub-Section of Article Location (N=74) 
Location Front page Page 2 or 3 Page 4 or higher 
News 8  2 19 
Local 11 5 5 
Business 14 4 3 
Editorial 0 0 3 
Total 33 (44.6%) 11 (14.9%) 30 (40.5%) 
 
 The majority of the articles were considered strictly “news” pieces (67 or 90.5%) 
while a small number of articles were considered either “news briefs” (5 or 6.8%) or 
“editorials” (2 or 2.7%).  
Data were collected on the total word count for each article. The lengthiest article 
contained 5,729 words while the shortest article contained just 79 words. The average 
word count including the lengthiest article was 630 words per article but excluding the 
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lengthiest article the average word count drops to 568 words per article. Fifty-two articles 
(70.3%) contained less than 700 words while the remaining twenty-two articles contained 
700 words or more (29.7%). Table 23 presents the frequencies and percentages of news 
articles by word count category. News papers have varying guidelines in terms of column 
length and word count. On average, feature or front section news stories will contain just 
over 1,000 words suggesting that the articles concerning environmental crime are about 
half as long (568 words per article on average).  
Table 23: Frequencies and Percentages of News Articles by Word Count (N=74) 
Number of Words Number of Articles Percentage of Articles 
Less than 100 4 5.4 
101-300 15 20.3 
301-500 15 20.3 
501-700 18 24.3 
701-900 11 14.9 
901-1,100 6 8.1 
1,100 or more 5 6.8 
 
 Case Specific News Articles on the Petroleum Refining Industry 
The news data presented in the preceding paragraphs and in Tables 19 through 23 
are reflective of all news articles collected on the petroleum refining industry from 1997 
to 2003. A small number of articles (17 or 23%) pertained directly to one or more of the 
cases presented in the ECHO databases. Table 24 presents information pertaining to the 
company named in the article, the ECHO case number, and the number of articles 
addressing that specific case.  
Although only seventeen articles were directly related to the cases analyzed in the 
present study, a number of articles mentioned more than one company. For example, BP 
and Koch were reported on in four articles with Koch also mentioned in one additional 
article. Both Marathon Ashland and Motiva were reported on in three articles for each 
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company. Conoco (3 articles), Clark Refining and Marketing (2 articles), and Murphy Oil 
(1 article) were the only singular cases to be reported on in the news articles.  
Table 24: Company Name, ECHO Case Number, and Number of News Articles (N=17) 
Company ECHO Case Number News Articles 
Koch Petroleum Group 31 5* 
Koch Petroleum Group 55 5* 
Koch Petroleum Group 56 5* 
BP Exploration and Oil Company 32 4* 
BP Exploration and Oil Company 33 4* 
Marathon Ashland Petroleum 61 3** 
Marathon Ashland Petroleum 29 3** 
Marathon Oil Company, Inc. 28 3** 
Motiva Enterprises, LLC 62 3*** 
Motiva Enterprises, LLC 63 3*** 
Motiva Enterprises, LLC 64 3*** 
Conoco, Inc. 97 3 
Clark Refining and Marketing Inc. 22 2 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. 24 1 
* All five cases concerning BP and Koch were represented in four of the same articles (Koch had one 
additional article). 
** All three cases concerning Marathon Ashland were represented in the three corresponding news articles. 
*** All three cases concerning Motiva were represented in the three corresponding news articles. 
 
 ECHO Case Information and Corresponding Article Information  
 Data are presented on the specific ECHO cases that appeared in news articles 
relating to the violation. In addition, information from each article is presented below. A 
more detailed discussion of the latent content of the articles and case comparisons will be 
examined in the following Discussion Chapter.  
Clark Refining and Marketing Inc. (ECHO Case #22) (Two Articles) 
 According to the EPA, Clark Refining and Marketing Inc. violated the CAA, 
CWA, RCRA, CERCLA, and EPCRA, at their refinery located in Blue Island, Illinois. 
The EPA filed a civil case against the company on September 9, 1998 and settled the case 
on June 12, 2002. The company did not voluntarily disclose the violations. The penalty 
amount sought by the EPA was not disclosed but the EPA assessed the company 
$3,125,000 for the violations in addition to $1,450,000 in compliance costs.  
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 Two news articles (from the St. Louis Dispatch and the Washington Post) 
appeared on the date following the filing of the case by the EPA (9/10/1998). The first 
news article appeared in the St. Louis Dispatch Metro section (word count = 717) and 
reported on a press conference attended by then Attorney General Janet Reno who 
announced that the Justice Department would be pursuing civil action against several oil 
companies for EPA violations, including Clark Refining and Marketing. The case was 
mentioned as part of the Mississippi River Initiative, a federal effort to protect the 
Mississippi River. For the most part, the article focused on violations committed by Shell 
Oil Company (not included in the ECHO database) but did mention that Clark was 
responsible for violating a number of federal statutes including the Clean Air Act and the 
Clean Water Act. Reactions from Clark officials were presented in the article. No penalty 
amounts were included in the article.  
 The news article from the Washington Post, Section A, page 3, (word count = 
1,001) was similar in content to the news article presented in the St. Louis Dispatch. 
Again, quotes from then Attorney General Janet Reno were reported and an emphasis 
was placed on Shell Oil Company. Information pertaining to pollution of the Mississippi 
River was highlighted. Enforcement actions against Clark Refining and Marketing were 
mentioned very briefly, in just one sentence of the entire article.  
Conoco, Inc. (ECHO Case #97) (Three Articles) 
  According to the EPA, Conoco, Inc. violated the CAA at their refinery located in  
Ponca City, Oklahoma and at eight other refineries located across the United States, 
including a refinery in Commerce City, Colorado. The EPA filed a civil case against the 
company on December 21, 2001 and settled the case on February 20, 2002. The company 
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did not voluntarily disclose the violation. The EPA sought $1,500,000 in fines but 
assessed the company $824,000 in fines in addition to compliance costs of $80,000,000 
and an SEP amount of $1,800,000.  
 Three articles appeared on the same day the case was filed by the EPA (12/21/01). 
Article sources included the Houston Chronicle, the Denver Post, and the Rocky 
Mountain News (Denver). The news article from the Denver Post Metro section (word 
count = 536) focused on Conoco’s violation of the CAA at the Commerce City, CO 
refinery. The article stated that Conoco agreed to pay over $22 million on air pollution 
controls at the Commerce City refinery and also mentioned a $145,000 civil penalty and 
$2.6 million SEP amount. State health officials, regional EPA officials, and community 
leaders were quoted in the body of the article. Emphasis was placed on Conoco’s quick 
reaction to comply with regulations once the company became aware of the violations. 
Although the case against Conoco was judicial in nature, article statements imply that 
Conoco agreed to work with the EPA in order to avoid lengthy litigation.   
 The second news article concerning Conoco appeared in the Rocky Mountain 
News, another Denver, Colorado publication. The article was reported in the Local 
section of the paper and contained 703 words. The body of the article was very similar to 
the information reported in the Denver Post. Penalty amounts were reported and local 
officials were quoted. Again, emphasis was placed on Conoco’s quick response to the 
pollution allegations and subsequent compliance efforts. The article described the 
benefits to the community in terms of decreased air emissions and support for local 
environmental projects.  
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 The third and final article addressing Conoco appeared in the Houston Chronicle 
Business section (word count = 243). The brief article stated that Conoco agreed to spend 
up to $110 million to reduce emissions at its various refineries located in Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, Colorado, and Montana. Similar to the two previous articles, the Chronicle 
article also reported on a $1.5 million civil penalty and a $5 million SEP amount. While 
the majority of the article addressed the EPA violations, the article also discussed 
Conoco’s intentions to purchase interests in a natural gas project off the Vietnam coast.  
Marathon Ashland (ECHO Cases #28, #29, and #61) (Three Articles) 
 According to the EPA, Marathon Ashland violated the CAA, CWA, RCRA, and 
TSCA at their refineries located in Texas, Illinois, Louisiana, Kentucky, Ohio, 
Minnesota, and Michigan. The judicial case was filed by the EPA on May 11th, 2001 and 
settled on August 28th, 2001. The EPA combined the cases for penalty assessment 
purposes. No cases were voluntarily disclosed. The EPA sought $3,800,000 in penalties 
and assessed $3,700,000 in penalties. In addition, Marathon Ashland was assessed 
$265,000,000 in compliance costs and agreed to pay $6,500,000 in SEP amounts.  
 Three articles concerning the Marathon Ashland cases appeared the day after the 
EPA initiated its judicial cases against the company (5/12/01). Articles appeared in the 
St. Louis Dispatch, the Star Tribune (Minneapolis), and the Houston Chronicle. The 
article appearing in the St. Louis Dispatch was part of a section entitled “Nation and 
World Briefs”; consequently the information reported was very brief. The article stated 
that Marathon Ashland was assessed an estimated $265 million to install pollution control 
equipment at its refineries. The article listed the location of the violating refineries and 
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stated that Marathon Ashland was responsible for a $3.8 million civil penalty and a $6.5 
million SEP amount.  
 The second article addressing Marathon Ashland was reported in the News 
section of the Star Tribune (Minneapolis) (word count = 607). The article stated that 
Marathon Ashland had “agreed” to spend $265 million on pollution control equipment, a 
$3.8 million civil penalty, and a $6.5 million SEP amount. In addition, the article 
repeatedly addressed an “odor” problem affecting the community located near the St. 
Paul Park refinery. The article reported the various ways in which Marathon Ashland is 
required to reduce pollution at its refineries and stated that several of the pollutants “have 
been associated with serious respiratory problems and could exacerbate childhood 
asthma”. Although the case was not voluntarily disclosed, a Marathon Ashland official 
stated that the settlement was voluntary and would avoid litigation. The article lists the 
other refineries included in the settlement and describes the lengthy violation history of 
the St. Paul Park Refinery.  
 The third and final article concerning the Marathon Ashland cases appeared in the 
Houston Chronicle Business section (word count = 231). Like the first article from the St. 
Louis Dispatch, the article is considered a “news brief”. The article begins by stating that 
the cases against Marathon Ashland were “settled” on the previous day although 
according to EPA data, the cases were actually filed on that day and settled several 
months later. Again, similar to the two previous articles, the Chronicle article reports 
penalty amounts and refinery locations. The article also addressed how new equipment 
would “help ease respiratory problems such as childhood asthma”. Attorney General John 
Ashcroft is quoted as stating that the settlement was “a victory for the environment”.  
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Motiva Enterprises (ECHO Cases #62, #63, and #64) (Three Articles) 
 According to the EPA, Motiva Enterprises violated the CAA, CWA, RCRA, 
TSCA, and EPCRA at their refineries located in Louisiana and Texas. The judicial case 
was filed by the EPA on March 21st, 2001. The EPA combined the cases for penalty 
assessment purposes. No cases were voluntarily disclosed. The EPA sought $4,400,000 
in penalties and assessed $4,400,000 in penalties. In addition, Motiva was assessed 
$400,000,000 in compliance costs and agreed to pay $5,500,000 in SEP amounts.  
 Three news articles appeared on the day following the initial filing of the case by 
the EPA (3/22/01). Articles were reported in the Houston Chronicle, the Time Picayune, 
and the Seattle Times. The Houston Chronicle article appeared in the News section, front 
page, and contained 733 words. The article immediately reported the high compliance 
amount ($400 million) assessed against Motiva for violations at nine refineries located in 
five states. The article also mentioned a penalty amount of $9.5 million and an SEP 
amount of $5.5 million and contained quotes from the EPA administrator and officials 
from the Department of Justice. While the article addresses violations committed by 
Motiva, other violating refineries are also included. Descriptions of the air pollutants 
released by the offending facilities are reported although there is no discussion of the 
related health concerns.  
 The second article addressing Motiva appeared in the Times Picayune National 
news section (word count = 1,005). Again, like the previous article concerning Motiva, 
penalty, compliance, and SEP amounts are reported. Quotes from prominent Louisiana 
environmental officials appear throughout the article. Then Attorney General John 
Ashcroft stated, “protecting our natural resources. . .is a top priority for the Department 
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of Justice”. No mention is made about how human health is affected by pollution. The 
article addressed a criminal case pending against Motiva concerning alleged faulty record 
keeping.  
 The third and final article addressing Motiva appeared in the Seattle Times “News 
Across the Nation” section (word count = 443). The article summarized the cases against 
Motiva and included a list of the offending refineries, the penalty/compliance/SEP 
amounts, and the amount of emissions that would be reduced under the case agreement.  
BP and Koch (ECHO Cases #31, #32, #33, #55, and #56) 
 According to the EPA, BP Amoco violated the CAA and RCRA at their refineries 
located in CA, UT, LA, WA, ND, OH, IN, OK and VA. The judicial cases were filed by 
the EPA on January 18th, 2001 and settled on August 29th, 2001. The EPA combined the 
cases for penalty assessment purposes. The EPA sought $9,500,000 in penalties and 
assessed $9,500,000 in penalties. In addition, BP was assessed $550,000,000 in 
compliance costs. According to the EPA, Koch violated the CAA, CWA, RCRA, and 
EPCRA at their refineries located in Texas and Minnesota. The judicial cases were filed 
by the EPA on December 22nd, 2000 and settled on April 25th, 2001. The EPA combined 
the cases for penalty purposes. The EPA sought $4,500,000 in penalties and assessed 
$4,500,000 in penalties. In addition, Koch was assessed $102,000,000 in compliance 
costs. These cases are described together due to the fact they were reported on 
simultaneously in the following news articles.  
 Four news articles addressed the violations committed by BP and Koch and one 
addition article addressed violations committed solely by Koch. Articles appeared in the 
Houston Chronicle, the Washington Post, the Times Picayune, and the Star Tribune (2). 
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The article reported on in the Houston Chronicle Business section (word count = 538) 
listed the 12 violating refineries and 10 affected states including local refineries in Texas 
City and Corpus Christi. Penalty amounts, compliance costs, and SEP amounts are 
reported and the article emphasized that the almost $600 million compliance costs were 
the “largest enforcement agreements” related to air pollution in history. Quotes from the 
EPA administrator were included and the companies were hailed for voluntarily initiating 
negotiations (although according to the EPA the violations were not self-reported). The 
article included a description of the agreement stipulations and highlighted BP and 
Koch’s 15 percent total U.S. oil refining capacity. The companies were praised for their 
“cooperativeness”.  
The second article concerning BP and Koch appeared in the Washington Post in a 
“news brief” (word count = 115). The high compliance costs ($600 million) are reported. 
The twelve violating refineries are lists. And again, BP and Koch’s 15% of total oil 
refining capacity is reported.  
 The third article concerning BP and Koch appeared in the Times Picayune Money 
section (word count = 708). The article is very similar to the above mentioned articles in 
that it reported penalty, compliance, and SEP amount, location of violating facilities, the 
15% oil refining capacity, and descriptions of agreement stipulations. The article quotes 
the EPA administrator and violating company officials.  
The fourth article concerning BP and Koch appeared in the Star Tribune News 
section (word count = 825). The article included penalty amounts, compliance amounts, 
and quotes from the EPA administrator as well as the impact of emission reductions on 
the environment. Again, no mention of human health impacts were addressed.  
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The fifth article addressed violations committed solely by Koch and appeared in 
the Star Tribune News section (word count = 276). The article reported on the penalty 
and compliance amounts as well as the reduction in terms of air pollutants.  
Summary of Results for Research Question #2 
 A detailed discussion of the content of news articles analyzed in the present study 
will be presented in the next chapter. News articles on petroleum refining industry 
violations are similar in terms of reporting trends and themes. The overall image of 
federal petroleum refining violations as reported by news articles is misleading. Articles 
liberally quote government officials and company representatives but rarely, if ever, 
quote residents or victims of environmental crime. The overabundance of quotes from 
government sources suggests the problem is receiving a great deal of attention and that 
enforcement is a priority. Violations are reported in vague and general terms. An 
emphasis was placed on penalty amounts and compliance costs. Companies are often 
praised for cooperating with government officials. Environmental and human health 
concerns are either ignored or downplayed. Articles do not equate environmental 
violations with criminal behavior. 
Research Question #3 
Which factors lead to greater news coverage of petroleum refining violations? 
 There is very little news coverage of federal petroleum refining violations. Very 
few ECHO cases receive any attention from the mainstream news media. Of seventy-four 
articles concerning petroleum refining industry violations from 1997 to 2003, only 17 or 
23% were directly related to the ECHO cases analyzed in the present study. Overall, lack 
of news media coverage of federal petroleum refining industry violations suggests that 
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the media considers such law violations as rarely newsworthy. Although newspaper 
coverage of federal petroleum refining violations is lacking, the news articles that were 
reported suggest that certain factors lead to the likelihood of greater news article 
coverage. These major factors include: 1) Initial date ECHO case was filed by the EPA, 
2) Location of the violating refinery, 3) Large penalty, compliance, and SEP amounts 
assessed to the violating company by the EPA, and 4) Refining capacity. 
Initial Date of Case Filed by the EPA 
 Of the seventeen articles addressing specific ECHO cases included in the present 
study, twelve articles (70.6%) appeared in news sources on the same day the EPA case 
was filed or in the week immediately following the initial case filing. In five articles 
(29.4%), the date the case was filed or settled appeared to have no direct correlation with 
the date the article appeared in the news source. No articles appeared on the day the case 
was settled by the EPA or on days immediately following the settlement. Table 25 
presents the name of the company, the news article source, the case filing date, and the 
date the article appeared for the twelve cases with article matches for the date the case 
was filed.  
Table 25: Company, News Article Source, Case Filing Date, and Date Article Appeared (N=12) 
Company News Article Source Date Case Filed Date of Article 
Motiva Houston Chronicle 3/21/01 3/22/01 
 Motiva  Times-Picayune 3/21/01 3/22/01 
Motiva Seattle Times 3/21/01 3/22/01 
Koch Star Tribune 12/22/00 12/27/00 
Marathon Ashland Houston Chronicle 5/11/01 5/12/01 
Marathon Ashland Star Tribune 5/11/01 5/12/01 
Marathon Ashland St. Louis Dispatch 5/11/01 5/12/01 
Conoco Houston Chronicle 12/21/01 12/21/01 
Conoco Rocky Mountain News 12/21/01 12/21/01 
Conoco Denver Post 12/21/01 12/21/01 
Clark Refining and Marketing St. Louis Dispatch 9/9/98 9/10/98 
Clark Refining and Marketing Washington Post 9/9/98 9/10/98 
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Location of the Violating Refinery 
 News articles addressing federal petroleum industry violations were more likely 
to appear if a violating refinery was located in the community in which the news source 
was primarily distributed. Thirteen articles (76.5%) addressing the ECHO cases reported 
on the cases with specific references to problems caused by local refineries. Only four 
news articles (23.5%) appeared in news publications with no ties to local violating 
refineries and two of these four articles appeared in the Washington Post. Table 26 
presents the name of the company, news source, and the location of the violating refinery 
for the thirteen articles with local refineries. 
Table 26: Company, News Source, News Source City/State, and Location of Violating Refinery (N=14) 
Company News Source City/State Location of Violating Refinery 
Conoco Denver Post Denver, CO Commerce City, CO 
Conoco Rocky Mountain News Denver, CO Commerce City, CO 
Conoco Houston Chronicle Houston, TX Houston, TX* 
Marathon Ashland Star Tribune Minneapolis, MN St. Paul Park, MN 
Marathon Ashland Houston Chronicle Houston, TX Texas City, TX 
Murphy Oil Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Milwaukee, WI Superior, WI 
Motiva Houston Chronicle Houston, TX Port Arthur, TX 
Motiva Seattle Times Seattle, WA Anacortes, WA 
Motiva Times Picayune New Orleans, LA Norco, LA 
BP and Koch Houston Chronicle Houston, TX Texas City/ Corpus Christi, TX 
BP and Koch Times Picayune New Orleans, LA Belle Chasse, LA 
BP and Koch Star Tribune Minneapolis, MN  Rosemont, MN 
Koch Star Tribune Minneapolis, MN Rosemont, MN 
* Conoco had no violating facilities in Houston but the company headquarters are located in Houston. 
 
Large Penalty Amounts  
 In sixteen (94%) of the seventeen articles directly related to the ECHO cases, 
EPA penalty sought, compliance amount, and SEP amount were reported. The cases 
reported on in news articles were all ranked as the top cases in terms of the penalty 
sought, the compliance amount, and SEP amount. Tables 27 presents the company, EPA 
penalty sought, and rank among all 162 ECHO cases in terms of the amount of the 
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penalty sought. Companies reported on in news articles were all ranked in the top ten 
(aside from Conoco which ranked 11) in terms of penalty amount sought. BP had the 
highest penalty amount sought ($9,500,000). Overall, cases reported on in news articles 
represented seven of the highest eleven penalty amounts sought by the EPA. 
Table 27: Company, Federal Penalty Sought, and Rank of Penalty Amount (N=162) 
Company Penalty Sought Rank of Penalty Amount 
BP  $9,500,000 1 
Murphy Oil $9,500,000 2 
Koch $4,500,000 4 
Motiva $4,400,000 5 
Clark Refining and Marketing $4,000,000 6 
Marathon Ashland $3,800,000 7 
Conoco $1,500,000 11 
 
Table 28 presents the company, compliance amount, and rank among all 162 
cases in terms of the compliance amount. Companies reported on in news articles were 
all ranked in the top ten (aside from Murphy Oil which ranked 12) in terms of compliance 
amount. Overall, cases reported on in news articles represented seven of the highest 
twelve compliance amounts. 
Table 28: Company, Compliance Amount, and Rank of Compliance Amount (N=162) 
Company Compliance Amount Rank of Compliance Amount 
BP $550,000,000 1 
Motiva $400,000,000 2 
Marathon Ashland $265,000,000 3 
Koch $102,000,000 4 
Conoco $80,000,000 5 
Clark Refining and Marketing $22,000,000 6 
Murphy Oil $4,500,000 12 
 
Table 29 presents the company, SEP amount, and rank among all 162 cases in 
terms of the SEP amount. Five of the seven companies reported on in news articles were 
ranked in the top ten in terms of SEP amount. Overall, cases reported on in news articles 
represented five of the highest six compliance amounts.  
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Table 29: Company, SEP Amount, and Rank of SEP Amount (N=162) 
Company SEP Amount Rank of SEP Amount 
Murphy Oil $7,500,000 1 
Marathon Ashland $6,500,000 2 
Motiva $5,500,000 3 
Conoco $1,800,000 4 
Clark Refining and Marketing $1,200,000 6 
BP $0 --- 
Koch $0 --- 
 
 Table 30 presents the company, the total amount in terms of penalty assessed, 
compliance amount and SEP amount, and the rank of amount among all 162 cases in the 
ECHO data included in the present study. The companies reported on in news articles 
were the highest seven cases in terms of total penalty assessed, compliance amount, and 
SEP amount. News articles only reported on cases in which the total EPA costs exceeded 
$20,000,000. Consequently, cases involving lower penalties, compliance costs, and SEP 
amounts did not receive any news coverage. It appears that the summation of the penalty 
amount assessed, compliance amount, and SEP amount is the greatest factor leading to 
news article coverage of petroleum refinery industry violations.  
Table 30: Company, Total Penalty Sought, Compliance Amount, SEP Amount, and Rank of Amount 
Company Total Amount Rank of Amount 
BP $559,500,000 1 
Motiva $409,900,000 2 
Marathon Ashland $275,300,000 3 
Koch $106,500,000 4 
Conoco $83,300,000 5 
Clark Refining and Marketing $27,200,000 6 
Murphy Oil $21,500,000 7 
 
 
 Refining Capacity  
 The greater the refining capacity of the company, the greater the likelihood of 
news coverage of petroleum industry violations. In ten (59%) of the seventeen articles, 
the total refining capacities of the violating company were reported. Taken together, just 
four companies represent 30 percent of the total refining capacity in the United States 
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(See Table 31). Refining capacities for the other companies included in the news articles 
were not reported. It appears that news coverage of petroleum industry violations is more 
likely to occur if the violating company is responsible for a high percentage of the total 
United States refining output. 
Table 31: Company, News Source, Refining Capacity, and Number of Violating Refineries 
Company News Source Refining Capacity 
(total in U.S.) 
Number of Violating 
Refineries 
BP and Koch Star Tribune 
Times Picayune 
Washington Post 
Houston Chronicle 
15% 12 
Motiva Times Picayune 
Seattle Times 
Houston Chronicle 
10% 9 
Marathon Ashland Houston Chronicle 
Star Tribune 
St. Louis Dispatch 
5% 7 
 
 
 Summary of Results for Research Question #3 
   
 News coverage of federal petroleum refining violations is limited. Only seventeen 
articles from 1997-2003 reported on cases included in the EPA’s ECHO database. While 
coverage is lacking, the results presented in the previous sections suggest that certain 
factors lead to the likelihood of news coverage. Most articles appeared on the day or days 
immediately following the filing of the case by the EPA, suggesting the EPA press 
releases are a prevalent source of environmental violation news for reporters. News 
coverage was also directly linked to violations committed by local refineries, indicating 
that environmental crime in the form of federal petroleum refining violations are of local 
concern rather than national concern. The greatest factor leading to news coverage 
appears to be penalty and compliance amounts. The seven companies receiving the 
highest penalty amounts by the EPA were also the only seven companies reported on in 
news articles. In addition, the higher the refining capacity of the company, the greater the 
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likelihood of reporting. A more detailed discussion of these factors is presented in 
Chapter Seven.  
Research Question #4 
Are petroleum refining industry penalty assessment decisions affected by the racial and 
socioeconomic composition of the communities surrounding the violating facility? Do 
other factors influence penalty assessment decisions? 
 
Originally, it was the intention of this research to determine the impact of 
community race and ethnic characteristics on penalties assessed against oil refineries that 
violated the environmental laws.  Preliminary analysis revealed that the assessed fine was 
largely predicted by the preliminary fine requested by the EPA (the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between penalty assessment and penalty sought by EPA was .931).  
Community race characteristics were not significant predictors of either the preliminary 
or assessed penalty.  Research on racial bias in criminal justice processes helps to explain 
this outcome.  Racial biases are more likely to be seen in early processing stages. Late 
stage decision making, particularly sentencing decisions, tends to involve a biased sample 
produced by earlier stage decisions (see Lynch and Patterson, 1991, 1996).  With respect 
to EPA decisions, for example, it is plausible that a larger number of cases affecting 
minority communities are excluded before the penalty assessment stage, while less 
serious cases affecting white communities are retained.  These processing selection biases 
make race appear to be an unimportant determinant of assessed penalties.  To address 
whether or not this is indeed a valid explanation, stage related case processing data would 
be needed.  Data of this nature is not public record, and would require special access to 
EPA files to collect. 
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Given the limitations described above, the analysis was redirected to determine if 
community race, ethnic and class characteristics impacted the departure from the EPA 
penalty recommendation.  In other words, are community characteristics related to the 
penalty difference controlling for other legally relevant decision making criteria that 
might impact penalty assessment. 
Several regression models were estimated in order to answer this revised question.  
The dependent variable for each of the regression models presented below was the logged 
penalty difference.  As stipulated in Chapter Five, the distribution of this variable was 
nonlinear and non-normal.  A log transformation approximated a more normal, linear 
variable.  
Table 32 presents the results of the first regression model predicting the percent of 
departure in penalty amount. The regression equation included the following independent 
variables: number of violations (vionum), voluntary disclosure (voldis), and percent 
minority (African-American and Hispanic) within a three mile radius of the violating 
facility (minper3).  
Table 32: Regression Model 1 Predicting Penalty Difference  
Variable B SE b Beta VIF T Sig. T* 
minper3 -6.432 .004 -.190 1.002 -1.687 .097 
vionum .448 .105 .478 1.004 4.248 .000* 
voldis 19.200 .803 -.013 1.005 -.115 .909 
*p<.05 
R2 = .269 
Adj. R2 = .231 
S.E. = .79505 
Durbin-Watson = 1.637 
 
 
 The R2 for the first regression model presented in Table 32 was .269. The adjusted 
R2 was .231, indicating that the independent variables predicted approximately twenty-
three percent of the variation in penalty departures. The results from model 1 indicate that 
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whether or not a company voluntarily discloses a violation has no significant effect on the 
penalty difference. Likewise, the percent minority within a three-mile radius had no 
significant effect on the penalty difference. The number of violations committed, 
however, was a statistically significant predictor of penalty departure (p = .000).  
Table 33 presents the results of the second regression model predicting the 
percent of departure in penalty amount where the percent African-American population 
within a three-mile radius was entered in place of percent minority population (which 
include Hispanics within a three-mile radius) to determine if there are specific  race 
effects. The regression equation included the following independent variables: number of 
violations (vionum), voluntary disclosure (voldis), and percent African-American within 
a three mile radius of the violating facility (aaper3).  
Table 33: Regression Model 2 Predicting Penalty Difference  
Variable B SE b Beta VIF t Sig. T* 
aaper3 -1.295 .005 -.312 1.027 -2.865 .006* 
vionum .407 .102 .434 1.028 3.976 .000* 
voldis -.149 .771 -.021 1.006 -.193 .847 
*p<.05 
R2 = .328 
Adj. R2 = .293 
S.E. = .76218 
Durbin-Watson = 1.772 
 
 
 The adjusted R2 for model 2 was .293, indicating that the independent variables 
predicted approximately twenty-nine percent of the variation in penalty departures. The 
results from model 2 indicate that voluntary disclosure was not statistically significant, 
but that number of violations was significant (p = .000).  In the first model, percent 
minority was not statistically significant. However, when percent African-American was 
included in the model and separated from percent Hispanic, the variable was statistically 
significant (p = .006).  
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Table 34 presents the results of the third regression model predicting the percent 
of departure in penalty amount. Model three included percent Hispanic within a three-
mile radius and excluded percent African-America within a three-mile radius to 
determine if there are different ethnicity effects. The regression equation included the 
following independent variables: number of violations (vionum), voluntary disclosure 
(voldis), and percent Hispanic within a three mile radius of the violating facility 
(hisper3).  
Table 34: Regression Model 3 Predicting Penalty Difference  
Variable B SE b Beta VIF t Sig. T* 
hisper3 2.835 .005 .067 1.021 .577 .566 
vionum .444 .109 .474 1.021 4.089 .000* 
voldis -1.257 .821 -.002 1.006 -.015 .988 
*p<.05 
R2 = .238 
Adj. R2 = .198 
S.E. = .81200 
Durbin-Watson = 1.772 
 
 
 The adjusted R2 for model 3 was .198, indicating that the independent variables 
predicted approximately twenty percent of the variation in penalty departures. The results 
from model 3 indicate that again, voluntary disclosure was not statistically significant, 
while the number of violations was statistically significant (p = .000). Unlike percent 
African-American, percent Hispanic within a three-mile radius had no significant effect 
on the penalty difference (p = .556).  
Table 35 presents the results of the fourth regression model predicting the percent 
of departure in penalty amount. The fourth regression model included percent below 
poverty in a three-mile radius to determine if there are socioeconomic effects. The 
regression equation included the following independent variables: number of violations 
(vionum), voluntary disclosure (voldis), percent African-American within a three mile 
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radius of the violating facility (aaper3) and percent below poverty within a three-mile 
radius (bppov3).  
Table 35: Regression Model 4 Predicting Penalty Difference  
Variable B SE b Beta VIF t Sig. T* 
aaper3 -1.304 .005 -.315 1.478 -2.385 .020* 
bpper3 4.686 .015 .004 1.455 .032 .974 
voldis -.151 .780 -.021 1.014 -.194 .847 
vionum .406 .106 .433 1.075 3.847 .000* 
*p<.05 
R2 = .328 
Adj. R2 = .281 
S.E. = .76883 
Durbin-Watson = 1.775 
 
 
 The R2 for regression model 4 presented in Table 35 was .328. The adjusted R2 
was .281, indicating that the independent variables predicted approximately twenty-eight 
percent of the variation in penalty departures. The results from model 4 again show that 
voluntary disclosure is not statistically significant, number of violations is statistically 
significant (p = .000), percent African-American is statistically significant (p = .020), and 
that the percent below poverty in a three-mile radius had no significant effect on the 
penalty difference (p = .974). 
Table 36 presents the results of the fifth regression model predicting the percent 
of departure in penalty amount. The fifth regression model included two additional 
variables: Supplemental Environmental Project amount and Clean Air Act (CAA) 
violator. The regression equation included the following independent variables: number 
of violations (vionum), voluntary disclosure (voldis), percent African-American within a 
three mile radius of the violating facility (aaper3), SEP amount (sepamt), and CAA 
violator (CAA1).  
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Table 36: Regression Model 5 Predicting Penalty Difference  
Variable B SE b Beta VIF t Sig. T* 
sepamt 1.901 .000 .274 1.094 2.529 .014* 
voldis 6.915 .733 .010 1.029 .094 .925 
vionum .416 .123 .359 1.050 3.387 .001* 
aaper3 -9.214 .005 -.227 1.147 -2.044 .046* 
caa1 .262 .201 .148 1.195 1.307 .197 
*p<.05 
R2 = .410 
Adj. R2 = .357 
S.E. = .71662 
Durbin-Watson = 1.764 
 
 
 The R2 for the fifth regression model presented in Table 36 was .410. The 
adjusted R2 was .357, indicating that the independent variables predicted approximately 
thirty-six percent of the variation in penalty departures. The results from model 5 indicate 
that the best predictors of penalty difference are the number of violations committed (p = 
.001), the Supplemental Environmental Project amount (p = .014), and the percent 
African-American in a three-mile radius (p = .046).  
 Summary of Results for Research Question 4 
 The regression models indicated that percent African-American population was a 
significant predictor of penalty departure amounts controlling for the effects of the 
number of violations, supplemental project amount, and whether or not violations were 
voluntarily disclosed.  The various regression models estimated above indicated that 
ethnicity population effects had a marginal to weak (statistically insignificant) effect, and 
that class-effects were not evident.  Overall, however, the models predicted only a modest 
amount of variation in penalty difference amounts, and it is plausible that omitted factors 
may explain this variation. 
 Although the relationship between African-American population and penalty 
departure is significant, it is difficult to interpret the regression coefficients because 
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penalty differences were logged.  Roughly, a one-percent increase in the African-
American population decreased penalty departure amounts by more than 9 percent. To 
clarify the relationship between race and penalty amounts further, the distribution of 
penalties for communities at opposite ends of the racial composition spectrum were also 
examined (see Table 37).  For example, for the 8 communities that were 60 percent or 
more African American, 5 involved no supplemental amount.  In addition, while 6 of 
these eight communities experienced a penalty departure, the departures were less than 
$255,000 in all cases.  The average penalty sought by the EPA in high concentration 
African-American communities was $171,108, while the average penalty difference was 
$13,608.  
Table 37: EPA Requested Penalty, Penalty Differences and Supplemental Penalty Amounts Across High 
Concentration African American, White, Hispanic, and Minority Communities. 
 Requested Penalty Penalty Difference Supplemental Penalty N 
ALL 588,464 165,838 237,651 107 
>60% AA 171,108 13,608 3,571 8 
>60% WH 704,662 274,280 436,975 54 
>60% HS 208,160 224,580 5,340 5 
>70% MN 185,017 121,855 12,277 15 
AA  = African American 
WH = White 
HS  =  Hispanic 
MN =  Minority (African American and Hispanic) 
 
 Comparing these results to those for communities that were primarily white (more 
than 60 percent white), fourteen of the 54 white communities (26%) received 
supplemental amount settlements.  The mean supplemental amount was in excess of 
$436,000, or one-hundred and twenty-two times higher than the mean supplemental 
amount in high concentration African-American communities.  In addition, 26 of the 54 
white communities received penalty departures.  In one case, the departure led to a lower 
fine than sought by the EPA ($ 23,850 less than the recommendation of $66,000).  In four 
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cases, the departures were in excess of $ 1,000,000.  The mean departure for primarily 
white communities was nearly $275,000, or nearly twenty times higher than in primarily 
African-American communities.   
 These results support those from the regression models, though they do not take 
case seriousness into account.  Both the supplemental and regression analyses results 
should be considered with caution given the small number of cases representing high 
African-American concentration communities. 
Summary of Results  
 The results of the four research questions analyzed in the present study indicate 
that petroleum industry violations are widespread; media reporting of petroleum refining 
industry violations is limited; the seriousness of the offense based on penalty assessments 
is the greatest factor leading to coverage; and that penalty departures were lower in 
predominantly African-American communities. A discussion of these results is presented 
in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Discussion 
 
 The following chapter provides a discussion of the results reported in Chapter Six. 
Overall, the present study found that environmental crime in the form of federal 
petroleum refining violations is widespread; media coverage of petroleum refining 
violations is lacking; certain factors contribute to the likelihood of news coverage; and 
that penalty departures are affected by community racial characteristics.  
Research Question #1 
 The purpose of Research Question #1 was to determine the nature and distribution 
of environmental crime as indicated by federal petroleum violations. Several variables 
were examined and the results for each variable were reported on in Chapter Six. The 
results for a number of the descriptive statistics deserves further discussion. The key 
findings were as follows:  
- Eighty-three percent of the total number of petroleum refining companies in the 
United States were responsible for one or more EPA violations from 2001-2002. 
- Thirty percent of our nation’s petroleum refining companies were involved in 
two or more EPA cases from 2001-2002. 
- Thirty percent of the cases involved more than one federal environmental statute 
violation. 
- Petroleum refining violations occurred in eighty-eight percent of states hosting 
petroleum refining operations. 
- One out of every five EPA cases involved a serious violation of environmental 
statutes. 
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- Only a small proportion of cases (13%) were the result of facility self-disclosures. 
- From 2003-2004, the EPA did not inspect 54.3% of facilities for violations of the 
CAA; the EPA did not inspect 49.6% of facilities for violations of the CWA; and 
the EPA did not inspect 48.4% of facilities for violations of RCRA.  
- From 2003-2004, states did not inspect 31.3% of facilities for violations of the 
CAA; states did not inspect 53.1% of facilities for violations of the CWA; and 
states did not inspect 49.2% of facilities for violations of RCRA.  
- Approximately half (48.4%) of all facilities were in non-compliance of the CAA 
for 7 or 8 quarters (of 8) from 2003-2004. 
 
 Company Information 
 The Environmental Protection Agency filed and/or settled 162 cases against 
petroleum refining companies from 2001-2002. Seventy-eight separate companies were 
involved in the 162 cases. According to the Department of Energy (2003), ninety-four 
companies own and operate the one hundred and forty-nine petroleum refineries located 
in the United States. Based on the data, eighty-three percent of the total number of 
petroleum refining companies in the United States were responsible for one or more EPA 
violations from 2001-2002. Sixteen of these companies were involved in three or more 
EPA cases, which represents 17% of the total number of petroleum refining companies 
operating in the United States. Twelve of these companies were involved in two EPA 
cases, which represents 13% of the total number of petroleum refining companies 
operating in the United States. Thirty percent of our nation’s petroleum refining 
companies were involved in two or more EPA cases from 2001-2002. Furthermore, thirty 
percent of cases involved violations of more than one federal environmental statute.  
 These numbers suggest that federal environmental violations committed by 
petroleum refining companies are widespread and frequent. For example, Koch Industries 
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was involved in ten cases, Chevron was involved in nine cases, and Shell Oil was 
involved in eight cases. Furthermore, the data analyzed in the present study is reflective 
of violations known to the EPA. If these 162 cases were reflective of all petroleum 
refining industry violations, it would be fair to say that the petroleum refining industry is 
responsible for a great deal of environmental crime. However, these cases more than 
likely only represent a small proportion of the total amount of environmental crimes 
committed by the petroleum refining industry. Criminologically, this rate of offending 
would qualify these companies as persistent criminal offenders, and perhaps as career 
criminals. Future research should compare the nature and distribution of environmental 
crime indicated by data analyzed in the present study with data for other years in order to 
provide a more accurate picture of the trends in petroleum refining industry violations.   
 Refinery Location 
 Violating refineries were located in thirty states across the country. According to 
the Department of Energy (2003), thirty-four of our nation’s states are home to one or 
more petroleum refineries. Based on the data, petroleum refining violations occurred in 
88% of the states hosting petroleum refining operations. Refineries located in Texas, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Illinois comprise 24.5% of the total number of 
refineries operating in the United States; yet refineries located in just these five states 
were responsible for over half (51.8%) of all federal petroleum refining industry 
violations.  
• Texas refineries comprise 16.8% of the total number of refineries in the United 
States but were involved in 25.9% of federal petroleum refining cases.  
• Oklahoma refineries comprise 2.5% of the total number of refineries in the United 
States but were involved in 8.6% of federal petroleum refining cases. 
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• Pennsylvania refineries comprise 2.5% of the total number of refineries in the 
United States but were involved in 6.8% of the federal petroleum refining cases. 
• Delaware refineries comprise less than one percent of the total number of 
refineries in the United States but were involved in 4.9% of federal petroleum 
refining cases.  
• Illinois refineries comprise 2.1% of refineries in the United States but were 
involved in 5.6% of federal petroleum refining cases.  
  
 While the present study did not focus on EPA enforcement decisions, it is worth 
noting that certain states appear to be responsible for more than their fair share of federal 
petroleum refining violations. It may be that refineries located in these states are in fact 
violating federal environmental statutes with more frequency than refineries located in 
other states. However, enforcement decisions may play a role in the unequal distribution 
of federal enforcement actions by state. Future research should examine the distribution 
of federal petroleum refining violations by EPA region, state, and related variables. In 
addition, an examination of state environmental enforcement initiatives and trends may 
shed some light on why particular states are disproportionately targeted by the EPA. If 
certain states consider environmental statute enforcement to be a high priority, the EPA 
may be less likely to get involved. Conversely, if state environmental enforcement 
actions are lacking, the EPA may pay more attention to refineries located in these states.  
 Case Type 
 According to the EPA, administrative action should be taken unless 1) the total 
penalty amount is in excess of $200,000; or 2) the offense was committed more than a 
year prior to the case issuance or 3) the nature of the violation requires injunctive relief or 
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involves evidence of a criminal violation. Criminal and civil judicial cases then involve 
more serious violations.  
Most of the cases in this sample (78.4%) were resolved by the EPA through 
administrative actions (the sample does not include criminal violations, which fall under 
the authority of the Department of Justice). However, in 21.6% of the cases (N=35), civil 
judicial action was required. The data indicate that one out of every five EPA cases 
involved a serious violation of environmental statutes. In order to get a better 
understanding of how serious judicial cases are in comparison with administrative cases, 
future research should examine violation details outlined in the ECHO database. 
Furthermore, future research should also include attempts to examine criminal charges 
brought against oil refineries.  Existing data sources, however, do not allow researchers to 
access corporate identities from criminal case data, and special access to EPA data would 
be required to undertake such an investigation. 
 Voluntary Disclosure 
 In December of 1995, the EPA introduced a program entitled “Incentives for Self-
Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of Violations”. The policy 
was designed to provide major incentives for companies that voluntarily discover, 
promptly disclose, and expeditiously correct noncompliance with environmental statutes. 
This program was designed to give companies the opportunity for a reduction in fines if 
they voluntarily disclosed existing violations. According to the EPA, violations can be 
considered voluntarily disclosed even if they are discovered during the course of an 
environmental audit. In the present study, only a small proportion of cases (21 or 13%) 
were the result of facility self-disclosures. The EPA insists that since the program was 
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initiated “an increasing number of companies have voluntarily come forward to disclose 
environmental violations”. However, the EPA does not provide the actual statistics for 
the impact of the policy on self-disclosures. Future research should examine the trends in 
self-disclosures and calculate the amount of penalties that would have been assessed had 
the self-disclosure incentives not existed.  
The voluntary disclosure policy led to fine reductions in all cases where the 
violation was voluntarily disclosed. Consequently, the seriousness of the violations based 
strictly on penalty amounts may be affected by this policy provision.  
 EPA and State Inspections 
 From 2003-2004, the EPA did not inspect 54.3% of facilities for violations of the 
CAA; the EPA did not inspect 49.6% of facilities for violations of the CWA; and the 
EPA did not inspect 48.4% of facilities for violations of RCRA. From 2003-2004, states 
did not inspect 31.3% of facilities for violations of the CAA; states did not inspect 53.1% 
of facilities for violations of the CWA; and states did not inspect 49.2% of facilities for 
violations of RCRA. Approximately half of all facilities included in the present study 
were not inspected by the EPA in the most recent two-year time period. Approximately 
half of all facilities were not inspected by the state for violations of the CWA and RCRA 
and one-third of all facilities were not inspected for violations of the CAA.   These 
findings suggest that violations might be considerably higher were the EPA and/or the 
state to inspect all facilities for petroleum refining violations. The reasons for lack of 
inspections are probably diverse and future research should seek to determine how the 
EPA and the states structures their inspection endeavors. If the EPA or the state has a 
systematic inspection format, it seems reasonable to suggest that facilities may aim for 
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compliance when they are aware of an upcoming inspection. If, however, the EPA and 
the state ensures that inspections are random, the possibility of discovering violations will 
likely increase.  
 Non-Compliance of CAA, CWA, and RCRA 
 The EPA collects data on the number of quarters of non-compliance of the 
various environmental statutes. The data show that approximately half (48.4%) of all 
facilities were in non-compliance of the CAA for 7 or 8 quarters from 2003-2004. Fifteen 
facilities (11.7%) were in non-compliance of the CWA for 7 or 8 quarters from 2003-
2004. Approximately one-third (27.3%) of facilities were in non-compliance of RCRA 
from 2003-2004. Overall, it appears that a significant proportion of facilities are often in 
non-compliance with federal environmental statutes, and are persistent, repeat offenders. 
The EPA does not undertake action against every facility that is frequently in non-
compliance. If the EPA were to file cases against every facility for every violation, the 
EPA would need to increase its budget and enforcement staff tenfold.  
 Discussion Summary Research Question #1 
 Although the data show that environmental crimes committed by the petroleum 
refining industry are widespread and persistent, it appears that enforcement actions are 
not consistent with the amount of crime committed by the petroleum industry. More than 
likely the industry is aware that inspections are infrequent and that even in the case of 
consistent non-compliance, the EPA may not undertake enforcement actions. It appears 
that the petroleum refining industry would rather violate environmental statutes and risk 
being caught, rather than comply. If the risk of being caught is low and punishment is 
rare or involves minimal economic impact, then the financial incentives to violate the law 
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are high. The results indicated that environmental crimes committed by the petroleum 
refining industry are widespread, even when one only takes into consideration crimes 
known to the EPA.  
Research Question #2 
 The purpose of Research Question #2 was to determine the nature and distribution 
of mainstream news media reporting of federal petroleum industry violations. Seventy-
four articles were collected which made reference to federal petroleum industry 
violations. However, of these seventy-four articles only seventeen articles (23%) 
corresponded directly with cases included in the EPA ECHO database. The mainstream 
mass media does not focus much attention on federal petroleum refining violations. The 
results from the present study add to the growing body of evidence which shows that 
media reporting of corporate crime and/or environmental crime is minimal (Maguire, 
2002; Lynch, Stretesky, and Hammond; Lofquist, 1997; Wright, Cullen, and 
Blankenship, 1995; Lynch, Nalla, and Miller, 1989; Morash and Hale, 1987; Evans and 
Lundman, 1983; Swigert and Farrell, 1980). Future research that broadens the scope of 
the search parameters to include a wider range of years and cases may reveal a greater 
number of articles for analysis. Despite the low number of articles reporting on the 
petroleum refining industry, the data do have some noticeable characteristics which are 
discussed below. 
 News Source 
 Over 20.3% of the articles were reported in the Houston Chronicle, which is not 
surprising considering that Texas hosts more petroleum refineries (25) than any other 
state. The Times Picayune (New Orleans) was responsible for 16.2% of articles, which 
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again, is not surprising as Louisiana hosts the third largest number (17) of the nation’s 
petroleum refineries. What is most surprising is the number of articles produced by the 
Star Tribune in Minneapolis (7) was rather large, despite the fact that only two refineries 
are located in the entire state. The New York Times also contained seven articles 
pertaining to the petroleum refining industry despite the fact no petroleum refineries were 
operating in the state.  
Overall, the data suggested that reporting decisions may be based on the 
importance of petroleum refining in the local community and on individual decision-
making by reporters. For example, some reporters may feel that the petroleum refining 
industry is newsworthy while other reporters may disagree. Ultimately, editors must 
decide if the article is newsworthy. Future research should pay particular attention to 
news reporting decision-making processes in order to provide a better understanding of 
the process.  
 Article Location 
 News articles on the petroleum refining industry appeared in one of four 
locations: 1) News (Section A and National News), 2) Local News (Section B, Metro, or 
Suburban), 3) Business or Money, or 4) Other (including Science or Editorials). The 
location of the article is significant in that certain sections of newspapers are more widely 
read than other sections. According to a recent study by Mediamark Research Inc. (2004) 
on newspaper section readership, seventy percent of adults read the general news sections 
of the paper while only forty percent read the business or finance sections of the paper. 
Sixty-eight percent of petroleum refining industry articles appeared in the general or local 
news sections of the paper while twenty-eight percent of articles appeared in the business 
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or money sections of the paper. Of the seventy-four articles, only eight articles appeared 
on the front page of the national news section. While sports and entertainment are given 
their own sections in the paper, the environment is reported on in various sub-sections of 
the paper.  
 Case Specific News Articles 
 Chapter Six reported on the content of newspaper articles directly related to cases 
included in the present study. The purpose of the following discussion is to present some 
of the themes apparent throughout the news articles that reported specifically on the cases 
included in the present study. Specific quotes taken from the various articles represent 
overall reporting trends observed in the seventeen case specific news articles. Discussions 
of the reporting trends are presented after each sample of article quotes.  
  Violations Committed 
“The sector (petroleum refining) is regarded as one of the worst in terms 
of environmental compliance” (Times Picayune, New Orleans, 7/26/00) 
 
“An Environmental Protection Agency investigation of U.S. refineries 
showed widespread violations of the Clean Air Act, with emissions 
problems from stacks, leaking valves, and other areas” (Times Picayune, 
New Orleans, 7/26/00) 
 
“The comprehensive agreement frees the company from the threat of legal 
action by the government for past violation of clean air laws” (Times 
Picayune, New Orleans, 7/26/00) 
 
 Only one article (Times Picayune, 2000) indicated that the petroleum refining 
industry is “one of the worst” violators of environmental statutes and that violations are 
“widespread”, consequently the public is more than likely unaware of the extent to which 
the petroleum refining industry violates environmental laws. If more articles presented 
the petroleum refining industry as one of the worst violators in terms of environmental 
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compliance and explained what that means in terms of environmental and human health 
consequences, perhaps the public would be more likely to support stricter environmental 
legislation and emissions standards. Furthermore, social activism may increase with the 
knowledge and understanding of the extent to which the refining industry violates 
environmental policies. The last quote states that the agreement in question will free the 
company “from the threat of legal action by the government for past violation of clean air 
laws”. Similar statements appeared in other articles.  
“Fines cover pollution problems involving air, water, and solid and 
hazardous waste during the past 26 months” (Star Tribune, Minneapolis, 
7/26/00) 
  
“The complaint against Clark lists violations of federal statutes, including 
the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act”. (St. Louis Dispatch, 9/10/98) 
 
“The violations have included illegal dumping, illegal emissions, 
falsifying environmental reports, wetlands destruction, sewage overflow, 
chemical discharges, and oil spills” (Washington Post, 9/10/98) 
 
“The wide-ranging Norco probe centered on the company’s (Motiva) 
failure to monitor, check, and fix thousands of toxic leaks and on whether 
the company misrepresented its operations to the agency (EPA).” (Times 
Picayune, New Orleans, 3/22/01) 
 
 Specific violations committed by the petroleum refining industry were, for the 
most part, reported in general terms. For example, The Star Tribune (2000) described the 
violations as “pollution problems involving air, water, and solid and hazardous waste”. 
The St. Louis Dispatch (1998) (as well as other articles) listed the environmental acts that 
were violated. The Washington Post (1998) and the Times Picayune (2001) can be 
credited to some degree for providing a more detailed and specific list of the violations 
committed by the petroleum refining industry. Reporting violations in vague terms with 
sweeping generalizations does not present a clear picture of what is actually occurring. 
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For example, stating that a company violated the Clean Air Act, without a precise 
description of how and what impact the violation has on the local community, has an 
effect on how the public perceives the violations. If reporters provided more detailed 
descriptions of the violations and environmental and human health consequences, then 
perhaps the public would be more willing to view environmental offenses as criminal 
offenses.   
  Environmental and Human Health Impacts  
“Toxins include benzene, a known carcinogen, and smog-causing 
compounds such as nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxides, and volatile organic 
compounds” (Star Tribune, Minneapolis, 7/26/00) 
 
“The pollutants in question are smog-forming nitrogen oxide; chemical 
gases that form smog, including cancer-causing benzene; sulfur dioxide, 
and tiny soot particles.” (Houston Chronicle 3/22/01) 
 
“Air pollution triggers such illnesses as childhood asthma and cancer” 
(Star Tribune, Minneapolis, 7/26/00) 
 
“The new equipment is intended to help ease respiratory problems such as 
childhood asthma by cutting pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, sulfur 
dioxide, particulate emissions, carbon monoxide, benzene, and volatile 
organic compounds” (Houston Chronicle, 5/12/01) 
 
 News articles in the Houston Chronicle (2001) and Star Tribune (2000) did a 
fairly good job of listing some of the major pollutants released into the air as a result of 
violations. However, although many people know that sulfur dioxide and carbon 
monoxide are harmful substances, the dangers associated with other substances are not as 
apparent. The articles state that these pollutants are associated with respiratory problems 
and are known cancer-causing agents. The environmental and human health 
consequences of exposure to there pollutants are much more serious and vast than 
indicated in these articles. For example, the Star Tribune (2000) states that “air pollution 
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triggers such illnesses as childhood asthma and cancer”. This statement underplays the 
seriousness of air pollution with the use of the word “triggers”. Furthermore, cancer is a 
much more serious illness than childhood asthma. The spectrum of human health 
consequences are not explored in these articles which means that the public will remain 
ignorant to the problems caused by pollutants especially in light of the fact most articles 
did not mention environmental or human health problems at all.  
 
“In a statement, Norco refinery Manager Allen Kirkley said he was 
confident the deal would help the environment and prove beneficial to the 
residents of the community of Norco.” (Times Picayune, New Orleans, 
3/22/01) 
 
“The projects include $280,000 to finance a cancer study of the effects of 
industrial chemical exposure in the lower Mississippi River” (Times 
Picayune, New Orleans, 3/22/01) 
 
 The two quotes presented above, if taken at face value, may not be cause for 
concern. However, if one reads between the lines, several questions arise. In the first 
statement, a Norco refinery manager stresses that the enforcement “deal” will “help the 
environment and prove beneficial to residents of the community of Norco”. If Norco was 
truly concerned about the environment and the local community, why did they violate 
environmental laws in the first place and only make a “deal” with enforcement officials 
when they were caught? Why does the article present a Norco representative commenting 
on how the company (the offender) is benefiting the environment and the community (the 
victims)? Where are the voices of the victims? The second quote refers to the funding of 
a cancer study to analyze the effects of industrial chemical exposure. Why do we wait for 
problems to arise before we study them? We have known for a long time that chemical 
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exposure is linked with cancer and other illnesses. Studies of this type take years to 
complete. In the meantime, people will continue to get sick due to chemical exposure.  
 
“Residents of nearby Park Hill criticized the length of time the company 
(Conoco) was allowed to delay adding (air pollution) controls. ‘I think we 
have to look at what these emissions will cost in terms of people’s health’, 
said Roz Wheeler-Bell, 50, chairwoman of Greater Park Hill Community, 
Inc. ‘I don’t think improvements six or seven years down the road is any 
great victory.’ Wheeler-Bell said the neighborhood is often washed by a 
‘chemical, burny’ odor that sets off her son’s asthma and brings 
complaints of headaches from other residents. ‘It just smells toxic’, she 
said, ‘And the consensus is it’s gotten worse in the last few years’.” 
(Denver Post, 12/21/01) 
 
 Only two articles of the seventeen case specific articles actually quoted a resident 
(victim) from the local community and in both articles (Denver Post, 2001; Rocky 
Mountain News, 2001), the same resident was quoted. While the first part of the articles 
contained quotes from EPA officials and the violating company, which included words 
and phrases such as “agreement”, “settlement”, and “victory for everyone involved”, the 
comments made by resident, Roz Wheeler-Bell painted a different picture. She 
emphasized that the so-called “victory” was not a victory for local residents. While an 
enforcement decision did penalize Conoco, the company was given several years to fix 
the problem. And in the meantime, residents continue to suffer numerous health 
consequences of exposure to toxic air. No other case specific article addressed resident 
concerns. It would appear that the victims have been forgotten when newspapers report 
on petroleum refinery violations.   
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  Actions Speak Louder Than Words 
“Protecting our natural resources through strong enforcement of 
environmental law is a top priority for the Department of Justice” 
Attorney General John Ashcroft. (Times Picayune, New Orleans, 3/22/01) 
 
“Edward L. Dowd Jr., the U.S. attorney for the Missouri District that 
includes St. Louis, is one of the nation’s most aggressive prosecutors of 
waterway crimes, with 10 convictions in the last year. ‘We’re sending a 
message that you can’t pay a fine and walk away,’ Dowd said in an 
interview. ‘This is serious stuff. We’re going to make you repair the 
damage you’ve done. And if you did it on purpose, we’re going to send 
you to jail.” Two sentences later. . .”Environmental crimes are still a tiny 
faction of the (Justice) department’s work, much less than 1 percent of its 
overall prosecutions” (Washington Post, 9/10/98) 
 
“Officials who gathered at the river’s banks yesterday said they were 
determined to protect the Mississippi from daily dumpings of raw sewage, 
cyanide, slaughterhouse waste, heavy metals, and other toxic junk” 
(Washington Post, 9/10/98) 
 
Attorney General Janet Reno (picture included with her quote) “vowed to 
hunt down all polluters ‘in all corners of the watershed’ and that they 
would not be let off with mere fines and apologies. However, Lois J. 
Schiffer, assistant attorney general for environment and natural resources, 
said the office has investigated criminal proceedings against Shell and 
decided that a ‘strong civil settlement was our only logical course in this 
case’”. (St. Louis Dispatch, 9/10/98) 
  
 Many of the case specific articles presented quotes from high-ranking state and 
federal officials. It comes as no surprise that these officials were adamant about going 
after violators. But actions speak louder than words. According to Attorney General John 
Ashcroft (Times Picayune, 2001), “strong enforcement of environmental law is a top 
priority of the Justice Department”. Similarly, Edward L. Dowd Jr. stated in the 
Washington Post (1998), “This is serious stuff. We’re going to make you repair the 
damage you’ve done. And if you did it on purpose, we’re going to send you to jail.” 
However, in the same article, just two sentences later, the following statement appears, 
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“environmental crimes are still a tiny faction of the (Justice) department’s work, much 
less than 1 percent of its overall prosecutions”. Attorney General Janet Reno was quoted 
in the St. Louis Dispatch (1998), stressing that polluters “would not be let off with mere 
fines and apologies”. But, just one sentence later, the truth is revealed, “Lois J. Schiffer, 
assistant attorney general for environment and natural resources, said the office has 
investigated criminal proceedings against Shell and decided that a ‘strong civil settlement 
was our only logical course in this case’”. It appears that officials are overzealous with 
their words. Environmental crime enforcement is NOT a major priority for the Justice 
Department. Quotes from officials make it sound like our federal and state agencies are 
deeply concerned about the problems caused by the petroleum refining industry. These 
quotes may even lead the public to believe state and federal agencies are committed to 
serious enforcement of our environmental laws. If so, the public is misguided. 
Enforcement of environmental laws is not given the serious attention indicated by our 
nation’s leaders.   
“The Motiva-Norco case demonstrated the state’s ineffectiveness in 
policing its major industrial sites. . .a DEQ inspector did not find any 
violations of the leak-detection program shortly before (a former 
employee) came forward. ‘These violations would not have surfaced had it 
not been for someone stepping out and effectively dragging the agencies 
to the violations’, Mark Davis, executive director of the Coalition to 
Restore Coastal Louisiana.(Times Picayune, New Orleans, 3/22/01) 
 
 Only one article reported on problems with environmental enforcement (Times 
Picayune, 2001) and even so, the emphasis was on problems with enforcement at the state 
level. While the present study did not focus directly on federal and state enforcement 
issues, it is worthy of discussion. The data indicate that violations are widespread, 
inspections are sporadic, and that enforcement is lacking. The quote above indicates that 
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a state inspector found no evidence of violations. However, only a short time later, a 
former employee made the effort to inform agencies of existing violations. This article 
suggests that even when inspections are being conducted, violations are overlooked. Are 
state inspectors intentionally overlooking violations? Future research should examine 
state and federal enforcement efforts and processes. If state agencies and the EPA are 
ineffective enforcers of environmental legislation, we need to know about it so that 
changes can be made.  
  Company Portrayal 
“Koch and BP Amoco came forward promptly to work on problems at 
their refineries” (EPA Administrator as quoted in the Star Tribune, 
Minneapolis, 7/26/00) 
 
“After being alerted by government officials, the two companies (BP and 
Koch) initiated talks with the EPA in March to avoid a lawsuit.” (Times 
Picayune, New Orleans, 7/26/00) 
 
“This agreement represents a strong proactive environmental initiative by 
Koch, consistent with our proven commitment to environmental 
stewardship and other voluntary clear air initiatives” Jim Mahoney, a 
Koch Petroleum Group executive vice president. (Times Picayune, New 
Orleans, 7/26/00) 
 
 
 The quotes stated above highlight a theme prevalent throughout the case specific 
articles. The offenders are often praised for their quick response to EPA inquiries and 
articles portray the companies as willing to work on the problems they caused. The 
second quote stated above is rather noteworthy. It states that government officials alerted 
BP and Koch about violations at their facilities. Due to this knowledge, BP and Koch 
“initiated” talks with the EPA. It appears that companies are ready and willing to work 
out problems they caused, but if and only if, they are caught red-handed. Reporting 
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presents the companies in favorable terms despite the seriousness of the violations 
committed by these companies. For example, Koch Industries was involved in 10 EPA 
cases from 2001-2002 (the most of any company) yet the article paints a different picture 
of Koch. By allowing the offender to comment (third quote above) and excluding victim 
accounts, the public is seriously misinformed as to the true nature of the violations and 
consequences. The offender says “I’m sorry (that I was caught)”, the EPA says, “Okay, 
pay a fine and don’t do it again”, and the victims are ignored. The company then goes on 
to violate the law, again, and again, and again.  
“In a telephone press conference, Browner praised BP and Koch for their 
cooperation in bringing the cases to a speedy conclusion”. At the 
conclusion of the same article, “In January, Koch agreed to pay $30 
million in fines and spend $5 million on environmental projects for 
spilling an estimated 3 million gallons of oil from pipelines in Texas and 
five other states. Browner said at the time that Koch negotiators had been 
stubbornly unwilling to accept responsibility for the environmental 
damage caused by the spills”. (Houston Chronicle, 7/26/00) 
 
“The companies deny all the allegations” Three sentences later “EPA 
Administrator Christie Whitman praised the three companies for ‘taking 
the initiative to resolve their environmental problems cooperatively and 
quickly’”. (Houston Chronicle, 3/22/01) 
 
 Similar to the quotes discussed in the previous paragraph, these two quotes from 
the Houston Chronicle (2000, 2001) report on the EPA’s “praise” of BP and Koch’s 
cooperation. However, in both articles, contradictory information is reported. In the first 
article from the Houston Chronicle, the EPA praises the companies for their 
cooperativeness but at the conclusion of the same article, it states that “Koch negotiators 
had been stubbornly unwilling to accept responsibility” for the damage they caused in the 
past. It appears that past behavior is unlikely to tarnish a company’s reputation (despite 
the fact that this same company was involved in ten EPA cases in a two year time 
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period). In the second article, it is reported that the companies “denied all the 
allegations”, yet according to the EPA, the companies should be praised for “taking the 
initiative to resolve their environmental problems cooperatively and quickly”. How are 
the companies able to resolve the problems cooperatively and quickly if the problems 
don’t exist?  
  Evidence of Criminal or Negligent Activity 
“The company (Koch) agreed to pay a $6.9 million fine in 1998, primarily 
to the state of Minnesota, and $8 million last fall to resolve a federal 
criminal complaint” (Star Tribune, Minneapolis, 7/26/00)  
 
“A significant number of the issues surfaced when a former Norco 
employee disclosed environmental problems to regulators.” (Times 
Picayune, New Orleans, 3/22/01) 
 
“Criminal inspectors have honed in on Motiva’s record-keeping in Norco 
to determine if the company falsified records.” (Times Picayune, New 
Orleans, 3/22/01) 
 
“The refinery was listed on the state Superfund site in 1987, and has been 
the subject of several previous legal settlements, including upgrades of its 
petroleum storage tanks after a major gasoline leak in 1994. The company 
also treated more than 330 million gallons of contaminated ground water 
and 14,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil during the mid-1990s, the 
result of a half-century of petroleum spills and leaks from tanks and 
underground pipelines” (Star Tribune, 5/12/01) 
 
“The Shell case, for example, did not lead to a criminal prosecution, even 
though the company faced allegations of illegal levels of sulfur dioxide, 
hydrogen sulfide, and benzene emissions. (Washington Post, 9/10/98) 
 
 Evidence of criminal or negligent activity was minimally discussed in the case 
specific news articles. The quotes presented above are the only examples of criminal or 
negligent behavior on the part of the company. Most articles do not discuss the cause of 
the violations, or they create the false perception that the company was unaware that they 
were violating environmental statutes. “We had no idea”, appears to be the company 
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motto when it comes to environmental violations.  The companies are not called 
“criminals”, the environment and affected communities are not depicted as “victims”. 
The violations and offenses are not labeled as “crimes”.  
 Discussion Summary Research Question #2 
 In an ideal world, the news media would report on every violation committed by 
the petroleum refining industry or at the very least, on the most serious cases. 
Consequently, the public would be aware of the widespread nature and distribution of 
environmental crime. Increased knowledge could lead to increased efforts to do 
something about the problem. Instead, we live in a society in which news reporting of 
this type of crime appeared in just seventeen articles over a six year time period. It is no 
wonder the public perceives environmental crime as less serious as compared to street 
crime. On a daily basis, our national and local newspapers report on violent crimes from 
around the world. Months may go before we see a news article reporting on 
environmental crimes committed by the petroleum refining industry. And even then, what 
is reported may actually do more harm than good. Results support the findings from 
previous research which suggests the media construction of corporate and environmental 
crime fails to adequately represent the actual nature of such crime (Maguire, 2002; 
Lynch, Stretesky, and Hammond; Lofquist, 1997; Wright, Cullen, and Blankenship, 
1995; Lynch, Nalla, and Miller, 1989; Morash and Hale, 1987; Evans and Lundman, 
1983; Swigert and Farrell, 1980). In the present study, the news reporting was never 
critical of the industry or of the government’s lack of enforcement efforts. The news 
reporting relied on EPA information and had no investigative component. The news 
reporting allowed the offenders to comment but ignored the victims. Overall, media 
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reporting of federal petroleum refining industry violations is not only lacking; it is 
misleading and downplays the serious of environmental crime.  
 Key Findings from the Star-Telegram, 2004 (Fort Worth, Texas) 
 Although the present study did not analyze news article coverage beyond 2003, 
one recent article that appeared in the Star-Telegram deserves recognition. The 
information reported on in the article was based on a research project which analyzed 
EPA compliance and enforcement data on the petroleum refining industry; the same data 
analyzed in the present study. Investigative journalists and environmental reporters 
collected and analyzed the data. In addition, project members conducted numerous 
interviews and visited refineries in Texas, Louisiana, and Delaware. The presentation of 
such an article in the news media is especially poignant since articles addressing 
petroleum refining industry violations are virtually non-existent. Furthermore, the article 
appeared in the National news section and contained over 4,000 words. The findings 
from the Star-Telegram are similar to the findings reported in the present study but with 
the addition of more data, including qualitative data, several key statements are worthy of 
review. 
• Comprehensive clean-air inspections, a crucial step in identifying 
violations, are down 52 percent for refineries since 2001, compared with 4 
percent for all industries. 
• Notices of violations have plummeted 68 percent for refineries, compared 
with a 24 percent drop for all industries. And formal enforcement actions 
are down 31 percent for refineries but less than 1 percent for all industries 
nationwide. 
• Refineries' increased self-reporting of pollution data has in many cases 
replaced on-site inspections by government regulators, and the EPA does 
little or nothing to ensure that the companies' reports reflect reality. 
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• Texas and Louisiana are home to five of the nation's 10 worst offenders 
when it comes to toxic air pollutants from oil refineries.But the EPA 
regional office responsible for those states, along with Oklahoma, 
Arkansas and New Mexico, has no air inspectors dedicated to the region's 
50 petroleum refineries. The office's 15 air inspectors are responsible for 
about 3,000 industrial facilities that the EPA has classified as "major" 
emission sources. Throughout Region 6, 60 full-scale air inspections were 
conducted at oil refineries in 2003 -- by far the fewest since at least 1984. 
• BP's Texas City refinery, the nation's largest, emits more toxic pollution 
into the air than any other U.S. refinery. Yet it hasn't had a comprehensive 
air-quality inspection in nearly three years. 
• In the Corpus Christi area, Valero's refinery hasn't had a full-scale 
inspection in three years and one month, the Koch Petroleum refinery in 
four years and two months. 
• In other parts of the country, from Chevron's refinery in El Segundo, 
Calif., to Premcor Refining Group's plant in Delaware City, Del., 
refineries with long histories of violations have also gone years without 
full inspections. 
• In Texas, which has more refineries than any other state, the Commission 
on Environmental Quality is responsible for inspections. But like the EPA, 
it has no air inspectors dedicated to refineries. Instead, the air inspectors, 
now down to 129 after steady declines since 1998, handle compliance for 
as many as 2,000 major industrial sources from Brownsville to Amarillo. 
• Since late 2000, the EPA has signed consent decrees with 11 oil 
companies, covering 42 of the 145 operating U.S. refineries. The 
settlements set deadlines for the companies to pay nearly $40 million in 
penalties and install an estimated $1.9 billion in pollution controls, among 
other requirements. In return, companies are released from liability for 
past violations. 
 The Star-Telegram report is noteworthy on two major fronts; 1) the article is 
extremely critical of the petroleum refining industry and the EPA; and 2) it serves as an 
example of exceptional media reporting of environmental crime. The article discusses the 
impact of political and economic decision-making which priorities dollar amounts over 
human health concerns. Overall, the presence of such an article may either be an anomaly 
or perhaps a sign of good things (more environmental crime reporting) to come.  
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Research Question #3 
  The purpose of research question #3 was to determine which factors appeared to 
lead to greater news coverage of federal petroleum industry violations. As indicated in 
the results from Chapter Six and in the preceding discussion, very few EPA cases (17) 
receive any attention from the mainstream news media. Although newspaper coverage of 
federal petroleum refining violations is lacking, the news articles that were reported 
suggest that certain factors lead to the likelihood of greater news article coverage. These 
major factors include: 1) initial data EPA case was filed by the EPA; 2) location of the 
violating refinery; 3) large penalty, compliance, and SEP amounts; and 4) refining 
capacity. Results from a content analysis of these articles were presented in Chapter Six. 
The following sections provide a discussion of the reasons why these factors appear to 
lead to greater news coverage of petroleum refining industry violations.  
 Initial Date of Case Filed by the EPA 
 Twelve of the seventeen articles (70.6%) appeared in news sources on the same 
day the EPA case was filed or in the week immediately following the initial case filing. 
No articles appeared on the day the case was settled by the EPA or on days immediately 
following the settlement. The violation data used in the news articles is more than likely 
gathered by reporters from the EPA through the Compliance and Enforcement Newsroom 
press release web page. If the EPA only provides press releases on the date the case was 
initially filed, it seems obvious why articles are reported in conjunction with the case 
filing date rather than the case settlement date. However, it appears reporters do not 
attempt to report anything more than what the EPA provides in their press releases. 
Perhaps if the EPA were willing to provide more detailed information to the press 
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regarding the violations, reporters would be more apt to provide more details in their 
articles. On the other hand, if reporters were interested in delving deeper into the 
violation cases, they would discover a great deal of information in available on the EPA 
web site. It appears likely that reporting is linked to press releases provided by the EPA. 
It is not possible to link news articles with past press releases because the EPA does not 
keep archives of past press releases prior to 2003. Future research should compare article 
information with information presented in EPA press releases. 
 Location of the Violating Refinery 
 News articles addressing federal petroleum industry violations were more likely 
to appear if a violating refinery was located in the community in which the news source 
was primarily distributed. Thirteen of the seventeen articles (76.5%) addressed violations 
committed by local refineries. While this factor may not be surprising, it suggests that 
some reporters/editors consider environmental violations more newsworthy than other 
reporters/editors. Even though most of these articles made connections with local 
refineries, only two articles addressed local concerns and interviewed residents. More 
importantly, it appears that environmental crime in the form of petroleum refining 
industry violations is considered a local concern, not a national concern. Unlike 
homicides and other violent crimes (which make national headlines), environmental 
crime is only viewed as a local problem and therefore, not worthy of national attention, 
despite the fact that there are more environmental offenses committed each year than 
homicides.  
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 Penalty Amounts 
 In sixteen of the seventeen articles (94%), EPA penalty sought, compliance 
amount, and SEP amount were reported. The cases reported on in news articles were all 
ranked as the top cases in terms of the amount of the penalty sought, the compliance 
costs, and SEP costs. News articles only reported on cases in which the total EPA costs 
exceeded $20,000,000. Consequently, cases involving lower penalties, compliance costs, 
and SEP amounts did not receive any coverage. It appears that the summation of the 
penalty amount sought, compliance amount, and SEP amount is the greatest factor 
leading to news article coverage of petroleum refinery industry violations. The problem 
with reporting only the most costly cases means that the seriousness of the case is 
determined by the penalty amounts and not by other more important factors. For 
example, harm to the community is not reported by the press nor measured by the EPA. 
High compliance costs are often associated with court costs and may not be directly 
linked to the seriousness of the case. In other cases, self-disclosure of violations led to the 
assessment of lower penalties by the EPA. Only the seven most costly cases received 
news coverage. Serious cases that did not receive penalties in excess of $20,000,000 in 
fines did not receive coverage despite the fact that many of these violations are 
responsible for a wide range of environmental and human health problems. Reporting of 
federal petroleum refining violations is directly related to economic issues and not human 
health issues.  
 Refining Capacity 
 News coverage of petroleum industry violations is more likely to occur in the 
violating company is responsible for a high percentage of the total United States refining 
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output. Bigger companies receive more media attention. While not surprising, these 
findings suggest that smaller companies in violation of environmental statutes are less 
likely to receive news coverage. Again, the seriousness of the offense is overlooked when 
reporting decisions are made.  
 Discussion Summary Research Question #3 
 The purpose of the news articles is to provide the public with newsworthy 
information. With the respect to the petroleum refining industry, it appears that 
information regarding violations is newsworthy if the EPA provides a press release and 
reporters do not need to investigate further. In addition, if a local refinery is in violation 
of environmental statutes, newsworthiness increases at the local level. The greatest factor 
related to reporting violations has to do with the amount of fines imposed by the EPA, 
rather than with the seriousness of the offense, which supports the findings presented by 
Randall and Defillippi (1987). If the offense did not result in more than $20,000,000 in 
fines, it was not newsworthy. Lastly, if the refining capacity of the company was 
relatively insignificant, the violations were not newsworthy.  
Research Question #4 
 The purpose of research question 4 was to examine whether or not petroleum 
refining industry penalty assessment decisions were affected by the racial and 
socioeconomic composition of the communities surrounding the violating facility and to 
ascertain whether other factors influenced EPA penalty assessment decisions. The results 
indicated that community race characteristics were not significant predictors of the 
preliminary or assessed penalty. Consequently, the present study examined whether or 
not community race, ethnic, and class characteristics impacted the departure from the 
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EPA penalty recommendation. For example, if the penalty initially sought by the EPA 
was $100,000, would the final penalty assessment be lower (or closer to the original 
amount sought) in minority and low-income communities and higher (greater than the 
original amount) in predominantly white and higher income communities. Several 
regression models were estimated in order to answer the revised question.  
 Voluntary Disclosure 
 Whether or not a company voluntarily disclosed a violation had no significant 
impact on the penalty difference. Although the EPA indicates that they are more lenient 
with facilities that self-disclose violations, the penalty differences in the present study did 
not lend support for leniency. This result however must be interpreted with caution due to 
the low number of companies that self-disclosed violations (21 cases or 13%). Other 
factors may have influenced EPA decisions despite the self-disclosure of the violations. 
The impact of voluntary disclosures on penalty assessments needs to be further 
examined, with the inclusion of a wider range of cases. 
 Number of Violations 
 Not surprisingly, companies with more violations received higher departures in 
the penalty amounts. In other words, the final penalty assessment was greater in cases 
involving multiple law violations. In cases involving just one violation, the final penalty 
assessment more closely matched the amount initially sought by the EPA. These results 
suggest that the EPA considers the number of law violations when making penalty 
assessment decisions.    
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 Percent Minority, African-American, Hispanic, and Below Poverty 
 The percent minority (African-American and Hispanic), the percent Hispanic, and 
the percent below poverty within a three-mile radius of the violating facility had no 
significant impact on the penalty difference. However, percent African-American within 
a three-mile radius did have a significant effect on the penalty difference. As indicated in 
Chapter Six, a one-percent increase in the African-American population decreased 
penalty departure amounts by more than 9 percent. Results from the present study 
indicate that the percentage of African-American residents in a community surrounding a 
violating facility appears to have an effect on penalty assessment decisions. Primarily 
African-American communities are again, negatively and disproportionately impacted by 
environmental decisions which further supports the growing literature on environmental 
justice. 
 Supplemental Environmental Project Amount 
 Of the 162 cases included in the present study, eight cases involved violating 
facilities located in communities with a greater than 60 percent African-American 
composition while fourteen cases involved violating facilities located in communities 
with a greater than 60 percent White composition. The average supplemental 
environmental project amount in primarily African-American communities was $3,571. 
The average supplemental environmental project amount in primarily white communities 
was $436,000 or one-hundred and twenty-two times higher than the mean supplemental 
amount in primarily African-American communities. Furthermore, the mean departure 
for primarily White communities was nearly $275,000, nearly twenty times higher than in 
primarily African-American communities ($13,608). These results indicate that the racial 
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composition of the community surrounding a violating facility have an impact of the 
penalty assessment decision-making process. However, due to the small number of cases 
involving high concentrations of African-American communities, these results must be 
interpreted with caution. These results however, do lend support for the underlying basis 
of the environmental justice movement which states that environmental hazards are 
disproportionately impacting African-American communities (Mohai and Bryant, 1992; 
UCC, 1987; Bullard, 1983) and that African-American communities receive less 
protection than predominantly white communities (Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns, 2004a, 
2004b; Lavelle and Coyle, 1992).  
Discussion Summary 
 The results from the present study contribute to the growing body of literature on 
environmental crime and justice and in particular, media coverage of environmental 
crime. To a large extent, the results presented in the preceding chapter are not surprising. 
Environmental crime in the form of petroleum refining industry violations is rampant. 
Almost every petroleum refining facility is in violation of one or more environmental 
statutes. Almost half of all facilities were in non-compliance of the Clean Air Act for 7-8 
quarters of 8. As indicated by the infrequency of EPA and state inspections, the EPA and 
states do not appear to have the financial or enforcement personnel to effectively inspect 
every facility in a two year time period. Most companies do not self-disclose violations 
even though the EPA has specifically stated it will be more lenient with companies that 
self-report violations. When compared to primarily White communities, African-
American communities are negatively and disproportionately impacted by penalty 
assessment decisions. Again, results indicate that environmental crimes committed by the 
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petroleum refining industry are widespread, just taking into consideration crimes known 
to the EPA.  
 Although environmental crimes committed by the petroleum refining industry are 
widespread, the mainstream mass media does not focus much attention on this type of 
crime. Over a six year time period, only seventeen articles from the nation’s leading 
newspapers reported on federal violations committed by the petroleum refining industry. 
Violations were rarely newsworthy unless they affected a local community and received 
fines in excess of $20,000,000. A content analysis of the seventeen articles reveals that 
what is reported may actually do more harm than good. There is no critical reporting on 
the industry as a whole. Environmental violations are reported in general terms. Human 
health consequences associated with the violations were either ignored or glossed over. 
Enforcement action was given a lot of hype in terms of quotes from EPA and government 
officials but no follow-up articles actually reported on enforcement results. The offenders 
are given more than enough press coverage and the ability to defend their actions, 
creating the image of a remorseful company that didn’t realize they were in violation of 
an environmental statute rather than creating the image of a knowingly negligent offender 
committing an environmental crime. Only two of the seventeen articles included quotes 
from the actual victims of the environmental violations. If the public is only exposed to 
environmental crimes committed by the petroleum refining industry via newspaper 
reports, it should come as no surprise that these violations are not regarded as serious 
crimes, if crimes at all.  
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusions 
 
When it comes to hazards in the workplace and the environment, the safe 
response, which has come to be accepted as scientifically responsible, is to 
say nothing and do nothing until we have clear proof that the hazard has 
actually made people sick (Davis, 2002: xvii).  
 
We wasted fifty years debating the role of cigarettes in causing cancer, 
and we cannot afford to waste another fifty years before we develop 
strategies to prevent environmental cancer and other avoidable diseases 
(Gaynor, 2002: x).  
 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to highlight the importance of studying 
environmental crime and to examine media coverage of environmental crime. The 
purpose of this final chapter is to; present the various challenges facing environmental 
researchers and activists and to offer solutions; offer suggestions for environmental 
legislation and enforcement initiatives; provide an overview of corporate and 
environmental crime research; introduce sources of environmental crime data; emphasize 
areas for future inquiry and analyses; suggest ways in which environmental crime can be 
presented to the public through mainstream media outlets as well as educational 
endeavors; and suggest a social justice approach to dealing with environmental crime. 
Challenges to Environmental Crime Research and Social Activism 
 Researchers engaging in environmental crime research and activists fighting for 
the environment and public health must take into consideration several challenges 
inherent in these pursuits. For one, the immediate consequences of an environmental 
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offense may not appear obvious or severe. Consequently, environmental crime does not 
fit most people’s perceptions of crime. Environmental crime researchers must, in addition 
to investigating and analyzing environmental crime data, provide rationalizations for their 
efforts. Furthermore, environmental crime is a complex issue that involves a wide range 
of problems, analyses, and so on. 
Environmental criminology deals with concerns across a wide range of 
environments (e.g., land, air, water) and issues (e.g., fishing, pollution, 
toxic waste). It involves conceptual analysis as well as practical 
intervention on many fronts, and includes multi-disciplinary strategic 
assessment (e.g., economic, legal, social, and ecological evaluations). It 
involves the undertaking of organizational analysis, as well as 
investigation of monitoring, assessment, enforcement, and education 
regarding environmental protection and regulation. Analysis needs to be 
conscious of local, regional, national, and global domains and how 
activities in each of these overlap. It likewise requires cognizance of the 
direct and indirect, and immediate and long-term consequences of 
environmentally insensitive social practices (White, 2003: 484).  
 
  Researchers must be prepared for the complexities associated with environmental 
crime research. Even if environmental crime researchers are successful in their empirical 
efforts, publishing may not be an easy task. Editors are often reluctant to publish studies 
which do not contribute to mainstream ideas of what constitutes crime. Activists must 
take into consideration the impact of corporate public relations campaigns which can 
influence the public’s perceptions of corporate wrongdoing. Grassroots activists rarely 
have the financial resources with which to battle multi-million dollar “greenwash” 
campaigns, utilized by corporations to present an environmentally friendly image. The 
following section provides a more extensive discussion of the challenges facing 
researchers and activists and suggests ways in which these challenges can be overcome.  
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 Conceptualization of Crime  
 Researchers are faced with a difficult uphill battle when they decide to research 
environmental crime. If, on the one hand, a researcher wanted to investigate homicide, 
s/he would not have to spend any time defending the selection of homicide as a crime, a 
serious infraction, or on definitions of what constitutes a homicide. On the other hand, 
environmental crime researchers not only have to define environmental crime, they must 
be prepared to describe in elaborate detail why environmental crime should be considered 
crime. The result is a theoretical and philosophical debate in the academic literature about 
the categorization and meaning of environmental crime. While environmental crime 
researchers are busy trying to “prove” environmental crime is indeed crime, corporations 
are continuing to illegally (and legally) release pollutants into the environment, and 
continuing to harm environmental and public health.  
 It is possible to change public conceptions about certain issues but not without 
extensive time and effort. For example, smoking cigarettes used to be considered socially 
acceptable. Political and public attitudes toward smoking have changed significantly 
since the 1960s, when the Surgeon General reported on the health hazards associated with 
smoking cigarettes. Numerous studies have shown that cigarette smoking causes various 
forms of cancer. Laws have been passed all across the nation that ban cigarette smoking 
in public venues. Anti-smoking campaigns have appeared in the mainstream mass media. 
But public attitudes toward smoking did not change over night. Even when it was 
extremely apparent that cigarette smoking caused numerous health problems, attitudes 
and behaviors toward smoking did not change immediately. We needed more proof and 
more studies to confirm that cigarette smoking was causing illness and disease.  
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 Illustrating the laborious effort needed to prove cause and effect, Devra Davis, 
author of When Smoke Ran Like Water: Tales of Environmental Deception and the Battle 
Against Pollution (2002: xi-xii) tells a story about a study involving the air inside 
airplanes:  
In the early 1980s, I reached a disturbing conclusion. I was working at the 
National Academy of Sciences on what turned out to be a four-year-long 
study of air inside airplanes. The investigation didn’t need to be four 
years, or even one. But Senator Daniel K. Inoyune had given the Federal 
Aviation Administration half a million dollars to fund a committee at the 
academy to find out why he kept getting sick after his regular eight-hour 
trips from Honolulu to Washington. . .I found out an easy way to answer 
the senator’s question. From a friend at the Environmental Protection 
Agency, I borrowed a clunky piece of equipment called a piezobalance, 
which could measure the weight of airborne particles smaller than a 
human hair, such as those produced by cigarette smoke. I set off on a 
flight to Paris. . .By the end of the flight, I had the answer. The levels of 
particles in the smoking and nonsmoking sections were identical. The 
senator kept getting sick because for all his lungs cared, he might as well 
have been sitting with heavy smokers. When I got back to Washington I 
eagerly told my boss at the academy the good news. ‘We don’t need to do 
a study for the senator!’ He looked at me nervously and asked, ‘What are 
you talking about?’ I suggested we could save time and money if we went 
out and studied a couple more planes and prepared a short report. After I 
explained what I had done, he sighed and shook his head. ‘You can’t do 
anything with those numbers. No committee reviewed what you were 
going to do. Nobody approved this project.’ Half a million dollars and four 
years later, the official academy study confirmed what I had found in a 
single flight. 
 
The purpose of Davis’s story is to illustrate the importance of extensive research in our 
society.  It is not enough to have a few studies linking environmental contaminants to 
human health problems. We need hundreds of valid and reliable studies to show that 
environmental pollution and toxins cause illness and disease. And even then, studies 
aren’t enough. The information must be made available to the public in an understandable 
format. Most people do not read academic journals. Consequently, in order to change 
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public perceptions as to what constitutes crime, information must be presented to the 
public in a “friendlier” format. For example, the movie Erin Brockovich had more of an 
impact on the public’s perception of environmental crime than any academic study 
because it reached millions of people and also entertained as it informed. 
Corporate and Political Backlash  
 Researchers and activists must take into account the vast amount of financial and 
political resources that corporations have to resist change. Corporations appear more 
willing to spend billions on touting an environmentally conscious image than to spend 
that money on actually changing their practices. “Greenwash” refers to public relations 
efforts to pose as friends of the environment through elaborate public campaigns. 
Corporations developed “greenwash” as a strategy for dealing with the community-based 
environmental movement. Corporate economists determined that it would be more cost 
effective to change the corporation’s image rather than their practices. In the past few 
decades, corporations have appeared to become more concerned with the environment. 
They have established environmental departments with environmental personnel; created 
environmental programs; presented environmentally-themed media campaigns; and 
instituted voluntary policies and principles. On the surface, their efforts seem 
conscientious. However, a more careful examination reveals that safer alternatives are 
ignored; the worst polluters are the biggest supporters of Earth Day; and researchers and 
activists are treading in shark-infested waters:  
In 2001, Elihu Richter and colleagues compiled a list of fourteen instances 
in the United States and other countries in which public health 
professionals were prevented from amassing data, where data were 
distorted by public relations concerns, where researchers were attacked or 
removed from their positions after warning of hazards, or where they were 
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blackballed or gray-listed from participating in research on the 
environment (Davis, 2002: 276).  
 
 What can researchers do? In order to counter corporate “greenwash”, researchers 
and activists must first educate themselves on the tactics utilized by corporations. There 
are a number of excellent resources available that describe the PR strategies employed by 
corporations, and that detail ways of dealing with such campaigns (e.g., Greer, J. and 
Bruno, K. 1996. Greenwash: the reality behind corporate environmentalism: Apex Press 
and Beder, S. 2002. Global Spin: the corporate assault on environmentalism: Chelsea 
Green Publishing Company). Changing perceptions of what constitutes crime, 
simplifying environmental crime research for public consumption, and challenging 
corporate “greenwash” are not easy tasks. But they are necessary for the sake of our 
environment and health.  
Suggestions for Environmental Legislation and Enforcement 
 One of the major criticisms of environmental legislation is its complex nature. 
One of the major criticisms of environmental enforcement is the lackadaisical effort 
given to criminal prosecution. While environmental crime prosecution has increased in 
recent years, there has been little progress in punishing or deterring corporate 
environmental violence. Regulatory agencies and the federal judiciary have been slow, 
cautious, or reluctant (if at all) to bring criminal charges against corporations for 
environmental crimes.  In most cases of environmental crime, the probability of being 
caught is extremely low. While the present study cannot unravel all of the problems 
associated with environmental legislation and enforcement, a number of suggestions 
regarding legislation and enforcement can be suggested. Across our nation, at the federal, 
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state, and local level, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges are faced with an 
overwhelming task: to investigate, apprehend, and prosecute criminal offenders, in 
addition to a plethora of other responsibilities. Crimes such as homicide, rape, robbery, 
and assault are readily defined and victims/offenders more easily determined as 
compared to defining environmental crime and ascertaining victims/offenders. Resources 
and personnel are often scarce. Consequently, the majority of criminal enforcement and 
prosecution efforts center on traditional forms of crime. In order to effectively reduce 
environmental crime, we need to not only raise the punishment but also increase the 
probability of catching offenders. Environmental crime investigation and enforcement 
may be given more attention if: 
1. Law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges were made aware of the grave dangers 
associated with environmental crime. 
2. Law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges were given special training in 
understanding environmental legislation, investigation, and enforcement. 
3. Policies were instituted that required the pursuit of criminal penalties for 
environmental crimes rather than administrative or civil penalties. Administrative 
and civil remedies would only be used if there were no criminal remedies 
available. 
4. Individuals from multiple agencies gave their commitment to environmental 
crime enforcement and prosecution.  
5. Punishments for environmental crime included not only substantial fines and the 
threat of incarceration but also required mandatory clean-ups and publication of 
judgments in the mass media. 
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The threat of serious punishment, including incarceration, is a more effective deterrent 
than the threat of a fine. But “deterrence only works if the sanction to which the potential 
polluter is exposed is much higher than the amount of damage he might he causing” 
(Sjogren and Skough, 2004: 59).  
Corporate and Environmental Crime Research 
 Recently, Lynch, McGurrin, and Fenwick (2004) examined the representation of 
white-collar crime and corporate crime research (1993-1997) in leading criminology 
journals, introductory criminal justice textbooks, and criminology Ph.D. programs. Lynch 
et al (2004) found that only 40 articles (3.6%) of 1,118 journal articles focused on white-
collar or corporate crime and the majority (30 or 75%) appeared in two of the disciplines 
most critical or liberal  journals. In each of the remaining mainstream journals, less than 
2.3 percent of articles pertained to white-collar or corporate crime. Lynch et al (2004) 
examined 16 textbooks and found that of the 9,410 total pages of text, only 425 pages 
(4.5%) were devoted to white-collar or corporate crime. Only 9 of 21 Ph.D. programs 
offered a class in white-collar crime; however, most only offered the program once every 
two years and none of these programs required the course for completion of the 
doctorate. Lynch et al (2004) clearly show that white-collar and corporate crimes are 
seriously neglected in the criminological literature, in textbooks, and in course offerings.  
As a subset of these crimes, environmental crimes received very little attention.   
 Environmental Crime Data 
 It is obvious that our discipline needs an environmental awakening. Researchers 
complain that there is a lack of data available to study environmental crime. However, the 
complaints stem from the fact that there is not a centralized system of environmental 
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crime data (Burns and Lynch, 2004). There is, however, a wealth of environmental crime 
data. Recently, Burns and Lynch (2004) published Environmental Crime: A Sourcebook 
which in addition to presenting an overview of environmental laws, the EPA, and 
enforcement practices, discusses in detail the various sources of environmental crime data 
which include data from EPA databases and non-EPA databases. The data are now 
readily available on the internet. In addition to the data described in Burns and Lynch 
(2004), there is a great deal of medical and epidemiological data that can be utilized to 
study human health and environmental crime. The following books also address ways in 
which environmental crime can be studied and analyzed:  
 Murphy, B.L. and Morrison, R.D., eds. 2001. Introduction to Environmental 
Forensics. Academic Press.  
   
 Gilbert, R.O. 1987. Statistical Methods for Environmental Pollution Monitoring. 
New York: John Wiley and Sons.  
 
 Drielak, S.C. 1998. Environmental Crime: Evidence gathering and investigative 
techniques. CC Thomas. 
 
 Current Environmental Crime Research 
  Environmental crime research is a relatively new area. Within criminology, much 
of this research has been conducted within the past decade. Researchers have spent a 
great deal of time defining environmental crime and justifying its existence as a form of 
corporate violent crime. In addition, much of the environmental crime research has 
focused on issues related to environmental justice and the disproportionate impact of 
environmental hazards on minorities and the poor. The existing body of environmental 
crime and justice research has created a solid foundation for future research. Applied 
research is necessary in order to utilize the data to create meaningful change.  
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 Future Environmental Crime Research 
 There is a wide range of future research endeavors relevant to environmental 
crime. According to Lynch and Burns (2004), the discipline of criminology needs to 
redirect the study of crime from street crimes to environmental and corporate crime. 
Research should examine federal and state enforcement trends of environmental laws and 
compare federal/state enforcement of environmental laws with federal/state enforcement 
of other laws. Cross-cultural comparisons of environmental law, crime, justice, and 
enforcement actions as well as an examination of public perceptions and media coverage 
of environmental crime in other nations would greatly enhance the environmental crime 
literature. Furthermore, research should examine the role of the government as a major 
source of environmental pollution and examine the role of organized crime syndicates as 
sources of anti-environmental activities including the illegal disposal of toxic waste. 
 The research on media coverage of corporate and environmental crime remains 
largely limited. The research that has been conducted clearly shows that the media under-
report corporate and environmental crime and do not treat corporate and environmental 
offenses as crime. Future research into the relationship between crime presentation and 
the media should take into consideration news media selection and production processes. 
In addition, research should examine the extent to which the news and entertainment 
media affect crime and justice attitudes, beliefs, and policies (Surette, 1992). The news 
media emphasizes extreme and dramatic cases. Environmental crime cases are extreme 
and dramatic stories. “Criminologists may well serve the commonwealth when they 
unmask the implicit biases of reporters and challenge the media to join the public 
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discourse concerning the seriousness and potential criminality of corporate violence” 
(Wright et al., 1995: 35). 
 Although previous research as well as the present study contributes to the growing 
body of corporate and environmental literature, specific questions still need to be 
addressed and/or further examined. In January of 2000, David R. Simon presented a 
specific agenda for corporate and environmental crime research in the American 
Behavioral Scientist (Simon, 2000). Specifically, Simon suggested that the following 
questions be examined in future research endeavors (2000: 10-11): 
1. What additional violations of corporate crime laws are exhibited by the various 
chemical and other firms that have been convicted of multiple violations of 
hazardous waste and other environmental laws? 
2. What are the specific relationships between the firms convicted of numerous 
violations of various environmental laws and the EPA? 
3. What influence do powerful petrochemical and other firms frequently convicted 
of environmental criminal violations have on Congress and on the executive 
branch of the federal government? 
4. What patterns of criminality exist in which government agencies and corporations 
violate environmental laws in a co-conspiratorial fashion? 
5. How are victims of environmental crimes presented in the media? In addition, at 
what point does the mainstream mass media become concerned enough about 
environmental crimes to give them major and/or sustained attention? 
6. What corporate interlocks exist between firms in environmentally related fields 
and other sectors of American capitalism? 
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 In addition to investigating these questions in future research, Simon (2000) 
suggests that it is necessary for criminologists to examine the relationship between 
environmental crime and major criminological theories. Future research should also 
continue to include the petroleum industry as a focus of inquiry. The petrochemical 
industry has a long history of criminal activity (Simon, 2000) and the EPA recognizes 
that the petroleum refining industry is one of the most polluting industries in the United 
States. Future analyses which include a larger sample of ECHO cases would more than 
likely lend greater support for the results reported in the present study. 
Environmental Crime Activism 
 Future environmental crime research is a good step in the right direction. 
However, research isn’t enough. Academics must be willing to become active 
participants in the fight to eliminate and reduce corporate and environmental violence. 
We must not only research, we must act. Beyond contributing to the growing body of 
environmental crime literature, criminologists can use their knowledge and expertise to 
educate the public and their students as well as to assist in grassroots activist efforts. 
 Newsmaking Criminology  
Newsmaking criminology refers to criminologists’ conscious efforts and 
activities in interpreting, influencing, or shaping the presentation of 
‘newsworthy’ items about crime and justice. More specifically, a 
newsmaking criminology attempts to demystify images of crime and 
punishment by locating the mass media portrayals of incidences of 
‘serious’ crimes in the context of all illegal and harmful activities; strives 
to affect public attitudes, thoughts, and discourses about crime and justice 
so as to facilitate a public policy of ‘crime control’ based on structural and 
historical analyses of institutional development; allows criminologists to 
come forth with their knowledge and to establish themselves as credible 
voices in the mass-mediated arena of policy formation; and asks of 
criminologists that they develop popularly based languages and 
technically based skills of communication for the purpose of participating 
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in the mass-consumed ideology of crime and justice. A newsmaking 
criminology invites criminologists and others to become part of the mass-
mediated production and consumption of ‘serious’ crime and crime 
control. It requires that they share their knowledge with the general public. 
(Barak, 1988: 566).  
  
 Academic involvement in the media process will not be an easy task. Chapter 
Two discussed the ownership of the majority of mass media outlets by just six 
conglomerates. Furthermore, many of the directors of these top media corporations sit on 
the boards of directors of some of the largest Fortune 500 companies and “interlock with 
each other through shared directorships in other firms” (Ruggiero and Sahulka, 1999). 
For example, NBC, Fox News, and Time Warner each have a board member who sits as 
a director on tobacco producer Philip Morris’s board. According to Parenti (1997), “the 
Boards of Directors of print and broadcast news organizations are populated by 
representatives of Ford, G.E., G.M., General Dynamic, Coke, ITT, IBM, Dow-Corning, 
Philip Morris, AT&T, and others. Given that distribution of ownership, it’s not surprising 
that the concerns of labor are downplayed in the media”. Criminologists can and should 
challenge the media elite and get involved in the media discourse on crime and justice. 
 To encourage the media to report on environmental crime, researchers with 
important information to present to the public need to establish ties with reporters and 
members of the press. MediaResource (mediaresource.org) is a non-profit organization 
which serves as a bridge between science and the media. According to MediaResource, 
journalists who contact the organization can get help at no charge in locating expert 
sources of information on science and technology to interview for their news and 
feature stories. MediaResource maintains a database of 30,000 scientists, engineers, 
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physicians and policy-makers who have agreed to provide information on short notice 
to print and broadcast journalists. The Society of Environmental Journalists 
(www.sej.org) is also a good source of contact for criminologists who want to get 
involved in the media process. SEJ's primary goal is to advance public understanding of 
critically important environmental issues through more and better environmental 
journalism.  
 A survey of print and broadcast media journalists found that more than half of the 
journalists (52%) admitted they avoided stories that were too complex (Pew Research 
Center, 2000). Researchers must be able to explain their findings to reporters in clear and 
concise terms.  In order to change public perceptions of crime, the mass media must not 
only report on environmental crime but also call it “crime”. Researchers can assist with 
the reporting if they are willing to do the work. Tenure is based on peer-reviewed 
publications. More than likely, trying to get a message out to the public via the mass 
media will do nothing to further one’s academic career. However, it will have a greater 
impact on our environment and health.  
 We know that the mass media play a critical role in the shaping of public 
perceptions of crime and justice. As criminologists, we need to become part of the social 
construction of public opinion of crime and justice. We cannot continue to leave the 
media construction of crime and justice solely to journalists and the media elite. In 
addition to establishing relationships with media personnel and providing different 
perspectives for crime news, criminologists can be more than just information sources. 
We can also produce crime information. Whether or not one agrees with the information 
presented by Michael Moore in his array of documentaries, it is apparent his efforts have 
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attracted a great deal of public attention. Criminologists can work with media personnel 
to not only supply information but also to produce our own media displays of information 
in the form of documentaries, news briefs, and the like. Furthermore, criminologists can 
participate in community-based events and projects which unite local concerns, research 
agendas, and media attention.   
 Environmental Education 
 In order for environmental crime to be better understood and recognized as crime, 
it needs to be a topic that is taught to individuals of all ages. It wasn’t until well into my 
criminology graduate program that I was even exposed to white-collar crime or corporate 
crime. Most colleges do not offer corporate or environmental crime courses. Most high 
schools do not even offer introductory criminology or criminal justice courses. 
Discussions of crime are generally included in social studies classes and are non-critical 
in nature. Children are told to watch out for strangers and to “Just Say No!”” I found just 
one book related to environmental crime aimed at middle and high school aged children 
(Arneson, D.J. 1991. Toxic Cops. Franklin Watts). There is very little research that 
examines criminal justice education at the elementary, middle, and high school level. 
This type of research is important. What are we teaching kids about crime? What we 
learn from the age of 5-18 has a major impact on what we believe as an adult. For 
example, I am constantly challenged by college students who have a difficult time 
accepting information I present even though it is based on academic research. Their 
opinions on certain topics were formed at a young age, by their parents, and were 
reinforced over fourteen years of school. When these same kids start college, they are 
dealing with huge life changes such as moving away from home for the first time, 
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exposure to more choices, etc. College isn’t just about learning, it is about adjustment. It 
is difficult for college professors to have an impact on student perceptions when we are 
competing against 1) parental opinions; 2) fourteen years of education; 3) and college 
adjustment issues. Consequently, criminal justice education should begin at a younger 
age.  
 According to Cheurprakobkit and Bartsch (2000), most public high schools do not 
offer criminal justice or criminology courses because they have difficulty finding 
qualified teachers and textbooks. Most instructors are law enforcement officers and the 
vast majority of textbooks are written for college students. General criminal justice 
education at the high school level is lacking; consequently exposure to environmental 
crime is not even on the radar.  
 Children may not need direct exposure to criminology and criminal justice 
education; however, they do need exposure to theories and perspectives that allow them 
to explore the relationship between humans and nature and our place in the natural world. 
Adults can benefit from environmental education as well. In general, science literacy in 
the United States is fairly low. According to Ross (1999), the public is overfed on 
information but starved for understanding. Knowledge of basic scientific concepts, facts, 
and vocabulary can make it easier for the public to follow new developments and 
participate in the public discourse on scientific issues (Ross, 1999).  
A Social Justice Approach to Dealing with Environmental Crime 
 People often believe that responsibility for health rests entirely with the individual 
and therefore, public health threats such as AIDS, smoking, heart disease, and cancer are 
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individual problems. Changing public opinion begins with informed education but 
awareness is just the beginning.  
Effective public opinion is more than widespread awareness of a social 
problem, more than desire for change, more than a planned demonstration 
on a busy street corner designed to draw the attention of otherwise 
uninterested passersby. Instead, effective public opinion is that expression 
of sentiment that actually reaches the systematic agenda of political 
decision-makers (Salmon and Christensen, 2003: 7).  
  
 A social justice approach means that researchers and activists work together to 
fight against environmental crime. It means examining the underlying structural causes of 
environmental crime. It means contributing to informed public participation efforts to 
eliminate environmental crime and injustice. There are a number of organizations and 
agencies which advocate a social justice approach to dealing with injustice. One such 
organization is the Citizen’s Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste. 
 Citizen’s Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste 
 The Citizen’s Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste (CCHW) is a non-profit 
organization founded in 1981 by Lois Gibbs, leader of the campaign at Love Canal. The 
CCHW is a national grassroots organization which strives to “translate scientific issues 
into plain language” (Gibbs, 1995: xxiii) and help activists fight for environmental and 
human health causes. In 1995, Gibbs published Dying from Dioxin. The first section of 
the book describes the health impacts of dioxin exposure with reference to EPA and 
several scientific studies. The second part of the book details how communities can 
organize and fight for their health. Gibbs emphasizes that just knowing the truth won’t 
stop corporations from polluting the environment; community organization is necessary. 
She also points out that the EPA is not an ally; in reality the EPA protects the right to 
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pollute by justifying standards that protect the interests of corporations and the 
government. According to Gibbs, successful organizations are community based, but 
nationally linked; they involve a large and diverse group of people; and offer up a clear 
and simple plan of action. The organization plan outlined in Dying from Dioxin (1995) is 
a must-read for grassroots activists. Gibbs knows that effective change begins at the 
community level:  
We need to make it more expensive to pollute than it is to change. 
Corporations will not change behavior because CEOS wake up one 
morning and decide that stopping pollution is the right thing to do. 
Corporations will change because people-consumers, voters, and workers-
convince them that they must change. This change will not come from 
Washington, D.C. It will not appear in the form of a top-down regulatory 
mandate. Changes in corporate behavior will only be accomplished 
through people working at the local level, then joining together at the state 
level, and then at the national level. Change depends on you, me, and 
millions of others who are willing to make that leap of faith from 
education into collective action (Gibbs, 1995: 293).  
 
The Time is Now 
I would like to advance another notion of responsibility, the same one we 
employ every day when, as parents, we send our children out with 
umbrellas if it looks rainy and lunch money if they will need to buy lunch. 
We don’t wait for them to go hungry or get drenched before we 
acknowledge that these misfortunes should be prevented. Yet when it 
comes to environmental health, we are expected to wait until after the fact-
until there are dead bodies or ill people to count-before taking action to 
prevent those and other harms from happening. Sometimes not even then 
(Davis 2002: xix). 
  
  Every day, thousands of people die from various diseases and illnesses. Their 
deaths may be recorded as the result of a heart attack, cancer, stroke or the like. But there 
will be no parentheses beside the cause of death to indicate (lived near a toxic waste site) 
or (high toxic levels in drinking water). Their deaths will not be counted as homicides or 
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negligent manslaughters. The media will not highlight their deaths in print or in 
newscasts aside from the obligatory obituaries. Every once in a while, if too many people 
living in close proximity to one another appear to be getting the same illnesses and same 
diseases, there might be some social, political, and media attention given to the 
community. If this community is disproportionately minority or low-income, the attention 
will be slow to come and action will be less likely to occur. Social, political, and media 
attention will only be maintained if the very people getting sick, who are also trying to 
raise families and support families, fight for the attention. No one else is going to come to 
the aid of those suffering unless they have something to gain from the assistance. If the 
local and federal governments are pushed hard enough to respond, then scientists will be 
called in to ascertain whether or not the illnesses and diseases are directly related to 
environmental contaminants or toxins. These scientific tests may take years and in the 
meanwhile, people living in these communities will continue to get sick. The majority 
cannot move away from the community. They do not have the financial resources to do 
so and their homes are losing value. The corporations responsible for the environmental 
toxins which are causing the community to suffer begin to cover their tracks and are able 
to spend millions to prepare defenses and to create PR campaigns that tout their 
environmentally friendly image. If tests eventually connect the human sickness and 
disease to the environmental toxins and the corporations responsible for their illegal (and 
sometimes legal) presence in the air, soil, or water, the battle is not over. In some cases, 
the corporation will be required to pay a fine. In most cases, the community will be 
forced to live with the consequences of the environmental contamination. The 
government rarely relocates communities due to environmental contamination. Rarely, if 
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ever, will a corporate leader face criminal charges for his/her involvement. Social, 
political, and media attention will be short lived if given at all. And the people will 
continue to suffer and die.  
 We cannot continue to ignore environmental crime and its lethal consequences. 
There is abundant evidence that industrial pollutants cause a significant number of 
diseases and illnesses in the United States. Researchers from multiple disciplines need to 
share their findings and unite in the fight for our environment and health. Research isn’t 
enough. We must also teach about environmental crime. We must give our time and 
expertise to the community. Community groups need the support of researchers to 
effectively challenge the power and financial influence of corporations. We must 
establish ties with local and national media to get our research into the public eye. We 
cannot waste anymore time. The time is now.  
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Appendix A: Nation’s Most Widely Circulated Newspapers 2004 
 
Newspaper Largest Reported  
Daily Circulation 
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution (Georgia) 606,246 
The Baltimore Sun (Maryland) 454,045 
The Boston Globe (Massachusetts) 707,813 
The Boston Herald (Massachusetts) 240,759 
The Buffalo News (New York) 282,618 
Chicago Sun-Times (Illinois) 963,927 
The Columbus Dispatch 361,304 
Daily News (New York) 786,952 
The Denver Post/Rocky Mountain News (Colorado) 750,593 
The Houston Chronicle (Texas) 737,580 
Los Angeles Times (California) 1,292,274 
Miami Herald (Florida) 416,530 
The New York Times (New York) 1,680,583 
Omaha World Herald (Nebraska) 242,964 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania) 402,981 
San Diego Union-Tribune (California) 433,973 
The San Francisco Chronicle (California) 540,314 
The Seattle Times (Washington) 462,920 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) 449,845 
St. Petersburg Times (Florida) 395,973 
Star Tribune (Minneapolis MN) 678,650 
The Tampa Tribune (Florida) 293,090 
The Times-Picayune (Louisiana) 281,374 
USA Today (National) 2,665,815 
The Washington Post (D.C.) 1,007,487 
 
Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation 
http://www.accessabc.com/reader/top100.htm 
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